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1Regulating world exchange 
1. Deeper interdependence 
Exchange is part of our social nature and thus critical for our species; as hu-
mans, we produce and exchange ideas, things and tasks, and by doing so, 
all involved are better off. In short, the collective cumulative innovation that 
gives shape to the progress of mankind is based on all forms of exchange. 
From gift-giving and barter to trade, from the time of our primitive ancestors, 
exchange has taken place, to the benefit of all. We can only guess when prim-
itive forms of trade became the dominant social norm. Barter among peoples 
is as old as human history. For millennia, we traded to improve our lives. By 
trading we can specialize and divide labor, and thus access an endless vari-
ety of goods (read things) and services (read activities) that we could never 
dream of producing by ourselves.1 In some way, these are part of the infra-
structure of our species. The origins of community are based on and shaped 
by exchange, and thus patterns of specialization and division of labor. Those 
patterns have made it possible to access the wide variety of goods, services 
and technologies that characterize advanced societies. 
Take the mobile phone, to pick a pervasive example. In essence, we cannot 
manufacture it at home, nor organize a global telecom network on our own. 
We need to enter into multiple transactions with private and public actors 
and therefore complex economies of scale in order to have affordable access 
to such technological devices (the good) and the related communication in-
frastructures (the services) allowing us to communicate with other people in 
any place, at any time, under price-cutting competition, almost everywhere 
on earth. The legal infrastructures of world exchange -and thus world trade 
law and institutions- allow us all to benefit from the specialization, division 
of labor and comparative advantages of the many-many others around the 
1  L. Read, I, Pencil, My Family Tree As Told to Leonard Read (2010).
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world, contributing to the production and distribution of a wide variety of 
components associated with those goods as well as the tasks associated with 
those services; certainly, this global fragmentation of production and distri-
bution also applies, in one way or another, to many of the things and activities 
that currently surround most of us. 
In short, trade is good for all. The driving force behind trade lies deep in the 
human collective experience. Trade and commerce are among the oldest 
human activities, serving as engines for wealth, innovation and change.2 To 
paraphrase Wonnacot, today, trade continues to serve the function of com-
munication, for we can imagine how much poorer we would be in an infor-
mational sense if, by decree, our borders were to be closed to the exchange of 
foreign goods and services.3 The development of commercial trade based on 
market principles from earlier forms of exchange, such as gift-giving or bar-
ter, was a long-term cumulative process. Appearing in archeological records, 
premodern patterns of trade have their origins in the exchange of seashells 
and obsidian, proving signs of trade in the form of seashell necklaces as far 
as 100 miles from the sea: from its beginnings in the prehistoric period to 
the emergence of the great trade networks linking Afro–Eurasia in the first 
millennium CE, the organization of long-distance trade, starting to take form 
in the early river valley societies that developed along the Tigris–Euphrates, 
Nile, and Indus, has shaped the evolution of mankind.4 The profit-seeking 
system of markets based on prices was not firmly established until the in-
dustrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries CE; however, the presence 
of some of these economic patterns in pre-modern trade should not be un-
derestimated, as evidences of markets in which prices were set by supply and 
demand appear between the late-fourth and mid-third millennium BCE. In 
any case, whether the modern capitalist system can be traced to around the 
16th century, as some scholars maintain, or can be seen as having developed 
progressively since the fourth millennium BCE, as others claim, the fact is 
that long-distance trade has had a pervasive influence on the ancient human 
adventure. Indeed, we have come a long way since the premodern exchange 
2  For a notable narrative history of world trade see W. Bernstein, A Splendid Exchange: 
How Trade Has Shaped the World (Atlantic, 2008).
3  G. Winham, The Evolution of International Trade Agreements (University of Toronto 
Press 1992) at 5.
4  See R. Smith, Premodern trade in world history (Routledge 2009).
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of seashells and the post-modern private megaport infrastructures with Ma-
laccaMax containerships crossing the oceans to keep the so-called global fac-
tory functioning.5
Today, trade in goods and services is managed through increasingly com-
plex and efficient supply chains, giving new shape to the traditional forms 
of trade; somehow, global supply chains have become the world economy’s 
backbone and central nervous system, as industrial production processes are 
increasingly fragmented around the globe.6 Nowadays, the fragmentation of 
manufacturing and the greater role of trade in industrial products that are 
further used in the production process (so-called trade in intermediates or 
trade in tasks) is changing the nature of production, and consequently the 
millennia-old landscape of long-distance trade. As a result, the world-scale 
production and distribution of goods and services can be fairly portrayed as 
one of the most powerful drivers for deep integration.7 In today’s global fac-
tory, the capacity to produce and distribute goods and services is dispersed 
through an expanding network of peripheral and core societies alike, regu-
larly spanning many countries, with each performing tasks in which there is 
a cost advantage. In short, the two-way trade in manufactures within single 
industries (so-called intra-industry trade) is a sign of our times,8 as multiple 
5  For the global transformations produced by the evolution of standardized container 
shipping see F. Broeze, The Globalisation of the Oceans: Containerisation from the 1950s 
to the Present (St Johns 2002). For a general account of the impact of the box see M. 
Levinson, The box: how the shipping container made the world smaller and the world 
economy bigger (Princeton University Press 2006). For the early visions on the potential 
benefits and efficiency of containerization see R. King, G Adams, & G. LLoyd Wilson, ‘The 
Freight Container as a Contribution to Efficiency in Transportation’, 1 Annals of the Amer-
ican Academy of Political and Social Science 87 (1936) : 27–36.
6  See i.e., G. Gereffi, ‘The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How 
U.S. Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks’. Commodity Chains and Global Cap-
italism (Greenwood Press 1994), at 95-122 and G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey & T. Sturgeon, 
‘The Governance of Global Value Chains’, 12 Review of International Political Economy 
1 (2005): 78–104.
7  P. Lamy, ‘The new mapping of international trade’, WTO | Speeches and statements (27 
February 2013). 
8  K. Sanyal, & R. Jones, ‘The theory of trade in middle products’, 72 American Economic 
Review (1982): 16–31, R. Lanz, S. Miroudot & A. Ragoussis, ‘Trade in intermediate goods 
and services’, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 93 (OECD 2009) and R. Johnson & 
G. Noguera, ‘Accounting for intermediates: Production sharing and trade in value added’, 
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stages of production are disaggregated across national boundaries, through 
organizational structures of densely networked companies.9
Not surprisingly, the size and magnitude of outsourcing, off shoring and in-
tra-firm trade today is simply unprecedented; high among the reasons for 
this phenomenon connected with supply chains is the intensification of tech-
nological progress: nowadays, manufacturers and retailers are able to man-
age complex international production networks that cover vast geographical 
distances as a result of quantum leaps in transportation and communications 
technology.10 In short, in recent decades, technological progress has signifi-
cantly reduced the costs and complications associated with long-distance 
trade.11 Fuelled by key advancements such as containerization and IT, world 
trade has led to the emergence of a global manufacturing system in which the 
production capacity of companies can be globally dispersed: with improved 
logistics and infrastructures for accommodating outsourcing and off shoring, 
supply chains now span more and more countries, with the concomitant re-
sult that nations are specializing in different branches of manufacturing and 
even stages of production within globally atomized industries. 
Technically speaking, supply chains are a dynamic method of organizing 
production internationally, involving the unbundling of stages of production 
across different countries based on cost advantages. Indeed, the globalization 
of supply chains has been around for almost as long as modern trade itself; 
however, what is different is both its qualitative and qualitative impact, due 
to the intense fragmentation of global production networks. In this regard, 
trade in intermediate goods now comprises close to 60 per cent of total trade 
in goods, being the average import content of exports around 40 per cent.12 In 
fact, the buoyancy of a country’s exports and its integration in global supply 
chains through imports of intermediates has a strong positive correlation; 
with increasingly complex supply chains in place, many production steps are 
86 Journal of International Economics (2012): 224–236.
9  G. Gereffi & M. Korzeniewicz, Commodity chains and global capitalism (Praeger 1994).
10  On changing production costs and geographical shifts in world production see in par-
ticular P. Krugman, ‘Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,’ 99 Journal of Political 
Economy 3 (1991): 483–499.
11 For a more general reflection see F. Cairncross, The death of distance: how the commu-
nications revolution is changing our lives (Harvard Business School Press 2001).
12  WTO, International Trade Statistics 2009 (WTO 2009) at 2.
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carried out across different countries, with semi-finished products or parts 
travelling along the production chain between these countries before leading 
to goods and services for final consumption. Under the exponential increase 
of trade in intermediates, components are produced and assembled in differ-
ent countries; in other words, production is multi-located.
Trade is thus no longer just about exports. As a direct result of these pat-
terns, the high level of import intensity in export production has created an 
unprecedented level of inter-dependency among countries engaged: in order 
to export, countries have to import. A wide variety of products ranging from 
machinery, robotics, electronics, vessels, aircraft, automobiles to clothing, or 
even food, to name some, are increasingly made across borders. Fewer and 
fewer products are actually ‘made in’ one place; as the world itself currently 
operates as a formidable global factory. Under multi-located production of 
goods, concepts such as ‘Made in’, ‘country of origin’ (thus read also rules of 
origin) are basically becoming obsolete. As Lamy explains, today’s goods and 
services are increasingly ‘Made in the World’.13
In this context, production is also more intensely connected to services than 
we tend to think. In this regard, as exports and imports are increasingly in-
terconnected, trade in services and trade in goods also follows the pattern. 
Today, a large share of the total domestic content of exports worldwide is 
generated by manufactured exports originates in the services sector. In fact, 
the share of services in world trade doubles when trade is measured in val-
ue-added, as the provision of industrial or commercial services is increas-
ingly subcontracted across countries, and thus comprises an ever growing 
component in the value of final products.14 Contrary to most conventional 
assumptions, in fact, some of these services are no longer purely operational, 
as they also increasingly deal with the strategic value of firms. In this regard, 
conventional wisdom suggests that companies should never offshore their 
core competencies or those processes that deliver strategic value to the firm. 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that value hardly gets any more strategic than 
13  P. Lamy, The mapping, op.cit.
14  For the different business models or trajectories that can develop in the outsourcing 
and offshore services industry see, in particular, M. Sako, Outsourcing and Offshoring: 
Key Trends and Issues, Background Paper prepared for the Emerging Markets Forum 
(Oxford Said Business School 2005).
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R&D itself, even these critical processes are relocated by off shoring R&D to 
foreign service providers.
Basically, supply chains have been intensely fueled by technological innova-
tion, in one way or another. Probably the rise of containerization combined 
with the intensive use of IT and logistics has implemented the greatest chang-
es in the economic geography of world production over the last four decades. 
In this regard, container shipping technology combined with IT has fueled 
trade in intermediates by significantly reducing freight costs and transit time. 
Before the 1970s, manufacturers needed to hold large stocks of components, 
as freight transportation was too unpredictable to risk that supplies from 
far off locations in the world would arrive on time to keep production lines 
functioning. However, with the advent of containerization in late 1970s, time 
transit as well as time spent in cargo exchange from one carrier to other be-
gan to significantly decrease. As trade in parts and components is the most 
time-sensitive trade flow in global supply chains, time acts in practice as a 
trade barrier.15 By sidestepping long delays at docks and time-consuming and 
expensive interchanges between land, sea and air carriers, the race for per-
vasive world off shoring and outsourcing under free trade rules was inaugu-
rated. Today, moving products around the globe is not only fast and easy but 
cheap, as freight costs have plummeted. As a logical consequence, informa-
tion systems and logistics tasks associated with fragmented production have 
become for many companies almost a routine operational function (sched-
uling production, storage, transportation, and delivery) in which off shoring 
and outsourcing parts and components is a given in the business landscape. 
The fascinating history of the box and its standardization is well document-
ed.16 Nowadays, most of the metal boxes moving around the world hold in-
dustrial products, as world trade is no longer dominated by essential raw 
materials or finished products. Manufacturers are routinely contracting with 
other companies the supply as well as just-in-time transportation services, to 
assure arrival of inputs exactly when needed. By taking wage rates, taxes, sub-
sidies, energy costs, and tariffs into account under tight cost-effective analy-
sis, along with considerations of freight costs and transit times, these compa-
15  Hummels, David L., & Georg Schaur. ‘Time as a Trade Barrier’, 103 American Eco-
nomic Review (2013): 2935–59.
16  M. Levinson, The box, op.cit.
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nies decide to import each component of their production line, or each retail 
product, from a variety of foreign supplies located elsewhere in the world. 
The buoyant economies of scale in production networks are illustrated by 
deep ongoing changes in transportation infrastructures, such as the steady 
expansion of containerization, the growing size of the box (from original 22-
foot to 44, and even 53-foot), the regular increase of the TEU capacity of the 
world’s fleet of containerships (with naval architects currently taking the 
measures of straits as part of their construction standards: e.g. MalaccaMax, 
PanamaMax, etc) as well as highly competitive mega-container ports offer-
ing efficient just-in-time services, access to large vessels and flows of cargo, 
and direct sailings to other transport hubs and nodes around the world. The 
importance of these transportation infrastructures, servicing supply chains 
by steadily reducing shipping costs and transit times, cannot be underesti-
mated. These industrial transport complexes and facilities are, in practice, 
the physical infrastructures of globalization, pushing forward deep economic 
integration through trade. 
Big technological transformations always readjust paradigms. Inevitably, in-
creasing trade in intermediate products, coupled with decreasing transport 
costs, and greater fragmentation of production require to change the conven-
tional narrative on trade, as well as traditional trade policies. In this sense, 
the realities of the disaggregated global factory suggest fine-tuning policy an-
gles, as conventional statistics still give misleading perspectives of the rele-
vance of trade to economic growth and income in all countries.17 There are 
strong reasons in this regard. To begin with, when trade comparative advan-
tages apply to tasks rather than final products, the skill composition of labor 
embedded in the domestic content of exports defines the development level of 
participating countries: for example, we know that labor-intensive assembly 
is regularly transferred to low-wage countries, thus reducing low-skill man-
ufacturing employment in industrialized countries. However, the big picture 
is more complex and subtle, as industrialized countries also have a short and 
midterm comparative advantage to perform high-skill tasks which logically, 
capture a larger share of the total value added, which happens to be better 
paid than assembling components. 
17  See A. Maurer & C. Degain, ‘Globalization and trade flows: what you see is not what 
you get!’, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD 2010-12 (WTO 2010). 
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To select a well-documented case study, traditional statistics suggest that the 
Peoples Republic of China has a comparative advantage in producing Apple’s 
electronic products;18 but using value-added measurement, that comparative 
advantage within global supply chains is still basically in assembly work. In 
this case, and many others, ‘Made in China’ basically means ‘Assembled in 
China’. However, what makes up the commercial value of Apple’s cosmopol-
itan products comes from the countries that preceded assembly, from design 
to the manufacture of components as well as the organization of logistics for 
the efficiency of that supply chain. Basically, as exported goods within world 
production networks may require significant intermediate inputs from man-
ufacturers, who in turn require significant intermediate imports, much of 
the revenue (or value-added) from selling those exported goods may end up 
abroad. This fact is particularly quite instructive of the need to find new ways 
to approach and conduct trade policies. 
Traditionally, we have looked at trade flows of goods and services across bor-
ders with quite simplified assumptions. However, as bilateral trade balances 
are often measured in gross terms, the trade deficits with final goods produc-
ers (or the surplus of exporters of final products) are exaggerated, as these do 
not deduct the value of foreign inputs. Paradoxically, statistics currently at-
tribute the full commercial value of imports to the last link in the production 
chain, even where the contribution made by that final link has been minimal. 
Needless to say that, with so much trade now involving foreign companies 
operating within national borders, and with components often criss-cross-
ing those borders several times, this method attributing the full commercial 
value to the last country of origin results in a significant measurement bias. 
The issue is not merely a simple curiosity as the former WTO DG has not-
ed, statistical biases pervert the true economic dimension of bilateral trade 
imbalances, leading to misguided perceptions and counter-productive policy 
decisions.19 
18  See J. Dedrick, K. Kraemer & G. Linden, ‘Who profits from innovation in global value 
chains?: a study of the iPod and notebook PCs’, 19 Industrial and Corporate Change 1 
(2010): 81–116, Y. Xing & N. Detert. ‘How the iPhone widens the United States trade defi-
cit with the People’s Republic of China’, ADBI Working Paper Series No. 257 (2010) and 
G. Linden, K. Kraemer & J. Dedrick, ‘Who captures value in a global innovation network? 
The case of Apple’s iPod’, 52 Communications of the ACM 3 ((2009): 140–144. 
19  See P. Lamy, ‘Made in China tells us little about global trade’, Financial Times (24 
January 2011).
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A few key lessons for policymakers are clear: trade barriers (whether at the 
border or behind borders) often disrupt entire global supply chains, as com-
ponents travel into one country and out of another to finally form the finished 
product.20 Nowadays, the interconnectedness of economies through complex 
production networks suggests more cooperative and less mercantilist ap-
proaches to traditional domestic trade policies as well as to multilateral, re-
gional and bilateral trade negotiations. In this regard, world production net-
works provide a meaningful measure and sense of the significant importance 
of trade openness to growth, employment and innovation. However, public 
representatives still lack the perspective and tools enabling them to fully ap-
preciate the extent of the changes under way, and thus enable them to more 
reasonably readjust their negotiating positions in current trade negotiations. 
The pervasiveness of supply chains in world trade would suggest revisiting 
the manner in which we compute trade flows, how we calculate jobs asso-
ciated with trade or bilateral trade balances; and in consequence also how 
we conduct trade policy. In short, in order to make the most of the resulting 
growth, diversification, employment and developmental opportunities, it is 
essential to look at and go beyond conventional trade policies. As mentioned, 
export-oriented low-skill assembly jobs have a value which is comparatively 
distinct from other export activities which are intensive in medium and high 
skill labor; in a world of trade in intermediates within fragmented production 
processes, we need to get specific, and look at the domestic value added or 
domestic content of exports, in order to get the measures right, and adopt 
informed policy decisions. However, the challenge also requires improving 
the quality of statistics to develop ways of allocating imports to users (indus-
tries) across nations. On this particular issue, more detailed bilateral trade in 
intermediate goods and services is a priority.21 
Along the lines of this policy, a joint initiative by the WTO and the OECD to-
gether with national statistics offices recently released a first public database 
20  See Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia: From trade in goods to 
trade in tasks (WTO-OECD-JETRO 2011). 
21  See R. Koopman, Z. Wang & S. Wei, ‘How much Chinese exports is really made in 
China –Assessing foreign and domestic value-added in gross exports’, NBER Working Pa-
per No. 14109 (2008) and also R. Koopman, W. Powers, Z. Wang & S. Wei, ‘Give credit 
to where credit is due: tracing value added in global production chains’, NBER Working 
Papers Series 16426 (2011).
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of world trade measured in value-added, aiming at the future elaboration of 
truly global input-output tables.22 Undoubtedly, these efforts to disclose the 
domestic content of exports (domestic value-added) are an excellent step 
in the right direction. However, they are still insufficient when it comes to 
avoiding ill-informed policymaking. As explained, today, the fragmentation 
of production processes often involves fragmentation within multinational 
enterprises across increasingly complex business networks; thus, measur-
ing the flows of value-added only reflects part of the picture of the impact of 
world trade in creating, distributing and redistributing wealth. The reason is 
clear and simple: to give just one paradigmatic example, a significant part of 
the value-added is often repatriated through transfer from the affiliate to the 
parent company (recorded as profit repatriation), or may reflect inter-cor-
porate or intra-corporate payments for using IP assets, all of which is not 
currently recognized as ‘domestically produced assets’ in conventional na-
tional accounts. Therefore, even the new estimates of value-added would not 
provide the full picture of where the revenue ends up at the end of the world 
production line. New statistics in this direction would contribute not only to 
informing efficient trade policies but would lead to more coherent policymak-
ing in multiple trade-related areas as well and, in particular, those associated 
with investment, technology and IP, including those regarding the taxation of 
intangibles (read IP). Only by doing so, is it possible to have the big picture of 
the reforms required to redistribute bigger pieces of the cake, including world 
revenue from intangibles (i.e. TRIPS) for example, through the legal and reg-
ulatory nodes of economic interdependence. 
2. Infrastructures of open trade
The pressing requirements of increased and improved empirical knowledge 
follow the long path of some wealth-enhancing economic theories and poli-
cies. Long before Ricardo conventionally framed the virtues of trade in modern 
terms, by devising the theory of comparative advantage,23 many entrepreneurs 
22  See OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added | TiVA (May 2013) and Implications of global 
value chains for trade, investment, development and jobs, G20 Report, (OECD–WTO–
UNCTAD, 6 August 2013). 
23  D. Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London, 1821, reprint, 
New York, 1965), pp.77–97.
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over time and across space naturally and spontaneously practiced specializa-
tion, division of labor and exchange. However, trade only began to be con-
sidered a public good a few centuries ago. In this regard, neither autarkic nor 
open trade policies are inherent to states. Thus, the mercantilist policies from 
the 18th century basically focused on the balance of trade, emphasizing export 
promotion, and placing import restraints above the level of exports. The first 
social reactions against such policies took shape later on, when economists and 
businessmen in England voiced their opposition to prohibitive customs duties, 
and urged the negotiation of trade agreements. These liberal ideas on trade 
led to the signing of a series of treaties, among them the Anglo-French Treaty 
of 1786, ending an economic war, as well as the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 
1860,24 which cut duties for a wide variety of products,25 and to some extent 
operated as a template for other European trade pacts.26 
However, the open trade policies of the second half of the 19th century, sig-
nificantly led by the English,27 were only to mitigate mercantilist policies for 
a few decades. The unilateral free trade that had begun with Prime Minister 
Robert Peel’s moving away from mercantilism, by repealing the Corn Laws 
in 1846, was certainly a highly remarkable feat. In fact, the British embrace 
of unilateral free trade at that time was to remain basically unchanged until 
the 30s of last century, surviving both protectionism and trade bilateralism, 
and even facing the emergence of Germany and the US.28 In any case, conti-
24  See A. Iliasu, ‘The Cobden–Chevalier Commercial Treaty of 1860’, 14 The Historical 
Journal (1971): 67–98 
25  See P. Wonnacot (ed.) & M. Allais, ‘International Trade’, Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(24/01/2014),
26  In practice, the Cobden-Chevalier network contributed to the deepening and diversi-
fication of infra European trade but was ideologically more properly identified with recip-
rocal liberalization than to the free trade doctrine. See M. Lampe, ‘Effects of Bilateralism 
and the MFN Clause on International Trade: Evidence for the Cobden–Chevalier Network, 
1860–1875’, 69 The Journal of Economic History (2009): 1012–1040.
27  On the fascinating and puzzling history of Britain’s unprecedented unilateral repeal 
of the protectionist Corn Laws in 1846 see, in particular, C. Schonhardt-Bailey, From the 
Corn Laws to Free Trade: Interests, Ideas, and Institutions in Historical Perspective 
(MIT Press 2006).
28  See Commercial Policy in the Interwar Period: International Proposals and Nation-
al Policies (League of Nations 1942) and Ch. Kindleberger, ‘Commercial Policy between 
the Wars’, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume 8 (Cambridge University 
Press 1989), chapter 11, section 3 in particular.
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nental European countries entered into a period of protectionism at the de-
pression starting in the 1870s that largely did not turn around until the end 
of the Second World War. To put things in context, however, it is interesting 
to recall that between 1815 and 1914, according to historians, volumes of ex-
ports multiplied approximately forty-fold in Europe, whereas during the 18th 
century they had trebled at the most.29 Nonetheless, from the early decades 
of the 20th century, political and economic nationalism as well as the Great 
War (1914-1918) exacerbated protectionist policies without respite until the 
end of the Second World War. Liberal trade ideas got briefly on board once 
in the inter-war period, with the first multilateral attempt to improve trade 
cooperation in 1923, when more than 30 nations concluded an international 
conference for the unification of customs formalities, paving the way for the 
convention for the abolition of import and export prohibition and restriction, 
signed at the world economic conference of 1927, in Geneva (2-23 May 1927). 
However, the resurgence of economic nationalism after the Great War was to 
refuel protectionist policies through to the crash of 1929 and until the end of 
the Second World War.30 In this context, and particularly following the pas-
sage of the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930, countries literally entered 
into a race to raise trade barriers without constraint, declining trade flows 
and investments, promoting increasing confrontation and thus inaugurating 
a new term for the occasion: beggar-my-neighbor policies.31 From there, open 
trade would have to wait to the end of the Second World War to gain policy 
space and momentum, under the leadership of the Roosevelt administration. 
As Drahos and Braithwaite frame it, the impact of the beggar-my-neighbor 
policies between the late 19th century and mid 20th century was so severe that 
the commitment to WTO still seems historically resilient today in its caging 
of ‘the tiger of mercantilism’.32 
29  For an analysis of European trade policy in the nineteen century, when the flourishing 
of liberalism in international trade theories and the development of modern protectionism 
see P, Bairoch, ‘European Trade Policy, 1815–1914’, The Cambridge Economic History of 
Europe–The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies, 
(Cambridge University Press 1989) at 1-160.
30  See G. Winham, International Trade, op.cit.p.26-27.
31  For the classical (and still contemporaneous) account of the inter-war years see K. Polanyi, 
The Great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time (Rinehart 1944).
32  See J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University 
Press 2000) at 206.
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Nevertheless, the case for free trade was not initially and exclusively argued 
for economic reasons but to also contribute to peace and stability as well.33 
Certainly, trade has not only begun to be considered a peace-keeping policy 
tool in recent decades.34 The case for nondiscriminatory trade today is not 
dissimilar from those earlier explanations, as it not only generally underlines 
the importance of reducing inefficient allocation of resources produced by 
protectionism but also that predictability and stability for business trans-
actions to proceed.35 However, policy measures in this direction would only 
reach a multilateral treaty making after two world wars, by convening the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (1947-1948) of which 
the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) is a long-standing enor-
mous contribution. The first steps to erect the current world trading system 
began at that UN conference which aimed to take trade back to work or, in 
other words, to mitigate the damage brought about by autarkic policies.36 
Taking the lessons of the 30s seriously, the architects of the postwar inter-
national order set up the incipient legal infrastructures to increase economic 
cooperation and integration, in order to avoid repeating the dire experiences 
of the beggar-my-neighbor policies from the inter-war period. As Ruggie ex-
plains, their task was to design a treaty-based regime that would safeguard 
and even aid the quest for domestic stability without triggering the mutually 
destructive consequences of that period.37 However, the international orga-
nization that the UN Conference on Trade and Employment was destined to 
create never saw the light of day in its original form −as the International 
Trade Organization (ITO) − because the US government was unable to pass 
its Charter, known as the Havana Charter, through a reluctant US Congress, 
and it was finally withdrawn by the Truman administration, after the 1950 
33  See generally F. Trentmann, Free trade Nation: The forgotten virtues of free trade 
(Oxford University Press 2008).
34  World Trade and the Doha Round, Final Report of the High-Level Trade Experts 
Group (May 2011) at 2-3, paragraph 12.
35  G. Winham, International Trade, op.cit.p.129.
36  For a well-documented official exploration of such adventure see C. VanGrasstek, The 
History and Future of the World Trade Organization (WTO 2013).
37  See J. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberal-
ism in the Postwar Economic Order’ (1982): 379–415 and J. Ruggie, ‘Embedded Liberal-
ism Revisited: institutions and progress in international economic relations’, Progress in 
international relations (University of California 1991) at 201–234.
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election.38 Reasonably, at this critical historical juncture after the war, other 
signatories did not have enough confidence to go forward without US back-
ing.39 
However, in the meetings of that Conference, an unadverted critical step was 
taken: by the time the trade delegates had returned to their countries, a small 
global network of public representatives and officials in favor of open trade 
had been created, with long-lasting positive consequences.40 With the uncer-
tain ratification of the ITO charter pending, this new breed of trade diplomats 
−mostly veteran trade policy officials− managed to strategically negotiate a 
new agreement for the progressive elimination of trade tariffs and quotas by 
directly and extensively borrowing from chapter IV (‘Commercial Policy’) of 
the Havana Charter: the GATT. With a few exceptions, the drafters of the 
GATT were the very same people who had negotiated the ITO Charter. In 
fact, the two sets of meetings at which the GATT text was negotiated –in Lake 
Success, New York, in early 1947 and in Geneva in the late summer of 1947– 
were extensions of ITO preparatory Committee meetings, serviced by the 
same delegations and chairmanship.41 In essence, the final text of the GATT of 
1947 equated nondiscriminatory trade (or so-called MFN-based trade) with 
a public good and reinforced the policy prescription, not without a generous 
amount of small print. The fine piece of clockwork legal technology that re-
sulted would inaugurate the post-war international order for non-planned 
economies, and would soon expand its coverage through a series of multilat-
eral trade negotiations (MTN), giving birth to the world trading system and 
its long quest for trade liberalization.
The ultimate decisions regarding the Geneva round were made by national 
38  On the failure of the ITO see, in particular, C. Wilcox, A Charter for world trade 
(Macmillan 1949), W. Diebold, ‘The End of the ITO’, 16 Essays in International Finance 
(1952) and T. Zeiler, Free Trade, Free World: The Advent of GATT (University of North 
Carolina Press 1999). 
39  See S. Dryden, Trade Warriors: USTR and the American crusade for Free Trade 
(Oxford University Press 1995) at 24-31 and T. Zeiter, Free Trade, Free World, op.cit.
pp.147–164.
40  See P. Haas ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordi-
nation’, 46 International Organization 1 (1992): 1–36.
41  R. Hudec. ‘The GATT legal system: a diplomat’s jurisprudence’, 4 Journal of World 
Trade Law (1970): 631.
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security officials, not free-trade experts, as national security forced a ‘con-
ciliatory approach’, particularly in Anglo-American trade relationships (i.e. 
British Imperial preferences).42 Paradoxically, however, the impact of cold 
war on the development and workings of GATT is not commonly considered 
in most of histories of GATT, and neither on historical accounts of the cold 
war itself:43 however, as McKenzie has explained, GATT did not obviously 
function in isolation from the Cold War, as liberal trade and increased pros-
perity were seen as ways to protect capitalist democracies against communist 
encroachment.44 To paraphrase this historian, the Cold War was a midwife 
at the birth of the GATT.45 In any case, the fact that national security played 
a key role in current accounts of GATT history does not challenge the im-
portance of those original GATT insiders −and particularly those who had 
been at Havana negotiations− for the construction of a viable regime for trade 
liberalization. In fact, it is the personal bonds forged in the Havana negoti-
ations that laid down the basis of the long-term policy venture that would 
progressively transform the GATT rules into something different from the 
type of trade agreements that had been around for decades: a creative and 
sophisticated dynamic treaty-based regime for the reduction of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers.46 
Decades later, the original efforts of this remarkable group of trade delegates 
would culminate with the final inception of the WTO, emerging in 1994 from 
the eighth (and most ambitious) of a series of multilateral trade rounds pur-
sued within the GATT, and thus making the circle round 47 years later. The 
social transformations in economic growth, income and employment that 
have been produced in recent decades resulting from the functioning of this 
legal and institutional infrastructure of world exchange is probably incom-
42  T. Zeiler, ‘GATT Fifty Years Ago: US Trade Policy and Imperial Preferences,’ Business 
and Economic History 26 (1997): 714.
43  For notable exceptions see, in particular, L. Haus, Globalizing the GATT: The Soviet 
Union’s Successor States, Eastern Europe and the International Trading System (Brook-
ings Institution 1992), T. Zeiler, Free Trade, Free World, op.cit. and, more recently, F. 
McKenzie, ‘GATT and the Cold War: Accession Debates, Institutional Development, and 
the Western Alliance, 1947–1959’, 10 Journal of Cold War Studies (2008): 78–109.
44  F. McKenzie, ‘GATT and the Cold War, op.cit.p.79.
45  F. McKenzie, ‘GATT and the Cold War, op.cit.p.81 and 86.
46  See A. Chayes & A. Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty: Compliance with interna-
tional regulatory agreements (Harvard University Press 1995) at 279. 
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mensurable. In any case, and using standard figures, the GATT/WTO regime 
has paved the way for the most rapid and sustained economic expansion in 
history, with estimates reaching $18.3 trillion of dollar value of merchandise 
exports, and $4.3 trillion in services exports.47 In short, the GATT/WTO re-
gime has been the key institutional driver for the steady postwar erosion of 
trade barriers. Obviously, the formidable economies of scale unleashed, and 
the wide variety of affordable quality goods and services available in our so-
cieties today would have not reached the shores without this infrastructure. 
Nowadays, the case for open trade is robust. As conventional economic litera-
ture suggests, trade encourages economies to allocate resources to where they 
can be most productively used. In addition, higher trade growth rates tend to 
reflect a link between prosperity and open trade.48 In fact, as the high-level 
trade experts group appointed in 2010 by WTO to help overcome the Doha 
stalemate explains, for the last four decades of the 20th century, those de-
veloping countries that grew at 3% or greater annual growth had a commen-
surate increase in trade; by contrast, those that stagnated or declined also 
had atrophied links to the global economy.49 With regard to OECD countries, 
on the other hand, a 10% increase in trade exposure (trade as a percentage 
of GDP) is associated with a 4% increase in labor productivity (output per 
working-age person); thus, as wages are linked to productivity growth, great-
er openness also implies rising standards of living.50 
But more importantly, not only has trade been a key driver for economic 
growth but it has literally lifted hundreds of millions of people out of pover-
ty in developing countries since the original inception of the world trading 
system;51 trade reduces poverty on average and in the long run.52 Last but not 
47  See International Trade Statistics 2013 (WTO 2013 WTO).
48  See generally, World Trade and the Doha Round, Final Report of the High-Level Trade 
Experts Group (May 2011), and pp.2-3, paragraph 10 as well as p. 14, paragraph 1.9 in particular.
49  See World Trade and the Doha Round, op.cit. at 2, paragraph 10. 
50  See e.g. The Sources of Gro wth in OECD Countries (OECD 2003) and Seizing the 
benefits of trade for employment and growth, OECD– ILO–World Bank–WTO, , Final 
Report (11 November 2010).
51  See World Trade and the Doha Round, op.cit. at 14, paragraph 1.9.
52  Among the large body of empirical work on the topic see, in particular, A. Winters, N. 
McCulloch & A. McKay, ‘Trade Liberalisation and Poverty’ 42 Journal of Economic Liter-
ature 1 (2004): 72-115.
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least, the efficient allocation of resources promoted by trade has to be includ-
ed into the equation of increasing standards of living, as open trade renders 
goods cheaper, and more diverse and sophisticated than at any previous mo-
ment in history.53
In 1947, the economist Jacob Viner wrote the following lines: ‘there are few 
free traders in the present-day world, no one pays attention to their views, 
and no person in authority anywhere advocates free trade’.54 This adviser to 
the Department of State during post-war trade negotiations could not have 
dreamed how the GATT insider network would manage to evolve in such a 
context; at that time, the GATT was indeed not particularly promising, as it 
lacked a proper institutional structure and had to be applied provisionally 
for five decades, in order to avoid domestic ratification procedures, due to 
self-evident difficulties in passing the text through parliaments.55 But in the 
curse of decades, this ‘Cinderella’ of the post-war world’s international re-
gimes -as its first executive secretary liked to portray GATT-56 progressively 
transformed itself into a structural regulatory node for economic integration, 
and thus a solid institutional foundation for the global market economy in 
the making.57 
Markets do not exist outside the state, and therefore outside society.58 It is no 
accident that most if not all mainstream interpretations of the market econ-
omy paradigm have finally turned their gaze on the critical importance of 
rules and institutions in order for markets to function effectively.59 In short, 
53  World Trade and the Doha Round, Final Report of the High-Level Trade Experts 
Group (May 2011) at 2-3, paragraph 11.
54  J.Viner, ‘Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter’, 25 Foreign Affairs (1947): 
613.
55  R. Hudec. ‘The GATT legal system, op.cit.p. 633.
56  W. White, The Achievements of the GATT, Address at the Graduate Institute of Inter-
national Studies, Geneva, December 1956 (GATT 1957).
57  J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization Constitution and jurisprudence (RIIA 
1998).
58  K. Polanyi, The great transformation (Rinehart 1944). 
59  For neoinstitutional economics and the ‘rediscovery’ of institutions for markets to 
function properly see D. North, Institutions, institutional change, and economic perfor-
mance (Cambridge University Press 1990) and O. Williamson, ‘The new institutional eco-
nomics: Taking stock, looking ahead’ 38 Journal of Economic Literature (2000): 595-613.
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regulation is what ensures that markets exist as well as function efficiently. 
In this regard, the law of the GATT/WTO regime and its Rounds has proved 
an essential tool for global open markets. By establishing a stable legal frame-
work for managing non-discriminatory trade, the world trading system has 
lowered tariffs to almost negligible levels, and has successfully inhibited 
protectionist pressures as well. Notwithstanding the significance of most of 
GATT rounds, and particularly the Kennedy (1963-1967) and Tokyo Round 
(1973-1979),60 the watershed for trade governance was the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1992) in which the agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
was established. 
The WTO is probably the most successful treaty-based regime of the post-
1945 period, and thus of the most recent history of universal international or-
ganizations. In a nutshell, its quasi-universal membership (160 WTO Mem-
bers and counting) is bound by a series of common disciplines in several key 
areas such as (1) trade in goods, (2) trade in services and (3) IP protection, as 
well as (4) binding dispute settlement and (5) regular external monitoring of 
domestic trade policies. Last but not least, the WTO defines itself in its own 
foundational agreement as a permanent forum for progressive trade liberal-
ization (read international lawmaking).61 Significantly, this creative mecha-
nism for the cooperative reduction of trade barriers has currently produced 
more than 30,000 pages of treaty law, including annexes and ‘schedules of 
concessions’.62 
There is nothing equivalent within other functional multilateral organiza-
tions. From a comparative international law perspective, the characteristics 
of this third generation’s regime are groundbreaking not only in regulatory 
coverage but institutional terms: a ‘single package’ approach to most of its 
legal instruments, the exclusion of reservations, an automatic and binding 
60  On pre-WTO MTNs see, in particular, E. Preeg, Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis 
of the Kennedy Round under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Brookings 
Institution 1970) and G. Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation 
(Princeton University Press 1986).
61  See Article III.2 of the WTO Agreement.
62  On the transformative challenges for the administrative infrastructures of developing 
countries resulting from the move of the world trading system from border barriers to in-
ternal barriers see, in particular, J. Finger & P. Schuler, ‘Implementation of Uruguay Round 
Commitments: The Development Challenge’, 24 World Economy 4 ( 2000): 511–525.
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jurisdiction for all Members −authorizing suspension of trade concessions− 
and a dynamic forum to advance rule-based progressive liberalization. From 
both a comparative and historical perspective, these legal developments in 
contemporary governance are revolutionarly, although sometimes taken for 
granted. In this regard, when comparing the minuscule budget and resources 
of the WTO with some non-economic UN agencies −not to say, the Bretton 
Woods institutions −, it is fair to make some kudos for its performance: in es-
sence, the WTO is a prime example of low-cost but high-quality governance. 
In fact, the current annual budget is less than CHF 200,000,000, and 700 
staff on regular budget, for its world-class Secretariat.63 In short, this regime 
is no doubt one of the most efficient regulatory structures of global gover-
nance nowadays. 
The WTO is a fascinating culmination of the collective project, initiated half a 
century ago around MFN-based trade, which currently puts flesh and bones 
on the progressive construction of a world market under common rules, 
through incremental layers of multilateral trade law. Within this long-term 
endeavor, it is reasonable to argue that the highly technical corpus of WTO 
law is a critical facility for such efforts to be progressively and effectively con-
ducted.64 The public good nature of a strong world trading system should 
not be underestimated, as we are better off with multilateral decision-mak-
ing within WTO. Obviously, we can question the content of the current rules 
or its decision-making processes, as this book does to some extent in fact. 
However, it is reasonable to argue that sticking to this key infrastructure of 
global governance is in the interests of all, notwithstanding the imbalances 
deserving reconsideration and reform. For this reason, as Gary Sampson puts 
it, achieving a common understanding on the role of the WTO is an absolute 
63  See ‘Secretariat and budget’, World Trade Organization-Annual Report, Chapter 
8 (2014). On the role of the GATT/WTO Secretariat in trade negotiations and the long-
term development of the world trading system see in particular H. Nordstrom, ‘The World 
Trade Organization Secretariat in a Changing World’, 39 Journal of World Trade 5 (2005): 
819–853.
64  For the flavour of its high degree of legal sophistication see WTO Analytical Index, 
Guide to WTO Law and Practice, volume 1 & 2 (World Trade Organization 2007). Within 
the expert legal literature see, specifically, R. Bhala, Modern GATT law (Thomson Sweet & 
Maxwell 2005) and P. Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Com-
mentary (Oxford University Press 2005).
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priority.65 The WTO law and architecture raises multiple conundrums and is 
certainly not free from flaws and contradictions. However, as a universal in-
ternational organization, it functions under high-quality legal and procedural 
standards on top of a healthy regulatory dynamism. Paraphrasing Kenneth 
Dam, the law of the world trading system has never been a static set of sub-
stantive rules.66In this context, the regime has some leverage for adaptation 
and change, as flexibility from within has been more than just a buzzword 
since its inception. 
Generally, pragmatic lawmakers value flexibility for the simple reason that 
they are not prophets;67 flexibility tends to be a key element of regulatory de-
sign in any given legal system and, as such, a policy option oriented towards 
its sustainability. In this regard, by incorporating a wide variety of escape 
clauses, safeguards and exceptions which make it fairly adaptable to chang-
ing domestic circumstances, the GATT regime was a prime example in this 
respect. From the perspective of comparative international law, it originally 
gave form to a very flexible body of rules, incorporating ‘pressure valves’ to 
strategically reduce domestic tensions caused by trade adjustment, economic 
crises and others;68 this flexibility, together with regulatory dynamism, have 
been key features of the long-term effective performance of the GATT/WTO 
regime. 
For half a century, flexibility and rule-based dynamism have been core ele-
ments in the institutional design of the world trading system for half a cen-
tury. Within the regime, tensions resulting from bilateral disputes can be 
solved on ad hoc basis as well as incorporated to its rulemaking agenda in 
order to work out generalized solutions.69 In this regard, in fact, the WTO is 
now legally framed as a permanent negotiating forum in article III.2 of WTO 
agreement, incorporating the practice of GATT MTN Rounds into treaty ob-
65  Gary Sampson (ed), ‘Overview’, The role of the World Trade Organization in Global 
Governance (Cambridge University Press / United Nations University 2001) at 16–17.
66  K. Dam, The GATT Law and International Economic Organization (University of 
Chicago Press 1970) at 4–5.
67  I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International economic law (Martinus Nijhoff 1992) at 42 
–43.
68  R. Hudec, ‘Adjudication of International Trade Disputes’, Thames Essay nº1 (Trade 
Policy Research Centre 1978) at 31–33. 
69  G. Winham, The Evolution, op.cit.p.128. 
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ligations and thus embedding regular lawmaking within the regime. In this 
way, as Hoekman and Kostecki explain, the WTO functions as a multi-issue 
barter exchange.70 In multilateral trade negotiations, in principle, the ten-
sions over unsatisfactorily regulated issues, and over gaps or loopholes, can 
be channeled into its permanent negotiating forum, which is always able to 
amend the rules of the game, regulate ex novo or both. Later on, coming full 
regulatory circle, the dispute settlement mechanism is now available to ad-
judicate the outcomes and, in doing so, channel tensions towards eventual 
re-regulation in later rounds. In short, flexibility and regulatory dynamism is 
part of the WTO inner rationale. 
Nonetheless, the intensity, breadth and range of issues involved in multi-is-
sue barter exchange are qualitatively distinct from those of the pre-WTO 
days. MTN Rounds have become more drawn-out and difficult to conclude, 
not only for the increase in the complexity of issues but in the participants 
required to build consensus: the Kennedy Round was completed in 3 years 
(60 countries); the Tokyo Round took 6 years (102 countries), and the Uru-
guay Round lasted 8 years (133 countries). As a result, the WTO Millennium 
Round failed spectacularly in 1999 (Seattle), and the Development Round 
beginning in 2001 (Doha) is still in a loop. The task of concluding the Doha 
Development Round has become harder with 160 WTO Members at the table, 
as a highly-efficient dispute settlement mechanism is now ready to enforce 
the outcomes. 
But is WTO dying from success? Evidently, producing balanced trade-offs in 
negotiations has become more complex. In fact, progress in Doha negotia-
tions is proving difficult, particularly in addressing the concerns of develop-
ing countries, who are not merely rule takers anymore, and now in fact open-
ly question unbalanced elements of the Uruguay Round, such as the TRIPS 
agreement among others.71 As Silvia Ostry puts it, the WTO itself was a vir-
tually last minute piece of the Uruguay Round, in which the deal was pretty 
much take it or leave it for developing countries, since the WTO agreement 
consisted of a single undertaking: the so-called ‘package deal’ and developing 
70  For an analysis of the negotiating forum as a multi-issue barter exchange, see B. Boek-
man & M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trade Organization: From GATT 
to WTO (Oxford University Press 1997) at 56 –83.
71  See J. Braithwaite and P.Drahos, Global Business, op.cit.pp.3–4.
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countries finally took it, notwithstanding its profoundly transformative im-
plications.72 It is partly as a result of this experience that the battle to deliver 
meaningful commitments in the Doha Round now proves so difficult, and the 
state of play does not look particularly encouraging. As a result, WTO is at a 
critical juncture, as the Round appears to be on hold after 13 years of glob-
al trade talks. Thus, driven by pragmatism, trade representatives have seri-
ously down-scaled the original expectations, and are now working to deliver 
a face-saving deal for the Doha Development Round.73 However, although 
much had already been agreed upon several years ago in some areas, the 
Round is still on hold due to minor tensions between India and the United 
States74. 
As David Gantz explains, the Doha round is in a loop due to deep differenc-
es between BRICS and Quad Countries. WTO efforts to implement the TFA 
agreed upon in Bali may be finally successful but other multilateral agree-
ments are certainly problematic. In this sense, with regard to trade facilita-
tion, implementation was blocked by India to protest Member demands in 
relation to possible future reduction of Indian government subsidies to In-
dian farmers. Thus, as WTO decisions require consensus, the TFA stalled. 
However, US and India agreed in mid-November of 2014 that India would 
be permitted to continue subsidizing agriculture, until a new agreement was 
reached, and India appears to have agreed to lift its objections to the TFA. An-
other significant area of potential negotiation is the green technology agree-
ment as this could reduce tariffs on green technology goods to 5% or less, 
probably by 2015. However, since WTO discussions have stalled, agreement 
(voluntary among members) could be alternatively adopted outside WTO. In 
addition, the other key plurilateral negotiations that have some potential for 
agreement are those around the 1996 Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA), as this agreement comprising 80 nations, and representing 97% of 
world trade in IT products, is out of date because many new IT products have 
72  S. Ostry, ‘The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for future ne-
gotiations’, The political economy of international trade law: Essays in honor of Robert. 
E. Hudec (Cambridge University Press 2002) at 287.
73  For a detailed analysis of the alternatives see D. Gantz, Liberalizing International 
Trade after Doha: Multilateral, Plurilateral, Regional, and Unilateral Initiatives (Cam-
bridge University Press 2014).
74  J Bhagwati & P. Sutherland, The Doha Round: Setting a Deadline, Defining a Final 
Deal, Interim Report from a High-Level Trade Experts Group (2011).
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been developed since its creation. In this regard, efforts to expand ITA stalled 
a year ago when China alone refused to agree to eliminate tariffs on an addi-
tional 200 tariff lines. Discussions between Chinese and US officials in No-
vember 2014 resulted in an understanding which should, in principle, allow 
completion of expanded ITA, eliminating tariffs on 1 US trillion dollars’ worth 
of IT products. However, whether these negotiations conclude successfully 
or not, the fact is that multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva are not likely 
to be resumed in the foreseeable future, except perhaps on the peripheries 
through approval of the TFA, or an expanded ITA. Aside from that, some 
progress may be made with plurilateral agreements on services, and trade in 
green technology goods, either in Geneva or outside (eg APEC). TISA negoti-
ations in this regard are moving very slowly, and it is still too early to gauge 
how and where -that is, inside or outside WTO- the results of these services 
negotiations could finally come about. 
Delivering significant outcomes through MTNs is a difficult but not impossi-
ble task. As Eric Wyndham White would have framed it, ‘there would be no 
great virtue in negotiations which were smooth and simple: the virtue is in 
concluding negotiations which are difficult.’75 Nonetheless, as stalemates and 
lack of reach or ambition always have a price in world trade negotiations, the 
failure to deliver in Doha has channeled pressures towards so-called variable 
geometry within WTO (as so-called ‘Plan B’), and thus for PTAs within the 
WTO framework, following the road of current plurilaterals in Annex 4 of 
the WTO agreement. Not surprisingly, for some observers, variable geometry 
could more easily facilitate WTO rulemaking, while providing incentives for 
later accessions by non-participating WTO Members such as, for example, 
the new GPA entering into force in 6 April 2014. For others, this à la carte 
strategy is a Trojan horse within WTO. However, there is also ‘not much sym-
pathy’ for the plurilateral approach outside WTO, in WTO Director-General 
Roberto Azevêdo´s own worlds.76 
The side-effect of the current difficulties to close the round is the resurge in 
75  See E. Wyndham White, ‘Press Conference of the Executive Secretary of the Preparato-
ry Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment’, Press Release 
No. 234 (11 July 1947).
76  See ‘WTO members mull alternative scenarios as impasse continues’, Bridges/ ICTSD 
reporting (6 November 2014).
PABLO ZAPATERO
34
PTAS which have, for decades, diverted trade and fragmented world market 
formation through myriads of bilateral, plurilateral and regional initiatives 
outside MFN-based principles. In this regard, parallel to the Doha negoti-
ations, the US and the EU in particular are deploying their market access 
strategies to the hilt, by promoting a variety of new preferential initiatives 
outside WTO which go from traditional trade bilateralism to even pacific and 
transatlantic preferential agreements. The PTAs which the GATT architects 
conceived as minor exceptions in article XXIV -basically requiring that the 
preferential tariff reductions for PTA members must be ‘substantially’ on all 
products and that there must be a commitment to reaching full 100% reduc-
tion by a target date- are eclipsing non-discriminatory trade, and thus the 
inner mechanics and rationale of MFN-based trade. As a result, the world is 
paved with a wide variety of entangled preferential schemes promoting trade 
diversion, market segmentation and thus inefficient allocation of resources. 
Since its early inception, the world trading system has been under continuous 
pressure to advance world market formation through progressive liberaliza-
tion. The current form of article XXIV is a by-product of the complex times 
in which the regime was originally conceived. In this regard, for example, 
in light of the antagonism with the Soviet Union, Truman and other senior 
advisers considered that the US should not allow a split with Britain over the 
system of reciprocally-enacted tariffs between the dominions and colonies 
of the former British Empire (the so-called imperial preferences) so, finally, 
the US delegation was instructed by Truman to reach agreement even though 
these preferences were largely intact, as it happened in practice.77 In addition, 
the US abandonment of the customs union requirement, and the extension of 
eligibility for article XXIV to free trade areas without external tariff, also has 
to be interpreted in the light of the need to accommodate negotiations for a 
secret US-Canada PTA. recently discovered by historians.78
Hence, in short, the drafting of article XXIV was not strictly driven by stan-
dard economics (eg. trade creation v. trade diversion, etc) but by a mixture 
of these with a set of ad hoc solutions aimed at keeping the whole project of 
the world trading system afloat in quite uncertain times, and thus not putting 
77  F. McKenzie, ‘GATT and the Cold War, op.cit.p.86.
78  For this study see K. Chase, ’Multilateralism Compromised: The Mysterious Origins of 
GATT Article XXIV`, World Trade Review (2006): 1–30.
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all eggs in the basket. In any case, however, the rules in place could have 
easily disciplined PTAs more than what they did in practice; however, the 
GATT community has applied a rather lenient interpretation to article XXIV 
since 1947. As explained by the experts group of 2011, in fact, PTAs has pro-
liferated largely because the rules laid down in order to discipline PTAs were 
ignored in practice, and also because the so-called Enabling Clause (PTAs 
among developing countries) allowed developing countries to have intra-de-
veloping-country preferences without any legal limit. As a result, the gen-
eralized phenomenon of PTAs has created a systemic problem where these 
have continued to increase, thereby making the world trading system far less 
MFN-based than was envisaged when the exception was drafted.79 
The problem of PTAs is not new but has exacerbated over the years. Today, 
the proliferation of PTAs not only harms WTO by undermining its credibility 
as a lawmaking forum, but also erodes its unparalleled dispute settlement 
system, by establishing alternative mechanisms marked by asymmetries of 
power and which are closed to third party participation. Reasonably, howev-
er, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, the proliferation of hundreds of 
‘me too’ PTAs is neither an alternative nor a substitute to global trade opening 
by 160 countries.80 As mentioned, the increased use of PTAs not only frag-
ments trade rules and forums, diverting scarce trade policy resources (eg. 
negotiating resources), but also deflects efficient allocation of resources as 
well.81 In essence, as Bhagwati explains, discriminatory trade misallocates 
world resources by shifting production from non-member lower-cost suppli-
ers to higher-cost member country suppliers. Thus, PTAs create trade diver-
sion as well as net welfare-reduction.82 
Last but not least, PTAs structurally promote managed trade regimes and, in 
this context, are made to serve the special interests historically dominating 
the trade policies of developed countries.83 In this regard, PTAs tend to be 
79  See World Trade and the Doha Round, op.cit.p.18, paragraph 1.28.
80  See i.e World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and preferential trade agreements: 
From co-existence to coherence (WTO 2011).
81  J. Bhagwati, ‘Reshaping the WTO’, 168 Far Eastern Economic Review 2 (2005): 25–
30.
82  See World Trade and the Doha Round, op.cit.p.18, paragraph 1.26
83  For the motivations behind developing countries to form hegemon-centered PTAs see 
J. Bhagwati, Termites, op.cit.pp.43–47.
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used to extract not just trade concessions -such as provisions favoring the 
import of the rich country’s intermediates- but non-trade related concessions 
as well, as PTAs tend to be easily captured by the lobbies of the hegemonic 
powers. In practice, lobbies from developed countries often tend to inocu-
late trade-unrelated agendas within the asymmetrical preferential negotia-
tions with weaker trading partners. In short, one-on-one negotiations open 
the door to the increasing number of non-trade-related provisions -labor 
standards, environmental rules, FDI protection, the ability to impose capi-
tal-account controls in financial crises, IP, etc- being inserted into the US and 
EU PTAs. Obviously, larger developing countries have more opportunities to 
avoid including trade-unrelated agendas in their PTAs with the hegemonic 
powers (eg. Indian negotiations with EU). However, that does not happen for 
the rest when they are approached on a one-by-one-basis. 
As developing countries are now more proactive in trade matters and more 
able to network and develop common fronts in the multilateral trade setting, 
concessions can be more easily extracted bilaterally. Multilateral trade ne-
gotiations are obviously not alien to lobbying as the Uruguay Round illus-
trates.84 However, developing countries are comparatively less exposed with-
in multilateral venues to pressure to accept non-trade related commitments; 
particularly as they can develop peer pressure. As clearly explained by Bhag-
wati, the political ability of hegemonic powers and the financial power of their 
well-endowed lobbies present a formidable combination to go up against.85 
To give just one graphic example, the US PTAs with Singapore and Chile im-
pede restrictions on capital flows at times of crisis (capital-account controls) 
in line with financial lobbies, even it is unreasonable to do so, and though 
the IMF now openly admits that such policy restrictions often make sense as 
macro-prudential policy measure. 
Therefore, it is no accident that the support provided by special interest 
from developed countries in PTAs negotiations has severely increased at the 
same rate that support for multilateralism has blurred. In this context, as a 
result, the United States is pushing for a decoupled strategy by negotiating 
in parallel two mega-PTAs through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP); being the later 
84  See, for example, chapters 3 and 7 of this book.
85  J. Bhagwati, Termites, op.cit.p.99.
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the largest regional PTA initiative in history. On similar lines, the European 
Union is also pursuing its traditional preferential treaty schemes, obtaining 
its biggest successes lately with PTAs with Latin America, South Korea and 
Canada. In this regard, the traditional loose use of PTAS by the UE together 
with non-MFN-based trade vehicles such as S&D, GSP (Generalized Scheme 
of Preferences) and other discriminatory schemes displayed by the EU in its 
trade policy arsenal (e.g. Everything But Arms) is particularly illustrative. 
The net welfare-reducing effect of preferential agreements is so evident that 
UN Members have committed themselves to ‘develop further an open, rule-
based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system’ within 
Goal 8A of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It is no accident that 
the high level trade experts group appointed by WTO to analyse WTO’s past 
and potential future targeted PTAs as one of its major challenges.86 As a re-
sult, nowadays, the so-called ‘spaghetti bowl’ of preferential agreements is, 
more than ever, a critical issue for preserving the nodal nature of the world 
trading system.87 Probably, as the expert group has suggested, the pragmatic 
way forward is to find ways to lessen the discrimination contained in PTAs 
and to agree on new WTO rules that bring some order to the so-called deeper 
disciplines within the PTAs signed by the US and EU, as these cover such a 
large share of world trade.88 Arguably, by establishing a new minimum com-
mon denominator on PTAs under negotiation, the Appellate body could also 
discipline some trade diversion ex ante. 
3. Larger markets but fragile demos 
By pushing forward economic integration, the world trading system has been 
a major contributor to development, sociability and peace for almost 70 years 
already. The legal infrastructures of world trade do not guarantee eternal 
peace but certainly help to reduce sources of inter-state conflict by means of 
86  On the harm that the proliferation is causing to the world trading system see, in par-
ticular, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenni-
um, and J. Bhagwati, Termites, op.cit., chapter 2 and chapter 3, respectively.
87  See J. Bhagwati, ‘U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Agreements’, The 
Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (AEI Press 1995).
88  See World Trade and the Doha Round, op.cit.p. 51, paragraph 4.30.
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increased economic interdependence. Partly for this reason, membership of 
WTO members has greatly expanded over the past decades, and open mar-
kets have steadily increased their advocates in last decades. The case for free 
trade is seen as stronger nowadays than at any previous time. In other words, 
protectionism is no longer a cool policy term in trade lingua. In a closely in-
tegrated world economy, goods and services come from literally everywhere, 
and an increasing number of jobs depend on trade today. As a result, the 
world economy has created its own anti-protectionism antidotes. Indeed, 
the idea that each time we segment market we incur a deadweight loss has 
become almost commonplace. By logical extension, more people both in de-
veloping and developed countries alike currently perceive trade in goods and 
services as welfare-enhancing on the aggregate. Obviously, the logic of free 
trade will always coexist with protectionism in practice;89 however, it is rea-
sonable to argue that the case for open markets is by now a robust one.90 In 
this regard, the link between trade openness and overall economic prosper-
ity (or aggregate GNP) is increasingly perceived by citizenship. Having said 
this, and notwithstanding that half a century of MTN rounds have boosted 
worldwide income, the dismantling of trade barriers is not a magic pill and 
does not necessarily obtain substantial upturns in GDP growth rates in all 
countries pursuing open trade policies. In this regard, trade is a facilitating 
device, requiring complementary policies to be in place, such as predictable 
legal environments, communications infrastructures, education, R&D among 
other macro-level policies including trade adjustment programs as well.91
We are all better off with rather than without WTO. Needless to say, the pic-
ture is nevertheless not so convincing for the critics, as they perceive how 
social and environmental externalities resulting from increasing interdepen-
dence are left unattended by the public decision makers who are constructing 
global markets. Not surprisingly, the absence of effective policies in these ar-
eas not only raises criticism by moderate citizens but also fuels the autarkic 
stances of those anti-globalization hard liners who frontally challenge open 
89  J. Bhagwati, Protectionism (MIT Press 1988) at 77.
90  See eg. R. Feenstra, ‘How costly is protectionism?’, 6 The Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 3 (1992): 159–178.
91  On the case for strong trade adjustment policies under import competition see, in 
particular, J. Bhagwati, Protectionism (MIT Press 1988), and J. Bhagwati, Import Compe-
tition and Response (University of Chicago Press, 1978).
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markets. However, the critics have it absolutely right in one aspect, and it is a 
big consideration: the lack of effective global policies regarding the externali-
ties of open markets; in short, the still weak global polity and demos coexist-
ing with world market formation. In fact, most critics basically tend to play 
versions of that pro-systemic discourse, irrespective of the issue involved. 
Few, if any, of the trade representatives and officials participating in the Uru-
guay Round negotiations, would have foreseen how much controversy this 
regime would raise across the globe. Obviously, there has always been policy 
discussions about trade’s social and environmental impact, and a wide vari-
ety of grass-root activists from both developing and developed countries tire-
lessly work to exact some policy shift, in one way or another, and have done 
so for decades. However, the attempts of proactive civic groups to influence 
how globalization is regulated only obtained a few minor successes within the 
Uruguay Round, including a few paragraphs in the WTO preamble, with re-
gard to sustainable development and raising standards of living.92 As a result, 
the critics denounce the absence of general decision making infrastructures 
for properly balancing economic interdependence with other social values; 
and they certainly have it right. 
As conventional economics suggest, exchange based on comparative advan-
tage, and thus specialization and division of labor is efficient on the aggre-
gate. In other words, overall, the aggregate gains from world trade outweigh 
the costs, although there will be losers from trade liberalization. In this re-
gard, it is necessary to provide generous adjustment assistance for those laid 
off in a way that can be linked to volatility from import competition.93 In ad-
dition, increasing economic growth can lead to increasing redistribution: if 
the pie gets bigger, there is more to share through subsequent redistribution. 
This is easier said than done, obviously, and the conundrum is how to collec-
tively implement socially sustainable economic interdependence. From the 
perspective of institutional design, the basic issue is whether it is a question 
of either remodeling the world trading system in order to correct external-
ities or, alternatively, rebuilding other global regimes in order to establish 
greater cohesion and adjustment programs by managing extra revenue raised 
92  S. Aaronson, Taking Trade to the Streets: The Lost History of Public Efforts to Shape 
Globalization (University of Michigan Press 2004).
93  See eg J. Bhagwati, In Defense of globalization, (Oxford University Press 2004) at 33.
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from the open markets erected by regimes such as WTO. Protectionism is cer-
tainly not an efficient way to deal with the social and environmental impact 
and concerns raised by open markets generally. Alternatively, supplementary 
policies such as trade adjustment programs for temporary income support, 
retraining, transition rules as well as strong redistributive programs general-
ly are required, as mentioned. However, the current regulatory networks of 
global governance, including WTO as one of its key nodes, lack any effective 
commitment on social cohesion for the proper functioning of markets. 
States have developed so-called world trade law −as a highly specialized sec-
tor of public international law− in order to secure open markets and thus 
allow firms trading in goods and services to operate with ease across nations. 
Obviously, open markets are directly dependent on public law and, in short, 
public decision-making generally. All inner infrastructures of any market, 
whether domestic or global, are based on public law. Thus, it is reasonable to 
argue tha elected representatives should do some more heavy-lifting to ad-
vance socially sustainable economic interdependence. In this regard, there is 
plenty of margin for giving shape to the so-called globalization with a human 
face; particularly by exacting extra revenue from world free movements of 
goods, services and capital in order to embed social cohesion in the regulatory 
architecture managing open markets. 
Conversely, and while social cohesion do not tend to be tackled in diplomatic 
economic conferences, world trade law has entered into multiple grey areas, 
often touching the very core of trade unrelated social policies. In this regard, 
the frontiers of state regulatory autonomy have been blurred, as negotiations 
to remove so-called trade barriers have shifted from the realm of so-called 
negative integration to that of positive integration, in which domestic laws 
and policies (e.g. health, culture, education, professional qualifications, and 
so on) are made to comply /converge with pro-trade disciplines. Thus, the re-
sulting impact on domestic public policies generally is significant. Today, the 
focus of liberalization is concentrated on non-border measures (or non-tariff 
barriers), with evident social implications. However, it is easy to see why the 
trade negotiations focusing on reducing the industrial tariffs still remaining 
do not raise the same social awareness and concerns as those tackling so-
called non-tariff barriers. In this regard, a key issue at stake is the increasing 
regulatory complexity that negotiating in the grey areas implies from the an-
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gle of general policy coherence.94 The task of reciprocally bargaining down 
“trade barriers” is not only becoming increasingly complex but controversial, 
as these international re-regulatory endeavors both intersect and intrude into 
other legitimate policy areas and objectives.95 
In principle, on a plain reading of WTO texts, it does not appear that there is 
a limit to the regulatory quest towards progressive liberalization. In practical 
as well as conceptual terms, progressiveness in itself means not just one dose, 
but regular extra doses: by definition, progressiveness always means more. 
In short, an endless opening is embedded in the regulatory DNA of WTO. 
Literally any domestic public policy can be within reach of the pro-trade open 
texture of the regime. It goes without saying that, by doing this, trade minis-
ters often tend to pay lip service to the boundaries between their competences 
and those of other domestic and global agencies; and in fact, just about any-
thing can be trade-related in one way or another. As a result, general policy 
considerations −in the sense of balancing issues in the public interest− are 
more often than not subject to simplistic regulatory dictums towards market 
formation. Paradoxically, while trade ministers have no expertise on how to 
tackle a wide variety of policy issues raised by global economic interdepen-
dence, non-trade policy expertise still remains ‘outside’ the world trade re-
gime; inside the rooms and corridors of those uninvited domestic agencies 
with competences in all the policy fields we traditionally refer to as adminis-
tration and/or government. 
The problem can also be explained by stressing the limitations of function-
alism in global governance.96 In this regard, by extending multilateral law-
making to trade policies behind the border, WTO Members −read trade min-
isters− often perform such tasks on the edge if not literally beyond both the 
94  P. Lamy, ‘Farewell statement of Director-General Pascal Lamy to the General Council’, 
WTO | Speeches and statements (24 July 2013).
95  See G. Majone, Deregulation or re-regulation?: Regulatory Reform in Europe and 
the United States (Pinter 1990), I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Tras-
cending the Deregulation debate (Oxford University Press 1992) and K. Vogel, Freer Mar-
kets, More Rules (Cornell University Press 1996).
96  See D. Mitrany, The progress of international government (Yale University Press 
1933) at 128 and M. Ryan, Ch. Lenhardt & K. Tamai, ‘International Governmental Organi-
zation Knowledge Management for Multilateral Trade Lawmaking’, 15 American Univer-
sity International Law Review (2000): 1347.
PABLO ZAPATERO
42
very border of their domestic competences as well as −unquestionably− be-
yond their knowledge and expertise. At the same time, parliaments as well as 
heads of national governments tend to follow the policy lead of their econom-
ic agencies too loosely, by granting them with mandates allowing to negotiate 
treaties on both trade and non-trade policy areas, through which they have 
erected powerful regimes in which they take new policy decisions. This being 
the case, the public interest is often inevitably lost in translation. 
Leaving aside that these practices do not easily produce welfare-enhancing 
outputs for the societies involved, it is also easy to see how both domestic and 
world policy coherence is manifestly lacking under the motto of open mar-
kets. A paradigmatic example of such phenomena is the TRIPS disciplines, 
which have not much to do with open markets, and that have pushed for 
world propertization of intangibles through WTO linkage (read world legal 
monopolies).97 In a similar vein, although the ITO founding fathers in 1947 
had already drafted a rulebook of binding disciplines on restrictive business 
practices (read antitrust law and policy),98 there is still no multilateral anti-
trust treaty in place within WTO annexes nor is there one on the imminent 
horizon. As market openness is a key discipline in the global rules of the game 
today, the perplexities raised by this paradox are understandable for laymen 
and informed observers alike; arguably, as antitrust law and policy is a struc-
tural feature of the market economy paradigm, the irony of delinking them 
from open markets is more than evident.
Reasonably, as public law is inextricably related to the proper functioning of 
open markets, it is fair to say that the lens through which trade representa-
tives pursue regulatory governance within WTO and other economic regimes 
is overtly simplified; transforming states into mere world facilitating agents 
of open markets and business transactions do not stand the litmus test of 
general interest, whether domestic or global, indistinguishably; the complex 
nature of social life arguably requires wider policy scopes and perspectives 
and, subsequently, more inclusive policymaking generally. In fact, in retro-
spect, states have never operated as mere facilitating agents of market trans-
actions: by progressively giving birth to a territorially-circumscribed ‘mar-
97  See chapter 5. 
98  On the ideas of the drafters of the ITO Charter see W. Diebold, ‘Reflections on the In-
ternational Trade Organization’, 14 New Illinois University Law Review (1994): 335-346.
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ketplace’ within their jurisdiction, domestic authorities have ‘governed’ and 
thus shaped the form and function of markets since the very early invention 
of nation-states. In addition, the past several centuries of market-formation 
built around territorially-circumscribed state jurisdictions differ from world 
markets in both quantitative and qualitative terms, as open markets are pro-
gressively extending their reach to the whole planet today. Hence, the quali-
tative change of what economic agencies are pursuing, by encompassing the 
whole world through international legal disciplines, has produced something 
more powerful, transformative and naturally distinct from the mere aggrega-
tion of 160 state-based marketplaces. A global market under common rules 
is not a mere aggregation of domestic markets and related state jurisdictions. 
Indeed quite a revolutionary project is underway.
Something is missing within the system of global governance. The globaliza-
tion of markets without a cohesive and wider overarching polity able to exer-
cise general policy decisions over their functioning does not appear to be par-
ticularly promising in systemic terms. Parliamentary democracy is still con-
sidered the best state-of-the-art vehicle for organizing large human gatherings 
through indirect representation. For centuries, the same nation-states within 
which public authority constructed a marketplace −circumscribed to their 
territorial jurisdiction− evolved to produce parliamentary democracies not 
without unease. Probably, world market formation should be framed against 
such historical background. In short, while we are pushing the fast-forward 
button for deeper global economic integration through public law, there is no 
such a thing as a global polity -not to say a global parliamentary democracy- 
able to guide and balance its transformative forces vis-à-vis the rest of the 
values involved in any meaningful idea of good governance.
For the sake of illustration, in an hypothetical case of absent trade, the pro-
duction, distribution and consumption of goods and services, together with a 
wide variety of socially valuable related issues (eg. sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, etc) would only be regulated within a single state-territory, and 
would thus fall into just one jurisdiction, with all its concomitant administra-
tive authorities, regulators, courts and tribunals. However, since an increas-
ing volume of goods and services is produced through the dispersed so-called 
global factory, business transactions and operations now take place across 
territorial jurisdictions and thus across domestic public laws. Paradoxically, 
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in this regard, the higher regulatory burdens of these transactions compared 
to those of global business transactions are quite telling. 
In this regard, to use the same example, the regulatory approach towards 
process and production measures (PPMs) at intra-state level has no connec-
tion with that taken towards an equivalent transaction at inter-state level. In 
fact, they are not only disconnected but at odds, as there is a legal consensus 
entrenched in the world trading system not to regulate PPMs of imported 
goods and services. Inevitably, this has created a mismatch between the lo-
cal and the global in which requirements for the global transaction basically 
proceeds within a sort of jurisdictional no place. Thus, even if there were no 
PPMs whatsover on both sides of the transaction -read the law of jungle- the 
transaction would legally take place. 
Notwithstanding the fact that trade restrictions to correct externalities such 
as those related to PPMs are not generally the least-cost effective policy 
measure, world regulatory structures managing open markets should not 
arguably deduct environmental and social externalities. Alternatively, they 
should be approached more creatively, which obviously does not imply that 
this has of necessity to be pursued by taking anti-trade rationales. In any 
case, the rules of the game in place today do not allow discrimination re-
garding the way products and services are produced and distributed. As a 
result, states have very thin (or no) margins for regulating aspects other 
than physical characteristics of imported products, disregarding the policy 
objective. In short, and technically speaking, domestic measures linked to 
the non-physical aspect of products (NPAs) are not compatible with WTO 
law. In this regard, GATT/WTO law zeroed in on NPA and does not allow 
discrimination against physically identical foreign products on grounds 
which are not revealed in the product itself, such as the way in which is 
produced or distributed. As a result, trade restrictions for foreign prod-
ucts manufactured or distributed with non-sustainable or labor-unfriendly 
methods are WTO illegal.99 However, it is reasonable to argue that envi-
ronmental and labor issues are related to trade, and thus could be more 
coherently managed world scale with a little more sensitivity, and without 
inevitably needing to establish trade restrictions (or conditionalities) in this 
99  See generally Ch. Conrad, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law: 
Interfacing trade and social goals (Cambridge University Press 2011).
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area. And the point to make here is that, it is quite likely that improved but 
equally trade-enhancing policies could have alternatively been devised if 
non-trade ministers −such as labor, health and environmental ministers− 
had also come to the table with trade agencies negotiating those disciplines. 
However, they were not there.
The treaty-based WTO regime is a paradigmatic illustration of the current 
era of technocratic global governance: an era characterized by an increas-
ing regulatory maze of expert rule-based systems often operating in legal and 
policy self-containment.100 Thus, there is strong case to make for deeper in-
ter-agency coordination in these and other areas. In short, the problem is 
that currently fragmented governance across autonomous world regulatory 
networks unavoidably has a bearing on the coherence of global public poli-
cies and international law.101 The issue of unattended social and environmen-
tal externalities in world trade is a paradoxical example. Leaving aside that 
both global governance and international law have never been as coherent 
as pro-systemic legal literatures have traditionally portrayed, it is difficult 
not to question that there are some treaty-based regimes which have signifi-
cantly higher leverage and influence (e.g. WTO, IMF, etc) than others which, 
in principle, are equally authoritative (e.g. UNESCO, WHO, ITU, etc). In es-
sence, the ‘who decides’ is again an important part of the problem, and thus of 
the systemic solution. The case of the world trading system analyzed in these 
pages is an evident example. 
As Picciotto has explained, far from creating a free world market, the WTO 
establishes a complex framework for coordinating the regulation of interna-
tional economic transactions: as a result, the WTO covered agreements go 
well beyond trade, and effectively create requirements for a wide range of 
domestic measures to comply with international standards, many of them set 
by other organizations. Thus, as this scholar sustains, the WTO is placed at 
the intersection of a variety of international regulatory networks which have 
grown up gradually since the 1970s, as part of the globalization of both busi-
100  P. Zapatero, ‘Modern international law and the advent of special legal systems’, 23 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (2005): 55–75.
101  M. Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From 
The Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 2006 (2006).
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ness and business regulation: in doing so, the WTO established itself as an 
important nodal point of intersection for many of these networks.102 
However, not all regimes are included in its specific regulatory node and, in 
addition, all those included are incorporated in a hub-and-spokes structure 
in which the WTO constitutes the regulatory apex; in short, no legal hor-
izontality among regimes at first sight. In this regard, it is also fair to say 
that some of the technical difficulties faced by the WTO regime in advancing 
its policy agenda of open markets today derive not only from north-south 
tensions but from the absence of other policy rationalities at the negotiating 
tables. Greater coherence could be obtained through increased regulatory 
cooperation by the WTO (and thus trade ministers) with non-trade regimes 
(and thus non-trade ministers). In short, improving the coherence of world 
policymaking with respect to the WTO node requires expanding inter-agen-
cy regulatory coordination. As the WTO regime sails the concurring wa-
ters of other (non-trade) regimes and domestic agencies, coherence with all 
those public policy values reasonably require increased inter-agency coop-
eration. 
Some time ago, the former Director General of the WTO Pascal Lamy por-
trayed the old GATT of 1947 as ‘an ITO minus the elements of coherence’, in 
the sense of lacking proper links between the opening up of trade and other 
policy areas (eg, global antitrust, social cohesion, etc).103 Arguably, the picture 
can also be applied to WTO today. In short, major inter-institutional policy 
integration is required for improving the coherence of global governance gen-
erally. However, the WTO jurisdiction is part of a legal architecture for global 
governance that currently lacks a higher authority to eventually adjudicate 
both disputes with other multilateral regimes, as well as conflicts (antino-
mies) between rules and acts resulting from other treaty-based regimes. In 
consequence, conflicts between the social values protected by each tend to be 
solved under the rules of the more empowered regime in practice; which, to 
102  See S. Picciotto, Regulating Corporate Global Capitalism (Cambridge University 
Press 2011), chapter 3.
103  See P. Lamy, Crisis is opportunity to restore coherence in global economic gover-
nance, WTO (8 december 2010) as well as P. Lamy, ‘The Place of the WTO and its Law 
in the International Legal Order’, 17 European Journal of International Law 5 (2007): 
969–984
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a great extent, lately happens to be the WTO, as a result of its highly efficient 
dispute settlement mechanism and related enforcement procedures. 
In this context, the raising of social concerns about the thin democratic le-
gitimacy of WTO is closely related to the restrictive rationality of functional 
regimes in global governance. With regard to WTO, institutional legitimacy 
is conventionally said to flow from above from the constitutional features of 
WTO law, and technical expertise from below (technocrats preparing new 
WTO rounds, WTO secretariat, as well as Appellate Body and panels).104 
However, for the critics, the reality of democratic governance or participation 
within the regime is basically reduced to indirect forms of accountability of its 
Members, at a local level.105 The flaws are easy to see when these structures of 
technocratic governance are confronted with the ideals of democratic partici-
pation; as mentioned, however, solutions to deepen parliamentary participa-
tion in world decision making are not easy to enforce in practice. In this con-
text, as Levy-Faur explains, we are now experiencing a transformation from 
representative democracy to indirect representative democracy, and now to 
second-level indirect representative democracy: 
‘Democratic governance is no longer about the delegation of authority to elected represen-
tatives but a form of second-level indirect representative democracy—citizens elect repre-
sentatives who control and supervise “experts” who formulate and administer policies in 
an autonomous fashion from their regulatory bastions’.106 
From the prism of regime-building, some of the challenging issues posed by 
the legal infrastructures of world exchange today are those related to the in-
ability to properly balance all values involved, and thus the incapacity to sub-
sequently deliver legal and policy coherence. In this context, as mentioned, 
104  See e.g. R. Howse & K. Nicolaidis, ‘Democracy without Sovereignty: The Global Voca-
tion of Political Ethics’, The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law, Oxford 
and Portland (Hart Publishing 2008) at 163-191 and R. Howse & K. Nicolaidis, ‘Why Con-
stitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far: Legitimacy and Global Economic Governance 
after Seattle’, Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the 
Millennium (Brookings Institution 2001) at 227–263.
105  R. Nickel, ‘Participatory Transnational Governance’, Constitutionalism, Multilevel 
Trade Governance, and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing 2010) at 209–250.
106  D. Levi-Faur. ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’, The Annals of the 
American Academy 598 (March 2005): 13.
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the WTO node could probably improve its legitimacy and effectiveness by 
establishing effective bridges with other non-trade treaty-based regimes and 
their rules (i.e. WHO, UNESCO, etc). In this regard, it could be argued that 
the coherence of both global governance and international law cannot be im-
proved in the absence of deeper inter-institutional integration. 
For this reason, upgrading the world constitutive process is an urgent objec-
tive to pursue.107 However, instead of sitting and waiting for such a develop-
ment, it would be reasonable to help it along, in one way or another. In this 
context, the WTO Appellate Body is one of the best qualified and authoritative 
bodies for sending signals to both governments and parliaments in this con-
structive policy direction. The reasons are twofold: firstly, because it enjoys 
wide recognition and respect for its law and policy reasonability; and second-
ly, because the dispute settlement understanding -and its applicable rules 
and customary rules of interpretation- currently gives its members sufficient 
wiggle room to give the best of themselves as global jurists, and not just as 
experts in trade law. In short, there is a need to push for constructive and 
inclusive legal world visions, and that can also be partly promoted by setting 
incentives in this direction, also through adjudication. 
The same year that WTO entered into force, Robert Hudec was recalling how 
treaties frequently claim to solve problems, but often merely paper over con-
flicting national positions; so given some time, the circumstances underlying 
the friction could change and hopefully make the conflict inconsequential. As 
this excellent scholar explains, ‘whether this sort of political theatre is noble 
in purpose or otherwise, it is a very important part of the public law of inter-
national economic affairs’.108 Not surprisingly, Hudec framed the Uruguay 
Round package deal as containing several examples of this ‘kind of non-con-
tent’, which is subsequently requiring scholars to ignore it in order to supply 
for ‘a coherent meaning to laws that appear incoherent’.109 Similarly, it would 
also be reasonable to add that WTO insiders and practitioners could also play 
107  M. Reisman. ‘Introduction’, Jurisdiction in international law (Ashgate) at xxi.
108  R. Hudec, ‘International economic law: the political theatre dimension’, 17 Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law (1996): 10.
109  See R. Hudec, ‘International economic law, op.cit.p.11. For the idea of ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ in treaty making see also J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Information Feudalism: 
Who Owns the Knowledge (Earthscan 2002) at 139 (referring to TRIPS negotiations).
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a stronger part in such fine policy lines, by using the inner flexibilities within 
WTO law to open up windows, and thus reconsider some content. 
4. Inside these pages
The legal construction of a global market economy requires inclusive policy 
rationalities or, in other words, avoiding self-contained economic policies. 
World policy coherence evidently needs inclusive policymaking, and that cer-
tainly applies to WTO. At the beginning of a new century, marked by increas-
ing economic interdependence, policy coherence is still pending an upgrade 
within and across a wide variety of regulatory networks in which WTO is not 
just one but a systemic node. Nonetheless, the aim and purpose of these pages 
is not to explore how the WTO should be alternatively governed for the best 
but to explore the basic world vision permeating the architecture of its legal-
ized values, as these stand today. In order to do so, the underpinnings of this 
great fabric are explored through a set of selected case studies. In the follow-
ing chapters, the book first takes a look at the GATT historical experience in 
upscaling the use of rules and adjudication for the incremental empowerment 
of the regime within global governance (chapter 2), going on to subsequently 
explore in some detail a few so-called WTO disciplines, in WTO speak (chap-
ters 3 to 7). The basic bullet-points are as follows:
•	 Construction of an expert legal system of international law (chapter 
2 on legalization)
•	 Blurring of general and especial interest in treaty-making (chapter 3 
on services)
•	 Linkage of propertized intangibles to trade (chapter 4 on knowledge)
•	 Trade delinkage from PPMs (chapter 5 on nature)
•	 Marketization of state tasks (chapter 6 on procurement)
•	 Structural commodification of objects and activities (chapter 7 on cul-
ture)
In short, the following pages explore some selected hits from the rulebook 
of progressive liberalization as it stands at the present time. As a whole, the 
text aims at taking a non-random walk around the inner rationalities creating 
the building blocks of this critical regulatory node. In considering the world 
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visions that have nurtured its substantive rules and subsequent state of play, 
the text leaves aside analysis of institutional features, with the exception of a 
few introductory notions covered in the second chapter.110 In that chapter, the 
text focuses on the successful contribution made by the legal profession and 
culture to regime-building within the GATT. This piece begins by explaining 
how the GATT community managed to progressively move from diplomacy 
to law, not without considerable creativity, almost from the moment of its 
initially weak inception; regime-building is explored from both an historical 
and sociological perspective in order to analyze how old-school trade diplo-
mats and lawyers, subsequently, managed to progressively devise from a so-
called ‘accidental organization’ one of the most effective treaty-based regimes 
in history. 
The third chapter takes the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) as a case study for exploring public-private partnerships (PPP) in 
economic rulemaking. Firstly, the chapter briefly explains how this regula-
tory vehicle designed to promote long-term progressive liberalization in the 
services sector got on board the Uruguay Round: it goes on to show how mul-
tilateral trade negotiations within this agreement improve market access and 
national treatment for foreign services providers as well as facilitate their par-
ticipation in publicly provided services. Further analysis also explores how 
the GATS built-in agenda has set the stage for the opening of negotiations on 
the so-called ‘disciplines on domestic regulation’ in recent years, opening up 
serious public debates on making WTO enter a new policy landscape which 
departs from the conventional assumptions of what trade law conveys. 
The following chapter focuses on the controversial relationship between en-
vironmental externalities and open trade, and explores tasks and activities 
promoted within WTO regarding this very issue. The legal disciplines of pro-
gressive trade liberalization currently delink open markets from sustainable 
standards of production and distribution. In this regard, three decades of 
‘trade & environment’ debates have delivered minor advances in the quest 
for world sustainable production and distribution, as process and production 
methods (PPMs) are legally deducted from the regulatory structures of world 
economic interdependence, as a result of devices such as, among others, 
GATT provisions on ‘like products’. Achieving non-trade restrictive solutions 
110  For such reflections see P. Zapatero, Derecho del comercio global (Civitas 2003).
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to deliver sustainable development in global production and distribution is 
not an easy task. Arguably, in any case, better policies to secure sustainability 
could be pursued. However, trade ministers do not particularly help by leav-
ing the whole issue outside the regime, in the sole realm of less-well endowed 
environmental agencies, while at the same time merely deducting environ-
mental costs from world production and distribution of goods and services. 
The chapter briefly approaches the status quo within WTO on this issue by 
dissecting trade policy assumptions as well as the intra-history of its limited 
opening to environmental sensitivity and values. 
The fifth chapter takes the Agreement on Trade related aspects of intellec-
tual property (TRIPS) as a case of study to explore how the world trading 
system embraced global propertization of intangibles by means of linkage 
to trade. It explains how TRIPS expands legal monopolies such as patents, 
which are taken as an illustrative example across the chapter, and thus have 
an impact on the traditional underpinnings of the market-economy by allow-
ing IP holders to segment territories for proprietary technologies world scale 
under rights-based vertical hub-and-spokes schemes. Along these lines, the 
chapter also explains how, by virtue of linking IP to trade, WTO Members 
have transformed the terms of trade, and subsequently produced additional 
incentives for IP lobbies to increase pressure on both technology-exporting 
and importing countries for extra world propertization of intangibles, which 
is pursued today through a variety of so-called TRIPs-plus initiatives. Final-
ly, the piece also explains how the TRIPS agreement has produced a form of 
global property, which is highly liquid and tradable and which often sets IP-
based anticompetitive arrangements beyond the enforcement radar of global 
antitrust law and policy. In this vein, licensing is taken as an example to brief-
ly illustrate the challenges faced. 
The subsequent chapter takes a brief look to the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA), as this WTO covered agreement captures regulatory pat-
terns and trends in the ways modern public administrations currently deliver 
public policies. Subject to a recent upgrade in both its provisions and cov-
erage, the new revised GPA entering into force on April 2014 illustrates the 
long-term historical transformation in the way governments are framed and 
conceived at delivering their policies: steering, not rowing. Under a regulato-
ry paradigm based on improving efficiency and best value for money, the 43 
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GPA Parties have reformed the 1996 GPA framework and thus significant-
ly expanded the so-called global procurement markets. The interest of ex-
ploring the GPA also resides in the increasing appeal of WTO plurilateralism 
among some WTO Members, as a second-best to multilateralism. For some 
observers, in this policy lines, the plurilateral experience of the GPA to date 
could inform extra explorations on variable geometry within the WTO. 
The final section of the book takes a look at culture from the law and policy 
perspective built into the world trading system. The dichotomy between cul-
ture as ‘expressions within community’ and culture as ‘goods and services 
within market’ is a quite telling case study to approach the inner assumptions 
of world trade law and thus to apprehend the WTO puzzle. In order to do so, 
these pages explore the legal position of culture within the world trading sys-
tem, as well as its contrast with treaty-based strategies of resistance deployed 
by ministers of culture within UNESCO: namely the convention on cultural 
diversity. The chapter aims at contextualizing the competing legal world vi-
sions on this (trade / non-trade) issue which are regulated in divergent direc-
tions across the fragmented regulatory structures of global governance. To 
illustrate the diverse policy perspectives on culture, the final section displays 
a few self-evident policy alternatives in this area. The main reason to close 
the book with a chapter looking not only inside but outside WTO is that these 
global inter-ministerial battles −also briefly explored regarding the environ-
ment in last sections of chapter 4− vividly illustrate the formidable challenge 
of delivering coherence within the fragmented networks of technocratic gov-
ernance.
Interdependence and exchange are powerful drivers of community, and thus 
intrinsically associated with our human (read social) nature, since our very 
first ancestors began gathering in small groups to make more of their lives, 
and not to merely survive. Multilateral cooperation to expand open trade, 
beginning halfway through the last century, is deeply linked to those key 
features of our social nature. These pages explore some selected issues and 
themes at the latter end of this long-term phenomenon. In this regard, they 
focus on some contemporary developments of this collective experience; as 
such, these are open reflections. Not surprisingly, the world trading system 
is not only a driver of interdependence and exchange but also a critical fab-
ric having an inevitable bearing in our societies generally. Building cohesive 
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architectures within global governance, and thus also balancing open mar-
kets with a stronger global polity, is a prerequisite for enhancing sustainable 
human welfare. In using this perspective on policy, these pages frame the 
powerful regulatory dynamics of the world trade regime as it is seen to stand 
today, with lights and shadows, notwithstanding its great contribution to de-
velopment, sociability and peace. 
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A history of regime-building at GATT club
1. Diplomacy by design 
The building of the world trading system was to take a long and somewhat 
tortuous path, beginning in the summer of 1944, as the Second World War 
was finally coming to an end. It was at that time that the Charters of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Reconstruction and 
Development Bank (the World Bank) were designed in order to create an in-
stitutional structure for economic relations in the post-war period (Bretton 
Woods Conference). At the time, the negotiators hoped to establish an inter-
national organization which would progressively eliminate trade barriers.1 
In essence, the initiative arose as a reaction against the protectionism of the 
interwar period.2 This was to be the third pillar of what was known as the 
Bretton Woods system. 
The first policy proposal on the need for regime-building in the area of world 
trade was a United States government report issued in February 1945 (Pro-
posals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment), which formally 
placed on the global public agenda the idea of creating an international orga-
nization specifically focused on reducing protectionism.3 By October of the 
following year, the United States had already submitted a detailed proposal 
for the constitution of this new organization to the United Nations Econom-
ic and Social Council (ECOSOC). At its first meeting in February 1946, the 
ECOSOC brought up the idea of this ‘Suggested Charter for an International 
Trade Organization of the United Nations’,4 and unanimously adopted a res-
olution to convene a United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. 
1  R. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Clarendon Press) at 31. 
2  T. Flory, Le GATT. Droit International et commerce mondial (LGDJ 1968) at 2–3.
3  W. Diebold, ‘The End of the ITO’, Essays in International Finance 16 (1952): 3. 
4  Doc U.N. EPCT/CII/1-66 (1946).
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The conference, finally held in Havana between November 1947 and March 
1948, would begin diplomatic negotiations to create an International Trade 
Organization (ITO).5
As a result, three preparatory conferences were held in London, New York 
and Geneva. During the London meetings (October and November 1946), a 
draft Charter was debated and drawn up, based on the original proposal by 
the US. At the same time, it was agreed to negotiate tariff reductions at the 
next meeting and a specific treaty framework was planned to safeguard these 
results. In the New York meeting, early in 1947, that instrument building 
on provisions in the draft Charter was drawn up under the title of ‘General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (GATT).6 
Thus, the preparatory conference in Geneva continued to work on the draft 
Charter (also known as Havana Charter) while pursuing the tariff negotiations 
at the same time. The reasons for this strategy were basically dependent on 
domestic US politics; at that time, the viability of the ITO as an international 
organization faced obstacles due to the internal political tensions between 
the US executive and legislative branches. Under the US Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934, in essence, Roosevelt’s government was authorized 
by Congress to conclude trade agreements, but not to set up international 
organizations. Thus, as the Havana Charter faced an uncertain future,7 the 
GATT text was envisioned as an interim arrangement in the wake of the un-
certain ITO ratification, but had to exclude all organizational elements from 
its provisions. 
Finally, 23 founding contracting parties endorsed the GATT in 30 October 
1947, together with schedules containing the tariff reductions and tariff bind-
5  J. Viner, ‘Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter’, 25 Foreign Affairs (1947): 
612–628.
6  J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT. A Legal Analysis of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (The Boobs-Merrills Company Inc 1969) at 43. 
7  For a detailed account of the ITO negotiations see, in particular, S. Aaronson, Trade 
and the American Dream: A Social History of Postwar Trade Policy (University Press 
of Kentucky 1996). For the specific diplomatic history within ITO negotiations giving rise 
to the GATT (and precise explanations on why it took its particular shape and form) see 
D. Irving, P.Mavroidis & A.Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press 
2008).
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ings. These schedules covered some 45,000 tariff concessions and about $10 
billion in trade. Both the form and substance of the GATT also drew heavily on 
the US bilateral trade agreements, particularly post-1935 trade agreements.8 
The GATT entered into force through a protocol of provisional application 
even before the United Nations Conference had ended, in 1 January 1948. 
The Protocol of Provisional Application contained a clause that provided for 
Part II to be applied ‘to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legis-
lation’.9 The underlying reason for this haste was again due to domestic US 
politics, as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act granted the executive a con-
gressional authorization to negotiate trade agreements (renewable for three 
year periods) which was about to expire. 
The Final Act authenticating the text of the Havana Charter was signed in 
March 1948 by 53 countries,10 covering a wide range of issues that had never 
before been tackled by any previous economic diplomatic conference.11 How-
ever, unlike the trade policy provisions, the chapters on employment policy, 
economic development, commodity agreements and restrictive business prac-
tices, were relatively new matters and, paraphrasing Bob Hudec, did not rest on 
the same degree of consensus.12 In any case, while waiting for the subsequent 
and unclear ratification of the Charter, an Interim Commission for the Interna-
tional Trade Organization (ICITO) was created, as an ad hoc secretariat for the 
weak new trade scheme, moving from Lake Placid (New York) to Geneva. This 
interim UN subsidiary body, based at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, would 
play a crucial role in GATT regime-building, under the critical leadership of 
Eric Wyndham White (1947-1968),13 its first ‘Executive Director’.14 The ICITO 
8  R. Hudec. ‘The GATT legal system, op.cit.p.616.
9  For the efforts of the GATT Secretariat in 1965 to propose that governments under-
take ‘definitive’ instead of ‘provisional’ acceptance but with reservation from pre-existing 
legislation see See GATT Doc L/2375 (5 March 1965).
10  See UN Doc E/Conf2/78, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment (24 March 1948).
11  W. Clayton, ‘Foreword’, in C.Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade, op.cit.p.vii. 
12  R. Hudec, ‘The GATT legal system, op.cit.p.620.
13  Following Francine McKenzie, there can be few heads of international organizations 
who rival Wyndham White for the widespread high regard in which he was held. See F. 
McKenzie, IO BIO, Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Or-
ganizations (13 March 2012). 
14  White became the first Executive-Secretary for the ICITO. The title for the position 
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was to be a cornerstone of the GATT from the moment that trade delegates and 
diplomats realized that ratifications of the Charter were not going to material-
ize. In practice, the project of a rule-based multilateral trade regime was kept 
alive thanks to that minimal institutional structure and the notable individuals 
working within it. Thus, with the passing of years, the ICITO staff ended up 
becoming de facto the GATT secretariat.15 With the help of the people from 
the ICITO, in fact, the GATT Contracting Parties went on to organize their first 
two rounds of tariff negotiations in the following two years (Annecy 1949 and 
Torquay 1950), inaugurating the famous GATT MTN Rounds. 
In December 1950, the US government finally made public its decision not 
to submit the ITO Charter to the US Congress for ratification. The decision 
paralyzed the ratification processes in a context in which the United States 
had become the major political and economic power of the post-war inter-
national order. Consequently, pragmatic solutions were sought to give the 
GATT a certain institutional structure somehow. Making a virtue of necessity, 
article XXV entitled ‘Joint Action of the Contracting Parties’ became the fo-
cus around which a minimum organic structure would be cautiously built for 
the GATT to function. Interestingly, this provision enabled trade representa-
tives to create an organization from almost nothing. In practice, a new body 
was invented, under the noun ‘contracting parties’, written in capital letters 
to differentiate from the Contracting Parties taken as individuals. The open 
wording of Article XXV transformed the provision into the ideal legal basis 
for progressively shaping a wide institutional structure: 
‘The Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to time for the pur-
pose of giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement which involve joint action and, 
generally, with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this 
Agreement’. 
progressively changed as the non-organization developed, under his leadership. Thus, in 
1957, White became Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties of GATT in 1957. A few 
years later, in 1960, the title would change again to Director General of the Contracting 
Parties of the GATT. See J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT. A Legal Analysis 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (The Boobs-Merrills Company Inc 1969) 
at 148–150.
15  J. Jackson, World Trading System: Law and policy of international economic rela-
tions (MIT Press 1989) at 37.
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Paradoxically, clinging to this raft, the Contracting Parties acting jointly as 
contracting parties would manage to intelligently overcome a weak institu-
tional framework.16 Not surprisingly, the project led by the ICITO Secretariat 
faced a complicated and drawn out process. In any case, however, the regular 
meetings of trade representatives (the so-called ‘Sessions’) were able to slow-
ly and consensually set up the minimum structure for managing the GATT, 
and thus for keeping regime-building going. This was a period of great uncer-
tainty, a time of cautious and careful experimentation in filling in the gaps in 
the institutional deficiencies of the GATT regime. 
It would take some time for the US Congress to legitimize the GATT. At 
the 1951 extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, a section read 
as follows: ‘The enactment of this Act shall not be construed to determine 
or indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Executive 
Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’. In these 
difficult circumstances, the ICITO Secretariat de facto became the GATT 
‘Secretariat’ and provided the strategic impetus for developing its basic or-
ganic structure.17 
Given this state of affairs, the contracting parties created the Ad hoc Com-
mittee for Agenda and Inter-Sessional Business in its ninth session of 
1951.18The Committee met some weeks (from four to six) prior to the meet-
ings of the former in order to compose the collective agenda. For the pur-
pose of regime-building, interestingly, joint decisions were adopted and a 
voting system was allowed whereby the voters’ presence was not required, 
as mail and telegraph were permitted as a means of voting. At last, once it 
was certain that the ITO Charter would never enter into force, all that re-
mained for trade delegates was to push for institutionalization by progres-
sively developing the Ad Hoc Committee. In practice, the Committee would 
become the ‘guardian’ of the GATT in subsequent decades and, in fact, it led 
to the establishment in 1960 of the GATT Council of Representatives, as the 
16  See J. Jackson, The World Trade and the law, op.cit.pp.132-136, J. Jackson, The 
World Trading System, op.cit.p.90 and J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Con-
stitution and jurisprudence (RIIA 1998) at 83-84.
17  See R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the GATT Secretaríat in the Evolution of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Procedure’, The Uruguay Round and Beyond. Essays in Honour of Arthur 
Dunkel (Springer 1998) at 105 and J. Jackson, The World Trading System, op.cit.p.37.
18  BISD II (1952) p.205. 
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permanent GATT body to undertake work between the regular sessions of 
the Contracting Parties.19 
However, the trade diplomats who negotiated in Havana did not give up their 
efforts to obtain full international legal personality for the GATT. Thus, these 
trade representatives renegotiated and drew up a second Charter proposal 
for an Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) in the ninth meeting period 
from October 1954 to March 1955.20 This initiative also fell by the wayside; 
and it therefore became clear to the GATT community that the only viable 
strategy for slowly extending the organizational fabric was to create a highly 
professional Secretariat, and begin operations by establishing some working 
groups and committees under a common agenda. As a result, the post of Ex-
ecutive Secretary was finally created in 1955, an office that was already being 
informally held in any case by Wyndham White since his early days at the 
ICITO. The game played under his leadership remained focused on slow and 
cautious regime-building,21 in a complex policy context in which ECOSOC had 
become a forum for GATT’s detractors in a widely endorsed resolution aiming 
at studying alternatives to GATT which would be adopted a year later.22
The Executive Secretary was to play a critical role in building bridges among 
delegations, in order to progressively build up the whole infrastructure, 
mandate and legitimacy of the accidental organization.23 As Kenneth Dam 
portrays him, ‘at every major turning point and in every major success in 
GATT history has figured an imaginative compromise, an unexpected initia-
tive, or a face-saving formula originated by Wyndham White’. In the words of 
Braithwaite and Drahos, by the time he retired in 1968, with the title of DG of 
19  BISD 9S /17-20 (1961).
20  See K. Dam, The GATT: law and international economic organization (1970) at 
337–338.
21  See W. Eckes, ‘In Globalization, People Matter: Eight who shaped the World Trading 
System’, 4 Global Economy Journal (2000): 303–314. 
22  See World Economic Situation: Measures for the Development of Trade Co-opera-
tion, 22nd Session, UN Doc E/AC.6/L160 (28 July 1956) as well as Summary Record of 
206th Meeting of the Economic Committee, ECOSOC Doc E/AC.6/SR.206 (30 July 1956), 
in particular. 
23  For a fine biographical sketch of this ‘towering figure’ in GATT history see, in partic-
ular, R. De Souzas Farias, ‘Mr GATT: Eric Wyndham White and the quest for trade liber-
alization’, 3 World Trade Review (2013): 463–485.
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the GATT, ‘he had forged an unconstitutional, temporary GATT into the most 
powerful, entrenched non-organization the world had seen’.24 Illustratively, 
right at the beginning of the 60s, Wyndham White was framing the GATT in 
the following terms: 
‘The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as its name clearly indicates, is, juridically 
speaking, a trade agreement and nothing more. But because it is a multilateral agreement 
and contains provisions for joint action and decision it had the potentiality to become, 
and has in fact become, an international ‘organization’ for trade cooperation between the 
signatory States’.25
Thus, a workable GATT regime was already in place, and would be carefully 
nurtured by a small community of trade diplomats and technocrats. From 
there to the signing of the WTO agreement in April 1994, four fascinating 
decades of regime-building would get underway. To paraphrase Kenneth 
Dam, the GATT was the humblest if not the neediest of the many interna-
tional bodies on the world scene; yet in terms of success it ranks among the 
highest achievers: this initial disadvantage was largely overcome thanks to 
the persistence of a dedicated and pragmatic Secretariat, with the remarkable 
help, political will and leadership of key Contracting Parties such as the US.26 
In practice, despite the fact that it was not an international organization at 
the outset, the GATT gradually evolved to become a strong regime in its own 
terms. 
In the interim, it operated precariously for almost half a century. In order for 
GATT to have entered into force, the instruments of ratification or acceptance 
should have represented 85% of the external trade of the territories included 
in Annex H. However, only Haiti accepted the GATT (7 March 1952) in confor-
mance with article XVI (Acceptance, entry in force and registration).27 There-
fore, the GATT did not technically enter into force: under the 1947 Protocol 
of Provisional Application and subsequent Protocols of Accession, the GATT 
24  See J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation, op.cit.p.177.
25  See E. Wyndham White, ‘GATT as an International Trade Organization’ (public 
speech), Polish Institute of International Affairs (Warsaw, 6 June 1961).
26  K. Dam, The GATT Law and International, op.cit.p.335.
27  Liberia also accepted the GATT on 17 May 1950, but withdrew on 13 June 1953. See 
Analytical Index of the GATT: Guide to GATT law and practice, at 924.
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was in fact to be under provisional application for the following decades.28 
Paraphrasing Jackson, the GATT had a ‘dubious legal status’ which has inevi-
tably led to misunderstandings both by the general public and the media, and 
even by government officials.29 Logically, this could have led to a variety of 
challenging legal issues and questions. However, interestingly, the constitu-
tional and international legal literature rarely raised this issue in detail. 
Provisional application did not bring into question the legal nature of this 
instrument,30 but rather the way of going about things, given that parliamen-
tary democracies did not take much part in developing this critical node of 
global exchange until the mid-90s!! Half a century of provisional application, 
without parliamentary ratifications, is a rather long process and, as such, an 
interesting issue for analysis. As such, Jan Klabbers chose the GATT as the 
most famous example of how provisions on the entry into force of treaties is 
not the best indicator of the binding nature of such treaties.31 Nevertheless, 
this situation influenced the way that things were done within GATT during 
that long period. In this respect, for example, it is quite illustrative that the 
initials of the ICITO were formally displayed at the GATT headquarters for 
many years.32 Equally interesting is the fact the United States Congress au-
thorized its annual contributions to the GATT in the budgetary section of ‘in-
ternational conferences and ancillary costs’ until 1968. Hence, during their 
early years, the building of the post-war legal infrastructures for open mar-
kets basically advanced keeping the organization’s head above water. 
John Jackson refers to the ‘fiction’ that the GATT was not an ‘organization’ 
28  See J. Jackson, ‘The Puzzle of GATT’, 1 Journal of World Trade Law 2 (1967):133, 
note.14 and E. Petersmann, ‘The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organi-
zation and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948’, 31 Common 
Market Law Review (1994):1162.
29  J. Jackson, ‘Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: 
WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Prospects’, The WTO as an International Orga-
nization (University of Chicago Press 1998) at 163.
30  See article 25 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties (provisional ap-
plication).
31  J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law International 
1996), pp.75–76.
32  P. Nichols, ‘GATT Doctrine’, 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 2 (1996): 390, 
note 57.
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but had generally avoided the adjective ‘international’, whenever he referred 
to it in his early legal writings. In line with this, the section on this matter in 
his classic work The World Trading System (1989) is indicatively entitled 
‘the GATT as organization’.33 In his words, the General Agreement did not es-
tablish an organization ‘in theory’, although ‘in practice’ operated as one34. In 
turn, other scholars maintain that the GATT was neither a treaty nor an inter-
national organization35. Similar differences of approach regarding this issue 
permeate the legal literature. In Spanish scholarship, for example, Remiro 
Brotons contends that it was understandable that, for international legal ex-
perts, the GATT was a clumsy instrument due to its evident inability to sur-
vive in defiance of the most basic legal standards and forms; furthermore, 
Brotons goes so far to state that the GATT lacked international subjectivity.36 
For other scholars, such as Liñán Nogueras, the GATT operated ‘on the basis 
of a somewhat conventional provisionality and with an organic element that 
was far from formal constructions’.37 By contrast, Pastor Ridruejo holds that 
the contracting parties of the GATT ‘empirically created’ an international or-
ganization.38 
The international legal literature exploring these questions offers diverse legal 
interpretations regarding this very issue. Certainly, the GATT was a curious 
experiment, both unusual and innovative, which was to progressively grow 
in strength despite its serious ‘birth defects’. The old-school GATT diploma-
cy managed to progressively develop one of the most effective and powerful 
regulatory regimes in contemporary world history. As mentioned, the success 
of GATT ‘as an organization’ was due to the efforts of a very small commu-
nity of trade diplomats who managed intelligently to sustain and reinforce 
its originally precarious set of rules against the odds of its flawed origins. In 
the words of Hudec, a ‘slow incremental development’ was the secret to the 
33  J. Jackson, The World Trading System, op.cit.p.37 and 41. 
34  J. Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations. Cases, Materials 
and Text (West Publishers 1995) at 289. 
35  P. Nichols, ‘GATT Doctrine’, op.cit.p.390.
36  A. Remiro Brotons, ‘Pelagattos y Aristogattos de la Comunidad Europea ante el Reino 
de la OMC’, 26 Gaceta Jurídica de la Comunidad Europea (1996):17–18.
37  D. Liñán Nogueras, in M. Diez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional 
Público (Tecnos 2011) at 615.
38  J. A. Pastor Ridruejo, Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones 
Internacionales (Tecnos 1996) at 823. 
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GATT’s legal success over all these decades.39 As a result, the GATT commu-
nity ended up organizing eight MTN Rounds, until finally an international 
organization with a remarkable institutional design and fully fledged inter-
national legal personality came into being, when WTO burst onto the scene 
of global governance on 1 January 1995.40 In short, the success of GATT’s 
regime-building is an unprecedented experience in the history of global gov-
ernance. It vividly illustrates how the strong political will of a minor group of 
peoples -mainly comprising trade diplomats and officials- was able to keep 
the flame of open markets alive in a precarious and provisional context, for 
decades. The peculiar and tortuous path towards its institutional consolida-
tion since its weak inception after the Second World War has in fact led some 
literature to qualify the GATT as an ‘historic accident’,and these observers 
are not far wrong,41 as the so-called GATT club successfully challenged all 
traditional legal standards of its era. 
2. The rule-based system 
The development of the world trading system is a landmark in contemporary 
world history. In order to understand how this regime came about, trans-
forming itself into WTO, it is particularly illustrative to focus on the com-
munity of professionals that ‘chipped away’ tenaciously over decades to con-
struct a dispute settlement mechanism within a regime under provisional 
application. The first by-product of their collective effort was the invention of 
GATT panels, which with the passage of time gradually became formalized, 
until its final transformation into a first ever and brand new world tribunal in 
January 1 1995; a mechanism that is sometimes portrayed, in its own rights, 
as the jewel in the crown of the WTO.
Law, lawyers and adjudication have played a changing role in the world trad-
ing system from the earliest days of its precarious inception. In this regard, 
one of the most interesting phenomena arising from the experience of re-
39  R. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: the Evolution of the Modern GATT 
Legal System (Butterworth Legal Publishers 1993) at 364.
40  R. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, op.cit.p.364.
41  T. Flory, Le GATT. Droit International, op.cit.pp.4-5 and G. Curzon & V. Curzon, 
‘“GATT: Traders´ Club, op.cit. p.31.
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gime-building in the GATT is the diverse and changing uses of law and ad-
judication within the body. In fact, the history of world trade liberalization 
since the end of the Second World War -and thus the origins and foundations 
for global economic interdependence- cannot be effectively grasped without 
paying attention to this phenomenon. In essence, the world trading system 
has passed through five main stages with regard to rule-based adjudication. 
Basically, these stages have defined and redefined half a century of global eco-
nomic interdependence, first with regard to trade in goods (GATT 1947-1994) 
and finally also in terms of services (GATS 1995) as well as propertization of 
intangibles (TRIPS 1995):
•	 Phase 1: a first ‘legalist’ stage, which dominated the drafting of the 
GATT and its amendments at the end of the nineteen forties (1946-
1947);42 
•	 Phase 2: a long ‘pragmatic’ stage (focused on consensus-building), 
which governs its administration and the interpretation of legal texts 
over the next twenty years (1947-1970s); 
•	 Phase 3: a third stage of relative inactivity regarding rule-based adju-
dication, which covers the decade of the 70s, and concluding in 1979 
with the new rules resulting from the Tokyo Round; 
•	 Phase 4: a following stage which began in the 80s when the focus re-
turned again to law as the preferential technique to develop solutions 
for trade disputes. 
•	 Phase 5: a current fifth stage characterized by fully-fledged hyper-le-
galization.
In the beginning, the evolution of GATT starts out with a markedly diplomatic 
approach. Initially, the first delegations considered that diplomacy (not law) 
should be the main tool for resolving inter-state differences in GATT. The 
collective attitude was best summarized by John Jackson, as leaving ‘legal 
technicalities’ to one side.43 By that time, the legal approach was viewed with 
criticism and even certain mistrust. The reason is simple: as explained, the 
GATT of 1947 was basically a tariff-liberalization agreement lacking appro-
priate institutional structures. Since the ITO Charter failed to pass through 
the US Congress, the agreement was under provisional application and, in 
42  K. Dam, The GATT Law, op.cit.p.4.
43  J. Jackson, ‘The Puzzle of GATT’, 1 Journal of World Trade Law 2 (1967): 132.
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consequence, in a precarious situation for playing the hard-law game. There-
fore, the Contracting Parties administered the GATT under consensus, and 
stayed focused on consensus-building for a long period, as a means of surviv-
ing while awaiting better days: at that time, consensus-building was the name 
of the game, built around a loose but intelligently administered article XXV.
In this way, during the first few decades of the GATT, an eminently diplomat-
ic approach governed the administration of GATT rules. As Robert Hudec 
portrayed it, the GATT of this period operated as a diplomatic instrument.44 
In the words of the last Director General of the GATT of 47, Olivier Long 
(1968-1980), emphasizing the importance of the diplomatic approach at that 
time: ‘legalism does not contribute to trade liberalization’. For this former 
Director General, the primary objective of the dispute settlement procedures 
was not to decide who is right and who is wrong but to proceed in such a 
way that even significant violations ‘are only temporary and are terminated as 
quickly as possible’.45 This policy vision, however, slowly lost support as the 
GATT became more firmly entrenched as an organization. 
Thus, the strong consensus-building culture in the GATT´s epistemic com-
munity developed, expanded and reinforced the bits and pieces of an origi-
nally weak instrument (under purely provisional application) to incremental-
ly construct one of the most highly effective nodal regimes of global economic 
governance. Only after the trade diplomats managed to deliver six consecu-
tive tariff Rounds, the GATT regime was basically consolidated, and a more 
legalist approach (based on state rights and obligations) gradually begun 
gaining credence. As a result, legal compliance slowly moved centre stage, as 
the preferred approach to trade disputes. 
Literally, diplomacy died by success. By regularly lowering tariffs, the consen-
sus-based former GATT was ready to jump to a compliance-based hard-law 
regime. However, the triumph of law over diplomacy was not achieved with-
out strong policy tensions. The debate over the relative weight of legal rules 
vis-à-vis diplomacy within the world trading system not only would involve 
44  R. Hudec, ‘The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence’, 4 Journal of World 
Trade (1970): 615.
45  O. Long, Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral System (Martinus Nijhoff 
1987) at 71 and 73. 
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discussions on the most effective methods and techniques to solve trade dis-
putes but also, and inevitably, cultural clashes with regard to the best profes-
sional qualifications to participate in the new policy era. 
The debate over balancing diplomacy and law inside GATT decision-making, 
as Jackson recalls, has a long history.46 However, it was during the nineteen 
eighties that these two main philosophies -diplomacy and law- came into 
conflict, both in respect of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism (panels) 
and, by logical extension, with respect to the inner functioning and develop-
ment of the world trading system.47 The competing perceptions with regard 
to the direction of the mechanics of dispute settlement (and GATT as a func-
tional regime itself) were often encapsuled in a basic and clear-cut dichoto-
my: (1) legalism vs pragmatism or, in other words, (2) rule-based approaches 
vs diplomatic approaches. 
Recalling that period, for example, William Davey, the first Director of the 
WTO legal service (1995-1999) attributed greater emphasis on negotiation 
and consensus as opposed to the ‘anti-legalist’ approach, and an accentua-
tion of adjudication (dispute settlement by third parties) to the ‘legalist’ ap-
proach.48 This policy battle had a critical importance for the world trading 
system from a functional perspective. However, as mentioned, the battle was 
not only over defining the preferential techniques for administering the evo-
lution of the GATT but also inevitably over the professional qualifications of 
those individuals best suited to do the job. Ultimately, legalism and the in-
creasing influence of both the legal profession and trade law scholars would 
shift the power-relations inside the GATT community towards the so-called 
‘rule-based approach’.49 
The inauguration of the Journal of World Trade Law in 1967 was also a mean-
46  See J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, op.cit.p.63.
47  See ‘Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement under The GATT and 
the Tokyo Round Agreements’, Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, on In-
vestigation Nº332-212 Under Section 332 (g) of the Tariff Act of 1930, USITC Publication 
1793 (December 1985) at 68. 
48  W. Davey, ‘Dispute Settlement in GATT’, 11 Fordham International Law Journal 1 
(1987): 66 and 97.
49  See R. Shell, ‘Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the 
World Trade Organization’, 44 Duke Law Journal 5 (1995): 846 and note 81.
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ingful sign of the times, by mainstreaming world trade law into academia. 
But more significantly, it is no coincidence that one of the leading intellectual 
figures behind the idea of creating a brand new rule-based international or-
ganization at the Uruguay Round, John Jackson, also distinguished between 
a ‘diplomatic approach’ and ‘rule-based approach’ in GATT.50 In fact, this 
academic authored the first legal monograph on GATT, as early as 1969.51 It 
goes without saying that what he coined as ‘rule-based approach’ meant a pri-
mary role for law in practice, with a few subtle pragmatic considerations. As 
Jackson explains, the tension was therefore a question of degree, of prepon-
derance of one element over another, more than an extreme confrontation in 
the sense of a zero-sum game.52
In the earlier stages of the GATT, even the legal nature of its rules was ques-
tioned. Bob Hudec’s comments regarding the characterization of the GATT 
rules in 1978,53 as well as those on the GATT legal system a few years before 
(1970), are particularly apposite reflections on this theme: 
‘The key to understanding the GATT legal system is to recognize that GATT’s law has been 
designed and operated as an instrument of diplomacy. Although the GATT legal system 
has many points in common with domestic models, the thing which sets it apart from 
others is the overriding concern for ‘flexibility’ –the insistence that the law’s coercive pres-
sures be applied in a controlled fashion which allow room for maneuver at every stage of 
the process.54 
In short, the rule-based approach was a critical development in modern his-
tory of economic interdependence. Interestingly, some observers also at-
tributed the diplomatic and rule-based approach to the behavior of some key 
GATT Contracting Parties. Thus, the US-originated literature tended to de-
fine the general attitude of the United States as ‘a legalist approach’ and that 
of Japan and the European Community as a diplomatic one.55 Similarly, a 
50  See J. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (Council on Foreign Relations Press 
1990).
51  See J. Jackson, World Trade, op.cit.p.43. 
52  J. Jackson, Restructuring, op.cit.p.59.
53  R. Hudec, ‘Adjudication of International Trade Disputes’, Thames Essay nº1 (Trade 
Policy Research Centre 1978) at 31-33. 
54  R. Hudec. ‘The GATT legal system, op.cit.p.665.
55  See for example, inter alia, W. Davey ‘The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Over-
view, Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (Kluwer law international 1997) at 75. 
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report on the dispute settlement mechanism drawn up by the US Senate in 
1985 identified the United States, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Australia 
as Contracting Parties which perceive GATT as a set of binding obligations; 
conversely, Japan and the European Community were characterized as favor-
ing a ‘flexible approach’, based on negotiation and consensus: ‘to the [Euro-
pean Communities], diplomacy rather than adjudication is argued to be the 
intended GATT philosophy, and third-party adjudication was not conceived 
of as requiring policy changes’. From that perspective, as the report added, 
the nature of GATT as an instrument regulating rights and obligations would 
be de-emphasized.56 
Also the more legalist approach attributed to the United States in that peri-
od was occasionally associated with an alleged traditional higher reliance of 
Americans on law and litigation. In line with this thesis, greater adhesion of 
the US administration to legal tools in the GATT would be more a cultural is-
sue than a question of interests.57 However, this approach was arguably more 
influenced by the fact that the GATT was drafted under the indisputable lead-
ership of the United States following the Second World War; and thus was 
also better adapted to its basic policy vision and economic interests. Reason-
ably, the more legalist approach of the European Union in WTO today could 
be explained by the same token: following the Uruguay Round, the rules of 
the game better reflect its aggregate interests; as a result, legalism also makes 
greater sense for Europeans. 
Last but not least, legalism is naturally connected to general perceptions 
among world trade experts and practitioners with regard to the aggregate 
benefits resulting from participating in an open trading system. The greater 
or lesser legalist behaviour of trading nations with regard to the WTO can be 
probably best explained as such. At the present time, the rule-based approach 
is the overarching pattern that defines the functioning of the WTO in most of 
its disciplines, excepting those regarding PTAs. Therefore, looking back, ‘le-
galism’ has not produced a ‘poisoning of the atmosphere’ of the multilateral 
trading system but quite the contrary; it has also strengthened it for a long 
56  See Review of, op.cit.p.68.
57  R. Ostrihansky, ‘Settlement of Interstate Trade Disputes: The Role of Law and Legal 
Procedures”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1991): 180.
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time.58 Currently, the vast majority of the world trade community defends the 
benefits of a strong WTO legal system and a rule-based approach in settling 
disputes59. The almost 70 years of the world trading system have ended up 
by persuading the many critics that such an approach is the most effective 
one for all. As Hudec recalled, social institutions tend to follow a pattern of 
maturing from informal processes involving accommodating interests, to for-
mal processes based on pre-established norms. This is clearly the case of the 
rules within the GATT/WTO regime. In essence, the key to success in the long 
term was considered to be the progressive circumventing of power politics 
by promoting increased compliance with the rules of the game. Under that 
approach, however, multilateral negotiations of new rules have become in-
creasingly complex. Evidently, a binding dispute settlement mechanism with 
teeth to authorize the suspension of trade concessions not only operates as a 
powerful lever for obtaining compliance with pre-existing commitments but 
also raises the stakes for negotiating new law.
3. Inventing adjudication 
Historically, the use of dispute settlement mechanisms in free trade agree-
ments was not seriously considered until the ITO was drafted,60 although 
the establishment of a world trade tribunal is obviously an older idea. In fact, 
Huston Thompson −a US prominent government official under Woodrow 
Wilson’s policy orbit− already suggested in 1919 the creation of an interna-
tional trade tribunal to be incorporated into the Versailles Treaty, and advo-
cated its development for several years.61 Aside from the proposals of vision-
ary individuals, the first serious diplomatic moves in this policy direction were 
the ITO negotiations. Originally, it was agreed that the Charter rules would be 
justiciable in the United Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ). Howev-
er, the idea of adjudication that prevailed at that time among some key trade 
58  W. Davey, ‘Dispute Settlement in GATT, op.cit.pp.70-72.
59  See for example, M. Young, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Tri-
umph over Diplomats’, 29 The International Lawyer 2 (1995): 389-409.
60  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the GATT Secretariat’, op.cit.p.102. 
61  See eg. H. Thompson, ‘Reconstruction of International Good Will’, 102 Annals of the 
American Academy of Policy and Society 162 (1922), ‘World Held in Need of Trade Tri-
bunal’, Washington Post, (June 11, 1931) at 5 and H. Thompson, ‘An international trade 
tribunal’, 34 ASIL Proceedings 1(1940): 3-4.
PABLO ZAPATERO
70
delegates was at odds with such a development. Notwithstanding the final 
wording of the Chapter, a memorandum on the issue of the ICJ sent by the 
UK Delegation after the first drafting session of the Charter (London, 1946), 
captures the idea about law within some key delegations: 
‘The making of rulings under the Charter should […], we feel, be the function of the In-
ternational Trade Organization itself and not of an outside body such as the International 
Court whose proper function is to determine questions of law and not to appraise econom-
ic facts… In almost every conceivable case arising under the Charter, the issues will of their 
nature involve the element of economic appraisal and assessment and will not be purely 
legal in character, and it will be impossible to say where economic judgment ends and legal 
argument begins’.62
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that the GATT regime could not have 
achieved its long term success if a series of innovations from its earliest years 
had not made it possible to effectively settle disputes between its Contracting 
Parties. The failed Havana Charter contained a detailed dispute settlement 
procedure in articles 93, 94 and 95 (Chapter IV).63 However, acknowledging 
the uncertainties of the ratification process explained above, the provisions 
from Chapter IV were reworded in the interim, giving rise to articles XXII 
and XXIII of the GATT. These two articles provide the legal basis for the pro-
gressive construction of a dispute settlement mechanism within the GATT re-
gime. From the very early days, and on the basis of these scant provisions, the 
GATT diplomats set in motion a series of informal dispute settlement practic-
es which were progressively developed during the first two decades, and final-
ly were codified during the 1973-1979 Tokyo Round.64 Later on, those codified 
practices were to become the building blocks for designing the effective and 
innovative WTO dispute settlement mechanism at the 1986-1994 Uruguay 
Round.65 Certainly, the transformation of those minimum provisions into the 
62  See E/PC/T/C6/W77 (14 February 1947).
63  For a comment see W. Brown, The United States and the Restoration of World 
Trade: An Analysis and Appraisal of ITO Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (Brookings Institution 1950), pp.227 and subsequent pages.
64  A. Ligustro, Le controversie tra stati nel diritto del commercio internazionale: del 
GATT all’OMC (Cedam 1996) at 94.
65  On the model and preliminary proposals for reform of the mechanism see, in partic-
ular, R. Hudec, Adjudication of International Trade Disputes, Thames Essay nº16 (Trade 
Policy Research Centre 1978) and W. Davey, ‘Dispute Settlement in GATT’, 11 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1 (1987): 51-106.
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current WTO dispute settlement mechanism is, paraphrasing Pescatore, ‘one 
of the most remarkable and pragmatic achievements of international law’.66 
And again, this institutional development was the direct result of joint efforts 
and experimentation by a small group of GATT insiders. These trade rep-
resentatives, officials and experts provided the impetus for such a complex 
endeavor by sharing a global policy vision regarding world trade (as public 
good). Understandably, for these people, dispute settlement was a prominent 
item on the agenda from the first meetings of the contracting parties. The 
GATT community was fully aware that regime-building required settling dis-
putes within the regime in one way or another, and thus some sort of dispute 
settlement mechanism had to be developed, even if such a device was to be a 
highly simplified one, at first. 
As a result, the early years of GATT show a low profile and cautious experi-
mentation by some contracting parties and the Secretariat, having embarked 
on a sustained strategy to develop a dispute settlement mechanism almost 
from scratch. A series of effective policy moves in the early years, which bear 
their stamp −and particularly that of Eric Wydham’s Secretariat− became key 
institutional developments in pursuing this objective. As Hudec explains, the 
people who negotiated the ITO were not prepared to abandon their original 
legal design easily.67 The original participants saw themselves as keepers of a 
flame,68 and managed to progressively develop their own way of doing things. 
As explained, a global epistemic regime had born during the Havana negoti-
ations. The invention of the so-called GATT panels is a significantly defining 
example, as these are in fact one of the most recognizable institutional fea-
tures of GATT.69 The origin of the idea took shape during the early meetings 
of the contracting parties. From then on, they gradually became the vehicle 
to settle disputes within the GATT. In particular, the process began in the 
first period of sessions in Geneva, when Cuba and the Benelux requested a 
66  P. Pescatore, ‘Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement’, Handbook of 
WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement, op.cit.p.7.
67  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the GATT Secretariat’, op.cit.p.103.
68  A. Chayes & A. Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty, op.cit. p.279. 
69  O. Long, Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral System (Martinus Nijhoff 
1985), p.77.
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qualified opinion from the Chairman of the meeting of the contracting parties 
regarding a dispute on discriminatory taxes.70 Following some consultations, 
the Chairman proposed a decision, which was adopted without opposition 
from any of the GATT contracting parties: ‘the meeting agreed...’;71 Cuba sub-
sequently withdrew the measure which had led to the dispute. However, the 
formula of a single adjudicator would be subsequently abandoned, probably 
foreseeing the complexity of future claims and the concentration of power 
that such formula could generate. Thus, there was only one other case on 
Indian taxes on products with export rebates, between India and Pakistan, 
which would be later settled bilaterally,72 as India made reservations to the 
Chairman´s ruling in that second session of the contracting parties.73 In 
this way, working groups began to be used after that session. These working 
groups would be focused on seeking a ‘practical solution’.74 
Interestingly, embedded in these original practices, conciliation is highly vis-
ible throughout the progressive development of the GATT dispute settlement 
system. The main feature of these ad hoc bodies, composed by representa-
tives of contracting parties, was that the conflicting parties within the work-
ing group were also involved in the diplomatic process of finding practical 
solutions. However, this formula was also soon to reveal its limitations. In 
this regard, the working group hearing a dispute between France and Brazil 
on discriminatory internal taxes on imported products, in the second Ses-
sion, was to remain on the GATT agenda from April 1949 to November 1957.75 
Thus, as the difficulties of a strictly conciliatory model became clear, working 
groups would soon evolve to more adjudicative forms and mechanics. This 
institutional development came about with the Australian Subsidy on Am-
monium Sulphate case:76 in this case, five state representatives discussed the 
issues at stake within the working group; however, this time only third parties 
made the final decision (United States, Norway and the United Kingdom).77 
70  See GATT/CP.2/9 (19 July 1948), Appendix A, Item 1.
71  See GATT/CP.2/SR.11 (24 August 1948), p.8.
72  GATT/CP.3/6 (21 February 1948), p.2.
73  See GATT/CP.2/9 (19 July 1948), Appendix A, Item 2. 
74  See GATT/CP.4/SR.21 (3 April 1950), p.8.
75  On this interesting case see, in particular, R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, 
op.cit.p.110-120.
76  See GATT/CP.4/39, Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate (31 March 1950). 
77  The Report, drafted by the Secretariat, was adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
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This critical development was the turning point for the progressive deploying 
of a dispute settlement infrastructure within the GATT. As Hudec suggests, 
the change was so significant that it can only be explained as part of a delib-
erate plan.78 
From then on, it would be necessary to wait for the seventh GATT session 
(1952) to see how this transformation evolved. As the agenda for that ses-
sion formally included 12 pending cases, the President, the Norwegian Johan 
Melander, proposed setting up a single working group to resolve them all. 
The list of possible members for that working group, finally proposed to the 
contracting parties by the Secretariat, inaugurated the now traditional ‘short-
list’ of so-called ‘GATT panelists’. It was at that time that the term ‘panel’ was 
first formally used by Melander himself to define the new formula; moreover, 
there were no representatives of major trading powers among the chosen 
panel members. The emphasis was placed on the technical expertise of those 
involved with dispute settlement, and thus on reducing power-politics within 
the procedures. Also the disputing parties did not object to the final propos-
al delivered by the panel, lending support to the argument that the parties 
had been consulted beforehand to facilitate dispute settlement regime-build-
ing: as Robert Hudec explains, the first step was to propose a single working 
group; and a few days later, the term ‘panel’ was slipped in without actually 
explaining what form it would take. The structure was the same as previous 
working groups; however, it was agreed that disputing parties would not be 
allowed to vote, and they were also not permitted to be present when the de-
cision was discussed and finally adopted.79 The panel’s mandate, becoming a 
short of template for later cases, reads as follows: 
‘To consider, in consultation with the representatives of the countries directly concerned 
and of other interested countries, complaints referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
under Article XXIII and such other complaints as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may 
expressly refer to the Panel and to submit findings and recommendations to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES’.80 
on 3 April 1950 and is accompanied by an appendix or memorandum from Australia stat-
ing its disagreement.
78  R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.p.70.
79  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the GATT Secretariat’, op.cit.p.108.
80  See SR7/7 (14 October 1952) and R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.p.75.
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Rosine Plank provides a detail that highlights the phenomenon: ‘the panel 
procedure was an invention-almost a conspiracy-devised by the secretariat 
to loosen the hold of the bigger powers which dominated the working parties 
at that time, and to re-enforce the secretariat’s role in guiding and drafting 
rulings or recommendations to be submitted to the plenary session’.81 The 
Executive Secretary declared in a note written in 1955 that ‘the primary func-
tion of the panel is to prepare an objective analysis for consideration by the 
contracting parties, in which the special interests of individual governments 
are subordinated to the basic objective of applying the Agreement impartially 
and for the benefit of the contracting parties in general’.82 
The organizational mechanics were relatively simple: the disputing parties 
explained their arguments to the panel, providing information and documen-
tation in support of their claim; on occasion, this was complemented with 
information that other interested parties deemed it appropriate to submit. In 
the following step, the panel drew up a draft report behind closed doors and, 
as mentioned, excluding the disputing parties. The disputing parties were 
then given the opportunity to discuss the draft report with panel members, a 
practice still present in WTO dispute settlement procedures. From then on, 
the final report was drafted taking into account their positions, and adopt-
ed by consensus; thus excluding dissenting opinions. Following this, the re-
port was issued to the contracting parties for final decision (read approval 
or dismissal). The GATT Secretariat under the leadership of Wynham White 
increased its role within these new practices, by drafting documents, orga-
nizing meetings, and providing information and documentation to the panel 
members. Also, according to Robert Hudec’s interviews with participants, it 
was the Secretariat which drew up most of the reports in this first stage of 
the GATT.83 From then on, dispute settlement procedures would be subject 
to gradual formalization, taking shape as a hybrid adjudicative form in no-
man’s land from the perspective of comparative international law. 
Regime-building required subtle experimentation. In this regard, the use of 
81  R. Plank, ‘An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Not’, 4 
Journal of International Arbitration 4 (1987): 55 (emphasis added). 
82  R. Plank, ‘An Unofficial Description, op.cit. 
83  See R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the Secretariat’, op.cit. p.107, R.Hudec, The GATT Legal 
System, op.cit.p.78 and R. Plank, ‘An Unofficial Description’, op.cit. pp.74-77.
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panels also involved the spatial rearrangement of the room where the differ-
ences were addressed. Thus, a strategic and gradual transformation from the 
debating round table to the ‘courtroom’ took place, with the panel members 
and the disputing parties ending seated at separate tables. With this innova-
tion, formal yet imbued with symbolism, the appearance and flavor of judicial 
practice was incorporated at no political cost. Taking into consideration the 
traditional difficulties of formally pursuing the creation of any internation-
al tribunal, a subtle move of this kind was remarkable; again, as mentioned 
above, the GATT was under provisional application, and lacked any formal 
treaty-based organ aside from Article XV (Joint action by the contracting par-
ties). 
The contracting parties soon began recognizing the auctoritas of the GATT 
panels. The four reports submitted in the seventh session, for example, re-
quired no debate prior to their approval. At this stage, the panelists began to 
be formally appointed in their role as trade law experts. By taking such step, 
dispute settlement activities were consensually framed as a professional ac-
tivity, and thus would soon nurture its own culture and procedures. Dispute 
settlement was slowly beginning to be drawn towards professional practice, 
as a means not only of increasing technical refinement but also institutional 
legitimacy. In fact, when making an assessment of how GATT was operating 
in the ninth session, several delegates formally voiced their positive opinions 
in respect of the way the panels were working: the Danish delegate even for-
mally proposed using the panel technique in other areas which had been the 
province of working groups until that time (ie: import restrictions for balance 
of payments difficulties); and, in fact, in the next session the Secretariat sub-
mitted a report proposing the experimental use of the panel technique in such 
areas.84 Nevertheless, the delegations finally agreed to leave things as they 
were.85
This first decade of the GATT regime was a period in which trade diplomats 
-many of whom were seasoned veterans- governed the day to day operation 
of the organization in the group spirit arising from the ITO negotiations. 
The GATT’s rather precarious status led them to emphasize a diplomatic 
84  See GATT L/392/Rev.1, Considerations concerning the Extended Use of Panels (6 
October 1955).
85  R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.p.81.
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approach to dispute settlement. Thus, diplomatic skills were highly appre-
ciated by many GATT practitioners. However, the triumph of the diplomatic 
approach within the panels during this period would inevitably make their 
reports rife with ambiguities and generalities. In Hudec’s rationalization of 
this period, given the uncertain perception that awaited the GATT legal obli-
gations in the capitals, it was important not to undermine all the prestige that 
GATT had gained with decisions that governments might well not be capable 
of fulfilling. Thus, as this fine scholar explains, the first GATT decisions were 
generally adjusted to this need for pleasant, smooth and more obscure legal 
decisions, using the language of diplomacy rather than legal jargon: in his 
words, the skills laid in suggesting the requisite conclusions by using impres-
sionist brushstrokes which, when closely examined ‘never actually stated on 
paper their real meaning, despite everyone being fully aware of their signifi-
cance’. By using this technique, it was impossible to reach a satisfactory legal 
conclusion (at least using normal standards of legal analysis) as to what the 
decisions really mean or what they actually required.86 This stage is often 
characterized by referring to the indecipherable nature of the reports. 
Certainly, the impressionist practices of that era raised serious criticism.87 
However, it should also be emphasized that this approach was in all proba-
bility the only option open to GATT dispute settlement at that time, given the 
context in which it found itself in the nineteen fifties, hampered as it was not 
only by its precarious status but its institutional weaknesses. In this respect, 
the strategy of GATT diplomats was completely rational, and probably the 
only means available at the time for keeping the regime on track. In short, 
at that time, the cryptic, almost artistic nature of those first reports fulfilled 
a pertinent function at the time, namely, to resolve inter-state disputes sotto 
voce. This pragmatic strategy helped to preserve the unstable institutional 
structure of the GATT regime from major political tensions, while awaiting 
better times ahead. Thus, a cooperative and conciliatory atmosphere was at 
the fore during this period. Curzon depicted this atmosphere by framing the 
GATT as a club. The discussions within four walls, the attempts at concilia-
86  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the Secretariat’, op.cit.p.106.
87  See Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement under the GATT and the 
Tokyo Round Agreements. Report to the Committe on Finance, U.S. Senate, On Investi-
gation Nº332-212 Under Section 332 (g) of the Tariff Act of 1930, USITC Publication 1793 
(December 1985) at 78.
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tion rather than head-on conflicts, the private meetings ‘to talk things over’ 
were all features of this club-like atmosphere; indeed, the GATT club.88 
4. The legal barbarians 
The club-like atmosphere would have a critical significance for regime-build-
ing within GATT, both in the short and long term, as it allowed the incum-
bents not only to construct common understandings on key issues but also 
to get comfortably involved in a controlled experimentation which would lay 
the foundations within the regime for an increased formal use of law, legal 
procedures and lawyers, with the passing of time. Hudec frames this first pe-
riod in similar lines by stating that the GATT had to get along with ‘whatever 
low-visibility procedures could be developed consistently with the pretence 
of not being an organization’: ‘the GATT would be a ‘club’, a place where 
like-minded officials could communicate without having to spell things out 
in confrontation-producing clarity’.89 In other words, as Weiler explains, the 
GATT operatives became a classical network: 
‘A very dominant feature of the GATT was its self-referential and even communitarian 
ethos explicable in constructivist terms. The GATT successfully managed a relative insula-
tion from the “outside” world of international relations and established among its practi-
tioners a closely knit environment revolving round a certain set of shared normative values 
(of free trade) and shared institutional (and personal) ambitions situated in a matrix of 
long-term first-name contacts and friendly personal relationships’90 
Within this context, the dispute settlement mechanism managed to solve 
more than twenty disputes, functioning regularly until 1963. From then on, 
however, the panels system fell into disuse from 1964 to 1970. One of the 
basic reasons was the entry on the scene of the European Economic Com-
munity’s (EEC) in 1958; and particularly its Common Agricultural Policy and 
88  G. Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: The General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade and Its Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques (Michael 
Joseph Books 1965) at 52-53.
89  R. Hudec. ‘The GATT legal system, op.cit.p.635.
90  J.Weiler, ‘The rule of law and the ethos of diplomats’, Efficiency, equity and legiti-
macy: the multilateral trading system at the Millenium (Brookin Institution Press 2001): 
334–336.
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preferential trade relations with overseas territories. These policies led EEC 
members to play the flexibility card within the GATT. Added to this were the 
trade claims from developing countries, recently incorporated in the GATT, 
who were demanding more effective access for their exports to the markets of 
developed countries.91Thus, paraphrasing Ernst-Ullrich Petersmann, the de-
cade of the 60s was characterized by the pragmatic attempt to accommodate 
the GATT ‘without undue legalism’ to the project of European integration and 
the new majority of developing countries in the world trading system.92 
Given this state of affairs, the activity of panels was brought to a halt. How-
ever, this situation soon changed, as the increase in non-tariff barriers, which 
affected the consolidated tariff concessions within GATT, led the US admin-
istration to put heavy pressure on its trading partners to open a seventh MTN 
Round in 1973. The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) intended to address these 
policy tensions as well as improve some procedural issues in GATT dispute 
settlement, among other matters. During the Round, the EEC opposed any 
reform to the dispute settlement mechanism but agreed to its customary 
practices being codified. As a result, the negotiating parties adopted the so-
called 1979 Understanding −consisting of 25 articles in 4 sections regulating 
notifications, consultations, dispute settlement and the monitoring of com-
pliance− in an Annex under the title ‘Agreed Description of the Customary 
Practice of the GATT’.93 Interestingly, the provisions of the Understanding 
were also complemented by multiple special provisions on dispute settlement 
contained in diverse Tokyo Round Codes, which overshadowed the new rules 
by fragmenting adjudicative procedures and authorities.94 In any case, the 
1979 Understanding facilitated the return of activity to the panels system. 
However, making GATT panels once again a core mechanism of the world 
trading system would also facilitate a turning point in the GATT regime, as 
the decade of the 70s veered in the direction of increasingly litigious and le-
91  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the Secretariat’, op.cit.pp.108-109.
92  E. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO, op.cit.p.84.
93  See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance, BISD S26/210 (1980). 
94  See Ministerial Declaration 1982, Doc BISD S29/9-23 (1983), Decision of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES Doc BISD 31S/9-10 (1985) Decision of the GATT Council 1988, Doc 
BISD S35/382 (1989) and Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES 1989, Doc BISD 
36/66 and subsequent pages (1989).
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galist attitudes, and thus a significant structural change in cultural and in-
stitutional terms. There were two basic motives underlying this change of 
direction. The first of these was a generational takeover of the delegations. 
As mentioned above, the original delegations had a strong diplomatic focus, 
given the provisional application of GATT and its original lack of any institu-
tional structures. However, the new generations of delegates had inherited a 
relatively established ‘organization’ and therefore their sensibilities were dif-
ferent to those of the old school trade diplomats, particularly in terms of the 
relative emphasis given to the roles of diplomacy and litigation in the world 
trading system. In their eyes, rules (read law) should prevail in GATT dispute 
settlement.
The second motive was the entry on the scene of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR): a brand new specialized trade agency in the United 
States, which assumed the trade policy functions formerly attributed to the 
Department of State. This new administrative body, from its creation, operat-
ed an openly litigious policy within the GATT, and thus developed extremely 
technical legal arguments, using teams of lawyers for this purpose. Inevitably, 
the aggressive new policy of the USTR −in which claims were loaded with 
drawn out baroque style legal arguments and esoteric legal claims−95forced 
the panels to redirect the way in which they approached cases.Attitudes and 
expectations changed, and the panels felt pushed to amend their well estab-
lished lex artis diplomatica. At the same time, the change forced all coun-
terparts who were in dispute with the USTR to employ similar techniques.96 
The days of traditional GATT diplomacy were numbered and the legalist ap-
proach gradually began to gain credence. Thus, a phase was coming to an end. 
However, inevitably, the GATT regime was not adapted to the emerging cul-
ture; in fact, there were few experts familiar with the technicalities required 
by this new approach to disputes not only among the state delegates who nor-
mally made up the panels, but in the GATT Secretariat as well. In this context, 
the pressure on the panels system for further technical legal refinement end-
95  R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System, op.cit.pp.112-113. 
96  For a detailed account and insights on the impact of this US agency in framing the 
evolution of world trade law and policy since its inception see, in particular, S. Dryden, 
Trade Warriors: USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (Oxford University 
Press 1995).
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ed by precipitating a crisis. In essence, the system was unable to withstand 
the contradicting pressures: the panel members endeavored to reconcile the 
old and new cultures without success, seeking impossible balances between 
diplomacy and legalism to keep both sides happy.
The basic feature of the most contentious cases of this period was the ques-
tioning of the technical legal quality of reports as well as decision-making 
procedures within the procedures of the panels. Under the new rules of the 
1979 Understanding, disputing parties and the most legally-oriented delega-
tions, in general, tended to play hard against the supposed ‘low legal stan-
dards’ of some reports as well as other procedural decisions of GATT panels. 
In this context, some controversial cases exacerbated the tensions between 
the US and European countries, such as the so-called DISC cases on corpo-
rate tax practices and export subsidies.97In essence, a new culture arose in 
the GATT with force and momentum. At this stage of regime-building, a new 
legal culture, winning positions within the GATT claimed that disputes could 
be best resolved using technical criteria, namely world trade law. The poli-
cy vision behind such positioning was constructing an ‘expert legal system’ 
within the GATT regime;98 in other words, building a specialized system of 
international law.99 
In the early days of this new phase, John Jackson published World Trade and 
the Law of GATT (1969) with the indicative subtitle ‘A legal Analysis of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’.100 The policy vision contained in 
this work –informally referred to by many as the GATT ‘bible’–sent a strong 
message across the board for perfecting legal techniques within the world 
97  See United States Tax Legislation (DISC), Report of the Panel presented to the 
Council of Representatives on 12 November 1976, BISD S23/98 (1977); Income Tax Prac-
tices Maintained by Belgium, BISD S23/127 (1977); Income Tax Practices Maintained by 
France, BISD S23/114 (1977); and Income Tax Practices Maintained by the Netherlands, 
BISD S23/114 (1977).
98  For a fine reflection on the need to construct GATT as a ‘legal system’ (taking the 
DISC cases as case study) see J. Jackson, ‘The jurisprudence of International Trade: The 
DISC Case in GATT’, 72 American Journal of International Law (1978): 747–781.
99  See P. Zapatero, ‘Modern international law, op.cit.
100  See J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT. A Legal Analysis of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (The Boobs-Merrills Company Inc 1969).
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trading system in order to upgrade its institutional efficiencies.101 The stance 
taken by this fine academic was highly visible and influential in GATT cir-
cles, helping to legitimize policy change towards the so-called ‘rule-based ap-
proach’. As David Kennedy recalls, ‘it was Jackson who largely invented the 
field [of trade law], transforming his experiences with the United Trade Rep-
resentative’s office from a narrowing regulatory specialty into a recognized 
subject of legal study’.102 The policy vision coined within that monograph as 
the ‘rule-based approach’ was to later expand into multiple influential aca-
demic articles, and it was finally to become mainstreamed in GATT lingua 
two decades later with the help of The World Trading System: Law and Poli-
cy of International Economic Relations (1989),103 published right in the mid-
dle of the Uruguay Round Negotiations (1986-1994).
The emerging new culture of the world trading system required different ex-
pertise and technologies. The GATT was changing, and not only from within 
the delegations but from within the Secretariat itself. Thus, when the Swiss 
Arthur Dunkel (1980-1993) succeeded Olivier Long (1968-1980) as Director 
of the GATT Secretariat, a final blow was dealt to the embattled old and new 
cultures. Indeed, Olivier Long was the last great proponent of the diplomatic 
approach within the Secretariat. In fact, it was he who proposed the idea of 
legally-controlled pragmatism in his Law and its Limitations in the GATT 
Multilateral Trade System (1985): according to the former Director Gener-
al, ‘the General Agreement offers many possibilities for a legally controlled 
pragmatism, and throughout the history of GATT, contracting parties have 
responded constructively and positively to international economic and polit-
ical conditions, without having undue regard to legal technicalities’.104 How-
101  For his current approach to world trade law after the inception of WTO see J. Jack-
son, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic 
Relations (Cambridge University Press 2000) as well as, in particular, J. Jackson, Sover-
eignty, the WTO, and the Changing fundamentals of international law (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2006).
102  See D.Kennedy, ‘The international style in postwar law and policy: John Jackson and 
the field of international economic law’, 2 American Journal of International Law and 
Policy 10 (1995): 672.
103  J. Jackson, World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Re-
lations (The MIT Press 1989).
104  O. Long, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1985) at 35 –36 and 62. 
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ever, a new era had begun. The diplomatic approach −which was the direct 
legacy of those who had negotiated the Havana Charter and kept the GATT 
afloat during its early years− was now also withdrawing from the Secretariat. 
In fact, Dunkel was to promote, not without some hardship, the creation of a 
legal service within the Secretariat itself; the new Director General’s aim was 
to guarantee against any ‘legal errors’ made by the panels, by assisting them 
in improving quality and technical accuracy of their decisions.105 
The increase in the legal quality of the panel reports in the eighties was defi-
nitely attributable to this initiative. From then on, the GATT had fairly well 
structured procedures in place (the 79 Understanding and other Tokyo Codes) 
and a growing number of delegates and experts were in favor of upgrading the 
position of legal rules in dispute settlement activities. Therefore, in order to 
close the circle of rule-based adjudication, the last big pitfall to avoid was the 
so-called ‘positive consensus’: the requirement for panels to be established 
as well as panel reports to be adopted by consensus at the GATT General 
Council. As a result, any contracting party could block the establishment of a 
panel or the adoption of a given report. Thus, the functioning of panels could 
be easily obstructed. For decades, the ‘positive consensus’ was entrenched 
in both culture and practices of the old trade diplomats, as a rational way of 
securing the survival of an originally weak GATT under provisional applica-
tion.106 However, new militancies and interests achieved reforms that hither-
to would have been unthinkable. In essence, the GATT Contracting Parties 
were fully aware of the benefits to be gained by generally honoring the rules of 
the game contained in world trade law. At the same time, the growing auctor-
itas of panels −as a result of their increased legal expertise− helped to pursue 
a stronger rule-based policy approach which would close the circle of world 
trade law. 
These developments, together with the pressure of US trade unilateralism,107 
led the GATT Contracting Parties to finally eliminate the ‘positive consensus’ 
rule from the provisions of the new WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
105  R. Hudec, ‘The Role of the Secretariat’ op.cit. pp.114–115.
106  See Review of the Effectiveness, op.cit.p.79.
107  See in particular R. Hudec, ‘Thinking about the New Section 301: Beyond Good and 
Evil’, Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading Sys-
tem (University of Michigan Press 1990) at 113-159.
MARKETS IN THE MAKING
83
under negotiation during the Uruguay Round. Paradoxically, in this regard, 
such change towards automatic and fully binding legal adjudication within 
the world trading system came about partly as a result of trade unilateralism.
During the Uruguay Round, the USTR managed to obtain a mandate from 
the US Congress to combat outside GATT procedures the supposed ‘unfair’ 
practices of other contracting parties. From its earliest days, the world trad-
ing system has traditionally functioned in line with US trade legislation.108In 
this case, US unilateralism was seeking more market access but also a more 
effective dispute settlement mechanism, which was already in the negotiat-
ing mandate of the Uruguay Round. Leaving aside the dubious international 
legality of such unilateral practices, the strategy paradoxically paid off for re-
gime-building, as less powerful countries saw the strengthening of the dispute 
settlement mechanism as a means of helping to restrain US unilateralism: 
ironically, the law of the jungle pursued through the so-called US Section 301 
and Super 301 promoted the consolidation of the rule of law in multilateral 
trade relations. Indeed, regime-building in this area would not have taken 
place probably without it. In fact, Arthur Dunkel is generally attributed with 
saying that this piece of domestic legislation was the best thing that ever hap-
pened to the GATT.109
5. A hard-law status
To paraphrase Pescatore, the panel system has managed to produce useful 
reasoned legal solutions to the often thorny inter-state tensions regarding 
world trade.110The history of the invention of the GATT panels evidences the 
importance of the ‘human factor’ in regime-building generally. As mentioned, 
the negotiations of the Havana Charter laid the foundations for a small global 
epistemic community, highly specialized in nature, with its own and increas-
ingly complex practices as well as cultural references and values. In essence, 
the GATT people basically kept the flame of the world trading regime alive, 
against all odds, for more than half a century. Being aware of this phenome-
non allows a better understanding of how the GATT has gone from a totally 
108  G. Curzon & V. Curzon, ‘GATT: “Traders´ Club”’, The Anatomy of Influence. Decision 
Making in International Organization (Yale University Press 1974) at 313. 
109  J. Bhagwati, ‘The Diminished Giant Syndrome’, 72 Foreign Affairs 2 (1993): 22–26.
110  P. Pescatore, ‘The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism’, op.cit.p.35. 
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provisional and anemic trade agreement to a highly powerful, efficient and 
sophisticated global regime under the form of WTO.
The invention of GATT panels has a starring role in the process, as these had 
a resounding long term success by allowing settling and/or mitigating mul-
tiple trade disputes within the four corners of the GATT. In doing so, the 
availability of panels helped not only to reduce trade tensions but also made 
it easier for the GATT community to advance a common rulemaking agenda 
in the medium and long term. As a result, the progressive development of the 
panels system culminated in the incorporation of a brand new and unprece-
dented dispute settlement mechanism in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. 
To paraphrase Silvia Ostry, this mechanism is ‘the strongest dispute settle-
ment mechanism in the history of international law’.111 The negotiations for 
the instrument began when 92 Contracting Parties would formally adopt the 
Punta del Este Declaration which formally opened negotiations of the Uru-
guay Round (20 September 1986);112 among the 14 negotiating groups, one 
was concerned exclusively with the dispute settlement mechanism.113 
The Final Act incorporating the results of the Round, signed on 15 April 1994, 
is the most successful of all MTNs held to date. Its advances regarding new 
disciplines and coverage as well as the creation of the WTO are presided over 
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); a highly technical instru-
ment that amply exceeded the expectations of the negotiators by incorporat-
ing key innovations: mainly, (1) the elimination of the positive consensus, (2) 
the integration of procedures and (3) the establishment of a permanent Ap-
pellate Body. These changes have been a large step forward in the strengthen-
ing of world trade governance. 
The dispute settlement mechanism today is, to paraphrase the first WTO Di-
rector General, the heart of the WTO system.114 In almost two decades since 
its inception, the new mechanism has gained a structural position in global 
111  S. Ostry, ‘The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for future 
negotiations’, The political economy of international trade law: Essays in honor of Rob-
ert. E. Hudec (Cambridge University Press 2002) at 287
112  Doc GATT/1396 (25 September 1986). 
113  T. Steward & C. Callahan, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-
1992), Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1993).
114  WTO Focus. Newsletter, August-September (1996) at 7.
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governance by producing highly technical legal decisions, which are adopted 
by the WTO General Council −formally acting as Dispute Settlement Body− 
almost automatically. Interestingly, however, one critical issue remained 
somewhat vague in the wording of the Understanding, namely the compulso-
ry nature of the reports. Under the GATT of 47, the requirement for positive 
consensus could leave reports in a legal limbo if at least one of the contracting 
parties did not agree with adopting the report.115 On the contrary, under WTO 
law, panel and Appellate Body reports are to be adopted unless the Dispute 
Settlement Body decides not to do so by consensus. Hence, the requirement 
has been subtly reversed, from positive... to negative consensus.116 In other 
words, as Komuro puts it, non-adoption of reports has turned into a mere 
intellectual curiosity.117 In short, adoption of reports is de facto automatic.
Notwithstanding the above, some legal literature questioned the compulso-
ry nature of reports right after the adoption of the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round. For example, US academics writing in legal journals such as the influ-
ential American Journal of International Law (AJIL) contended that the Un-
derstanding permits a generalized option of either compliance or compensa-
tion.118 These positions were strongly contested with celerity in that same jour-
nal by John Jackson himself, who argued that there is certainly a WTO legal 
obligation to comply with the reports, as well as that compensation, is as mere 
fallback in the event of non-compliance.119 Obviously, whether or not this is 
legally so was a capital question for the nascent WTO regime, and therefore its 
115  J. Jackson, ‘The World Trade Organization, op.cit.p.87.
116  See article 16.4 and 17.14 of the Understanding. The literature uses various terms to 
refer to this amendment: ‘negative consensus’, ‘reverse consensus’, etc. 
117  N. Komuro, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Coverage and Procedures of 
the WTO Understanding’ 29 Journal of World Trade 4 (1994): 41. 
118  J. Bello, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is more’, 90 American 
Journal of International Law 4 (1996): 416 and subsequent pages and J. Bello & A. Hol-
mer, ‘Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization Concerns and Net Benefits’, 28 
International Lawyer 4 (1994): 1103 (compensation as an option for replacing compli-
ance).
119  J. Jackson, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the 
Nature of a Legal Obligation”, 91 American Journal of International Law 1 (1997): 60-61. 
For further criticism on the editorial comments of Judith Bello see Roessler’s view, as for-
mer Director of the GATT Legal Affairs Division, in F. Roessler, ‘Comments: Performance 
of the System IV: Implementation’, 32 International Lawyer (1998): 789-790. 
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most recognizable academic expressed himself in an unflinching and categor-
ical manner.120 According to Jackson, framing the reports as mere recommen-
dations is a misunderstanding, as the practice of the original GATT contracting 
parties assumes that there was an obligation to comply with the terms of panel 
reports.121 His words in the editorial comment written for the occasion -under 
the illustrative title ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunder-
standings on the Nature of Legal Obligation’- are the following: 
‘So what does the DSU language itself say? Here we can examine a good number of clauses, 
and I would suggest that the overall list of those clauses, in the light of the practice of GATT, 
and perhaps supplemented by the preparatory work of the negotiators (unfortunately not 
well documented), strongly suggests that the legal effect of an adopted panel report’ is the 
international law obligation to perform the recommendation of the panel report’.122 
In consequence, the obligation to comply is basically derived from several ar-
ticles of the understanding (namely, articles 3.7, 19.1, 21.6, 22.8 and 26.b):123 
‘Thus, the DSU clearly establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the recom-
mendation; notes that the matter shall be kept under surveillance until performance has 
occurred; indicates that compensation shall be resorted to only if the immediate with-
drawal of the measure is impracticable; and provides that in non-violation cases, there is 
no obligation to withdraw an offending measure, which strongly implies that in cases of 
violation there is an obligation to perform’.124 
Notwithstanding these fine arguments, the text of the understanding does not 
allude in any way to the binding nature of the reports; and Jackson himself 
recognizes this fact: ‘[w]hat can we say about the new DSU? Unfortunate-
ly, the language of the DSU does not solidly “nail down” this issue’; and the 
scholar later adds: 
120  It should be emphasized in any case that compensation in place of compliance is 
expressly provided for in the specific case of non-violation complaints of GATT Article 
XXIII.b. See Article 26.1.d of the DSU.
121  J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, op.cit.p.83.
122  J. Jackson, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement, op.cit.p.62-63.
123  In a later text, Jackson reinforces his argument adding new provisions to the list 
(article 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 11, 19.1, 21.1, 21.6, 22.1, 22.2, 22.8 y 26.1b). See J. Jackson, The World 
Trade Organization, op.cit.p.87, note 82. <0}
124  See J. Jackson, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings’, 
op.cit.p.62.
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‘Oddly enough, some diplomats who assisted in the negotiation of the DSU told me that 
they thought they had nailed it down’.125 
The literal meaning of provisions such as Article 19 (under the heading ‘Pan-
el and Appellate Body Recommendations’), for example, are crystal clear: 
in principle, reports contain recommendations. However, the established 
practice has confirmed that such recommendations became binding deci-
sions once they had been adopted by the General Council acting as Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB). In practice, the originally debatable nature of panel 
and Appellate Body reports has been closed in favor of their binding nature, 
once these have been adopted by the DSB.126 Hence, at the end of the day, 
the mechanics of international customary law came to the rescue of WTO 
regime-building for the occasion. 
In fact, international legal literature is currently pacific regarding the binding 
nature of reports adopted by the DSB.127 Today, the highly consolidated inter-
play between practice and opinio iuris on this issue allows WTO Members to 
frame DSB adopted reports as legally binding. However, any person unfamil-
iar with these intricacies (including lawyers) would have serious difficulties 
in understanding this development, as she/he could always read the word 
‘recommendation’ in the legal texts. Hence, it would certainly have been de-
sirable for the Understanding to nail down such a critical issue, provided that 
binding nature appeared to be the intention of the negotiators. 
In any case, after decades of consensual practices within the panels system, 
the negotiating working group on dispute settlement in the Uruguay Round 
(presided over by Julio Lacarte-Muró) managed to go far beyond this by 
completing the drafting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.128 
125  Ibid: 62.
126  See Article 20 of the DSU (Time-frame for DSB Decisions)
127  See, for example, R. Hudec, ‘Broadening the Scope of Remedies in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement’, Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues & Lessons from the 
Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals, (Cameron May 2000) at 345-376 
or A. Sykes, ‘The Remedy for Breach of Obligations Under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?’ New Directions in International Eco-
nomic Law: Essays in Honor of John H. Jackson (Kluwer Law International 2000) at 
347-51.
128  T. Stewart & C. Callahan, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-
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To paraphrase Shell, the new system represented a resounding victory for 
the legalists in the debate over the dispute settlement model for multilateral 
trade.129 In fact, as a result of that, nowadays, the transition from the GATT to 
the WTO is seen by many observers as a full shift from soft-law to hard-law. 
For Abbott, for example, evidence of this trend is clearly perceptible in two 
areas: ‘The first area is progressive refinement of the rules from the general 
to the specific. The second is the transformation from a system for resolving 
differences to one based on a quasi-judicial system of consensus’.130 
Today, the functioning of panels and the Appellate Body is governed by strict 
application of WTO law. The strong diplomatic approach of some panels from 
the GATT era has been left behind. The legal approach has won over those 
critics identifying law and legal institutions with rigidity and inflexibility and, 
in consequence, as tools unsuitable for the institutional specificities of pro-
gressive trade liberalization.131 In the early years of the diplomatic approach, 
as Jackson recalls, the GATT was merely a ‘negotiating forum’ designed 
substantially to retain a balance of concessions and advantages between the 
Contracting Parties.132 Nowadays, the world trading system builds upon such 
forum to go beyond, by establishing a dynamic regulatory forum which rules 
are justiciable in practice. 
However some elements of the diplomatic approach still continue to hold 
sway when resolving disputes. In fact, some remain in the current provisions 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding itself. Thus, even though today the 
mechanism is hyper-formalized, it preserves some diplomatic elements that 
pay tribute to the tradition and old-school culture of world trade diplomacy. 
In this way, the DSU maintains diplomatic elements which are considered 
1992). Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1993).
129  R. Shell, ‘Trade legalism, op.cit.p.833.
130  F. Abbott, ‘Incomplete Rule Systems, System Incompatibilities and Suboptimal 
Solutions: Changing the Dynamic of Dispute Settlement and Avoidance in Trade Relations 
Between Japan and the United States’, 16 Arizona Journal of International and Compar-
ative Law (1999): 195-196.
131  In defence of this perception see, specially, O. Long, Law and its Limitations, 
op.cit.p.21 and 73 and K. Dam, The GATT Law, op.cit.p.358.
132  J. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of international economic 
relations (MIT Press 1997) at 93.
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useful.133For example, the terms of reference for panels are defined by bilater-
al negotiation. At the same time, the parties engage in a re-examination phase 
prior to obtain a final decision on the cases. Also the DSU still contains the old 
GATT provisions relating to obtaining a ‘mutually acceptable’ solution as well 
as the maintenance of a ‘balance of rights and obligations’. These elements, 
as Pescatore suggests, are very close to conciliation.134 In this regard, con-
ciliation was the privileged mode of resolving disputes in the world trading 
system in the pre-WTO phase,135 and that culture certainly did not vanished 
in the WTO legal texts. In consequence, several formulas related to concili-
ation have been retained.136 In short, regime-building in the area of dispute 
settlement advanced towards hyper-legalism without dispensing with at least 
some functional elements of its diplomatic inheritance. 
Today, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is not strictly speaking a ju-
dicial instrument, given that it comprises a number of ad hoc bodies togeth-
er with one permanent body −panels and Appellate Body respectively− the 
reports of which require, as explained, approval by the DSB. In this regard, 
although the establishment of panels and the approval of reports is now au-
tomatic in practice −rejection requiring collective negative consensus−, both 
decisions still require adoption by the General Council, acting as DSB. How-
ever, the Appellate Body has imprinted a strong judicial orientation in its pro-
cedures and rulings since the very first case was appealed in 1995. Thus, there 
is a wide consensus among world trade experts on the judicialization of world 
trade dispute settlement.137 As a result, the policy space for diplomacy/negoti-
ation under such terms is not only inside but outside the mechanism, as WTO 
dispute settlement functions by default. Therefore, it would be reasonable to 
133  Evidently, this is not exclusive of the WTO. On this, see in particular M. Shapiro, 
Courts: A Comparative and Institutional Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1981) at 
8 and 15.
134  P. Pescatore, ‘The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism’, op.cit.pp.37-38. <0}
135  E. Canal Forgues, L’Institution de la conciliation dans le cadre du GATT: Contribu-
tions a l’etude de la structuration d’une mecanisme de reglement des differends (Bruylant 
1993).
136  See E. Canal Forgues, ‘Le système de règlemend des différends de l’OMC’, La réor-
ganisation mondiale des échanges (Pedone 1996) at 285.
137  For some first reflections on this issue with regard to the GATT regime, see G. Mal-
inverni, Les Reglements des differends dans les organisations internacionales economi-
ques, (IHHEI 1974) at 171. 
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argue that diplomacy was not annulled but transformed by the current rule-
based approach into rule-based diplomacy. That is, in practice, WTO rules 
and decisions have become quite strong arguments in all bilateral trade rela-
tions nowadays, as the long shadow of the WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nism facilitates finding mutually acceptable solutions and arrangements. 
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3
Trade Rounds as public-private regulatory partnerships
1. Lobbying in services liberalization
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is one of the key in-
struments added to the world trading system in the complex negotiations of 
the Uruguay Round. As a result of multi-issue negotiations of the last GATT 
Round, the GATS was incorporated in Annex 1B of the WTO agreement, to-
gether with other substantive agreements. Designed to improve multilateral 
access of foreign services providers to domestic markets, the GATS has be-
come one of the key agreements (together with TRIPS) expanding the scope 
of the world trading system beyond traditional disciplines. Along with the 
substantive provisions of its text, GATS Annexes incorporate national sched-
ules in which WTO Members consign liberalization commitments in multi-
ple areas (transport, construction, education, telecommunications, energy, 
accountancy, legal services, engineering, tourism, etc). The only services ex-
cluded from these schedules are ‘services supplied in the exercise of govern-
mental authority’ (article I.3 of the GATS).1 
Trade in services is an important and growing contribution to all advanced 
economies. Nowadays, the global supply of services is burgeoning; trade in 
services accounts for more than 20% of world trade, and figures are steadily 
increasing.2 The services sector is also the major contributor to economic 
growth and employment in developed countries. In the European Union, 
for example, the services sector generates at least two thirds of the GDP 
1  See P. Delimatsis, International Trade in Services and Domestic Regulations: Ne-
cessity, Transparency, and Regulatory Diversity (Oxford University Press 2007) and 
J. Van de Gronden (et al.), EU and WTO Law on Services: Limits to the realization 
of General Interest Policies within the Services Markets? (Kluwer Law International 
2009).
2  See ‘Trade in commercial services’, WTO International Trade Statistics 2013, Chap-
ter III (WTO publications 2013) at 143.
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and employment.3 Currently, the EU-28 reports surpluses in service trans-
actions of more than 100.000 million Euros with the rest of the world.4 In 
addition, the service sector in emerging economies has gone beyond merely 
providing an extra market niche for foreign services providers; companies 
from E7 economies (China, Russia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, South 
Korea and Turkey) are significantly increasing their stake in the global sup-
ply of services.5
As a result, the services industry incorporated in developed and emerging 
economies is putting pressure on state representatives to improve market 
access in such a strategic sector. To achieve this end, a number of business 
platforms, networks and associations influence the negotiating positions 
of trade representatives and delegates in multiple global negotiations, by 
providing expert knowledge and identifying market niches. Business coa-
litions such as the United States Coalition of Services Industries (USCSI), 
the European Services Forum (ESF), or the Global Services Coalition are 
illustrative examples of how the industry collaborates with trade represen-
tatives within these processes. These are examples of long term trends. In 
fact, the GATS itself owes its existence to a seminal strategy pursued by the 
USCSI in the 80s. This industry coalition was created in 1981 by the man-
aging directors of AIG, American Express and Citicorp to launch a powerful 
campaign for incorporating services to the GATT liberalization agenda for 
the Uruguay Round.6 As explained by the first President and founder of the 
USCSI, Harry Freeman, the idea began to take shape at the end of the nine-
teen seventies when American Express’ expansion strategy came up against 
3  See, in particular, A partnership for new growth in services 2012-2015’, European 
Commission Communication (8 June 2012).
4  See International Trade in Services: Trade in services 2006 and 2011, Eurostat 
(Data from August 2012).
5  See Services Trade Balance: Export minus import of services 2012/1, OECD Fact-
book Statistics (8 January 2013).
6  For the central role of American Express see, in particular, D. Yoffie, ‘Trade in Ser-
vices and American Express’, International Trade and Competition: Cases and Notes 
in Strategy and Management (McGraw-Hill 1990) at 367–386. For a detailed history 
of GATS see G. Feketekuty, ’Assessing and Improving the Architecture of GATS’, GATS 
2000, New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (Brookings-Wharton Papers on 
Financial Services 2000) at 85–111 and J. Marchetti and P. Mavroidis, The Genesis of the 
GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services, 22 EJIL (2011): 689–721.
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barriers to market access in over thirty countries and began to enlist public 
support in this regard.7 
According to this former President of the USCSI, the services industry soon 
foresaw the regulatory potential of the GATT to open services markets. How-
ever, services liberalization had to be first incorporated in GATT MTN rounds, 
which were traditionally focused on trade in goods. In order to make such a 
project possible, the Managing Director of American Express joined forces 
with the heads of Citicorp and AIG to found the USCSI, opening offices in 
Washington, New York, Brussels and Tokyo.8 The coalition lobbied the US 
government and congressmen, attended congressional hearings and funded 
events and campaigns on the benefits for the US economy of regulating global 
trade in services; for example, media companies still using the term ‘trade in 
goods’ were contacted to point out that trade is also ‘trade in services’ and 
asked to correct the ‘error’ in future. It was unusual to link trade with ser-
vices, and even terms such as ‘financial services’ had still not been coined at 
that time. In any case, the USCSI managed to consolidate the term and thus 
the new idea of ‘trade in goods and services’ in public opinion.9 
Finally, an initiative regarding trade in services was on board the GATT at the 
end of 1982; in the Ministerial Decision of November 1982, GATT Contract-
ing Parties agreed to elaborate studies on the role and evolution of services in 
their economies, aiming to evaluate the possible incorporation of services in 
a new round of trade negotiations.10 Four years later, the Ministerial Confer-
ence launched the Uruguay Round (Punta del Este, 1986) including a negoti-
ating group on services (Ministerial Declaration of September 1986). USCSI 
members not only attended all the ministerial meetings leading to this launch 
(1982, 1984 and 1986); from then on, this business coalition actively collabo-
rated with US negotiators, and helped to shape the negotiating strategy of the 
USTR (United States Trade Representatives) throughout the whole Uruguay 
Round. 
7  H. Freeman, Financial Services and the GATS 2000 Round (Brookings-Wharton 
Papers on Financial Services 2000) at 454-461 and H. Freeman, ‘The Services Sector: Yes-
terday, Today and Tomorrow’, Economic Perspectives 1(1996): 19–21.
8  H. Freeman, Financial Services, op.cit.p.456.
9  Ibid: p.457. 
10  See GATT Ministerial Level Ministerial Declaration adopted on 29 November 1982, 
L/5424 (29 November 1982).
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2. Blurring the general and special interest
By the time the Round ended, the USCSI had approximately 400 people on 
its payroll.11 Thus, the GATS is to a great extent a by-product of a success-
ful public-private regulatory partnership. By producing a whole multilateral 
regulatory framework, this public-private partnership is an illustrative case 
study of how the allocation of resources to lobbying can advance special in-
terest in international legislation. 
A similar lobbying model was subsequently applied by the banking industry 
to liberalize world financial services after the Uruguay Round. As the round 
failed to successfully complete the negotiations for an agreement on financial 
services, and a further endeavor in this area also failed in WTO later on, the 
US and EU representatives gave a greater role to the financial industry in sub-
sequent negotiating processes. In this case, the CEOs of Barclays Bank and 
Ford Financial Services, Andrew Buxton and Ken Whipple respectively, were 
invited to set up a high level ‘transatlantic’ group that would work to define 
joint strategies in the field.12 The Financial Leaders Group was formed in 
1996 as a result, comprising chairmen and CEOS of major financial services 
companies (banks and insurers in the main). Their formal and informal rec-
ommendations guided the positions of negotiators and contributed to finally 
creating the WTO Financial Services Agreement in 1997.13 
The public-private regulatory partnerships employed by the USTR during the 
Uruguay Round also provided a model for European trade representatives to 
upgrade the market access strategies of the EU. Following the negotiations of 
the Financial Services Agreement, the Commission´s Directorate General for 
Trade adopted a similar model for its own consultations with the services in-
dustry in 1998. In fact, the Commissioner Leon Brittan publicly recommend-
ed the set up of a European special interest group for services and proposed 
Andrew Buxton −a lynch pin of the Financial Leaders Group− to organize. 
The objective of this European business platform was to provide technical 
11  H. Freeman, Financial Services, op.cit.456.
12  See A. Buxton, ‘Presentation speech’, Preparatory Conference for the World Servic-
es Congress, Washington DC (2 June 1999).
13  M. Kono, Opening markets in financial services and the role of GATS (WTO 1997) 
and W. Dobson & P. Jacquet, Financial services liberalization in the WTO (IIE 1998).
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assistance to European negotiators in preparing the so-called GATS 2000 ne-
gotiations.14 
This initiative led to the creation of the European Services Network, which 
that same year saw the setting up the European Services Forum (ESF), based 
at the European Employers’ association UNICE in Brussels. The platform was 
presented at an event sponsored by the Directorate General for Trade, on 26 
January 1999.15 In his inaugural speech, Brittan publicly offered to refine 
and develop the European negotiating strategy, working with the industry to 
define preferences and goals. Nowadays, ESF is a firmly established institu-
tion, providing a link between European negotiators and the European ser-
vices industry. Among other activities, this business platform follows up the 
development of liberalization requests and offers from the European Union 
in a variety of forums.16 
The British Committee for Liberalization of Trade in Services (LOTIS) −which 
answers to the IFSL (International Financial Services London) − is also a crit-
ical business platform playing a significant role in this regard. Inspired by the 
Financial Leaders Group mentioned above, at the time it provided a sophisti-
cated model of coordination between industry and trade negotiators. Under 
its hybrid structure, a limited group of high-level government and business 
representatives work jointly, share information and assess and deliberate on 
strategies for international negotiations in progress. 
Unsurprisingly, the non-inclusive nature of these public-private partnerships 
is often questioned by activists and observers alike. In fact, the leaking of 
the minutes and records of the LOTIS High-Level Group from April 1999 to 
February 2001 was roundly criticised when it was discovered that a dozen 
meetings of European negotiators had been held behind closed doors with 
major EU as well as US companies (e.g. Morgan Stanley, PwC and Prudential 
Corporation).17 
14  See A. Buxton, ‘Presentation Speech’, op.cit.
15  See L. Brittan, ‘European Service Leaders’ Group’, Speech at the launching meeting 
of the European Services Forum (26 January 1999).
16  See generally, J. Greenwood, Interest Representation in the EU (Palgrave Macmillan 
2003) and C. Gerlach, ‘Does Business really run EU trade policy? Observations about EU 
trade policy Lobbying’, 26 Politics 3 (2006): 176–183.
17  The texts of the minutes, which for a while were published on the official IFSL web-
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The position of the industry often permeates current global rulemaking as a 
result of such policy visions and partnerships. During the 10th anniversary of 
the WTO, to cite one example, the Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi 
addressed the following message to the CEOs of the US services industry: 
‘we need consistent pressure coming from the private-sector side. We need 
governments who understand what kind of interests you have in the Round’.18 
In addition, Commissioner Leon Brittan succeeded Andrew Buxton as Chair-
man of the LOTIS Committee of International Financial Services London 
(IFSL) after laying aside his public duties in 2001.19 In short, these public-pri-
vate regulatory partnerships open up a new dimension in traditional business 
lobbying, by placing global business lobbying at the heart of international 
lawmaking in the so-called ‘economic’ areas.
3. Restructuring public services 
The global liberalization of services is not free from challenges for many ob-
servers. For example, one concern raised by the GATS is that, by virtue of 
functioning as a dynamic regulatory framework, it lays the foundations for 
the services industry to gradually work its way into publicly provided ser-
vices.20 In principle, the GATS excludes from its disciplines those ‘services 
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’ (article I.3.b).21 This gen-
eral exception cuts across all sectors and is designed to cover essential gov-
ernmental functions.22 The wording of the agreement defines these services 
site may be consulted at the Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory 
in www.gatswatch.org.
18  S. Panitchpakdi, ‘The WTO After 10 Years: The Lessons Learned and The Challenges 
Ahead’ Council of Foreign Relations, Nueva York (10 March 2005).
19  See ‘Lord Brittan to Chair City’s Trade Liberalisation Group’, IFSL press release (7 
February 2001).
20  See eg. Ch. Scherer, ‘GATS: long-term strategy for the commodification of education’, 
12 Review of International Political Economy 3 (2005): 484–510.
21  Excluded sectors, in addition to services provided in the exercise of governmental 
authority, include the air transport sector, air traffic rights and their related services.
22  M. Krajewski, ‘Protecting a Shared Value of the Union in a Globalized World: Ser-
vices of General Economic Interest and External Trade’, EU and WTO Law on Services: 
Limits to the realization of General Interest Policies within the Services Markets? (Kluw-
er Law International 2009) at 212–213.
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as those supplied ‘neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one 
or more service suppliers’ (article I.3.c). In other words, the legal definition of 
these services is not based on their nature but on their mode of supply (those 
services not supplied in market conditions). For GATS advocates, the possi-
bility of providing services ‘in the exercise of government authority’ in any 
given sector does not detract from the fact that private and publicly provided 
services are both present in this sector. Nevertheless, as Adlung explains, if 
we interpret the term ‘on a commercial basis’ or ‘in competition’ with other 
service suppliers in the sense of ‘in coexistence’ or ‘potential replacement’, 
the general exception of article I.3.b would largely lack substance.23 Thus, for 
example, what does payment or joint payment in a public service imply for 
GATS disciplines? 
Nowadays, it is hard to find sectors in which private and publicly provided 
services do not coexist. Therefore, it is always possible to interpret that most 
publicly provided services could be excluded from being characterized as 
‘governmental’ if specific commitments are made in the national schedules. 
In GATS technical terms, the introduction of profitability or competitiveness 
in a publicly provided service originally operating as a non-profit public mo-
nopoly could probably deprive it of the status of ‘services supplied in the ex-
ercise of governmental authority’.24 These are some of the reasons why the 
critical literature on the GATS refers to the establishment of a world ‘neolib-
eral concept of public services’.25 This also explains in part why some trade 
representatives are being particularly cautious in consigning commitments 
within the GATS framework. In this regard, commitments in the national 
schedules have remained below the initial expectations; in fact, it has been 
suggested that WTO Members should come to an arrangement to clarify the 
GATS rules on the exclusion of governmental services, in order to facilitate 
the commitments to be made.26 
On the other hand, almost all public administrations include the private sup-
23  R. Adlung, ‘Public Services and the GATS’, 9 Journal of International Economic Law 
2 (2006): 464–465.
24  M. Krajewski, ‘Public Services and Trade Liberalization: Mapping the Legal Frame-
work’, 6 Journal of International Economic Law 2 (2003): 358.
25  M. Krajewski, ‘Public Services’, op.cit.p.359.
26  R. Adlung, ‘Public Services, op.cit.p.469.
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ply of public services to a greater or lesser degree. In fact, many public admin-
istration activities are carried out through mixed supply of services, combin-
ing public and private components through public procurement. As a result, 
the legal margins available to countries within the scope of the GATS sched-
ules become blurred: in practice, the majority of publicly provided services at 
the present time are likely to be provided in commercial conditions, and in 
competition with other suppliers. In addition, publicly provided services are 
not generally excluded from liberalization requests and offers. In this regard, 
the GATS rules fully apply once a liberalization commitment is incorporated 
in the national schedule of a WTO Member, unless the respective columns of 
its schedule consign limitations to market access or national treatment. Thus, 
any specific commitments in sensitive sectors such as health or education, for 
example, should be defined with special care.27 For example, a liberalization 
commitment may be consigned uniquely covering ‘services supplied by pri-
vate companies’ for processing and distribution of water. In this way, publicly 
provided services for processing and distribution of water would be exclud-
ed from GATS rules. However, this commitment may well also be consigned 
with little precaution. 
In principle, the ‘top down’ strategy embedded within the GATS for consign-
ing liberalization commitments, offers sufficient regulatory space and flexi-
bility to ensure direct governmental provision of public services.28 However, 
Part IV of the GATS is entitled ‘progressive liberalization’ for a reason: the 
GATS functions as a regulatory framework promoting long term progressive 
liberalization in all categories of services. In short, this regulatory framework 
was designed to gradually cover all classifications of services sectors and sub-
sectors within the UN Central Product Classifications (CPC).29 In this context, 
27  On GATS and health services see, in particular, P. Delimatsis, ‘GATS and Public 
Health Care: An Uneasy Relationship’, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012–005 (February 
9, 2012) and D. Legge, D. Sanders & D. McCoy, ‘Trade and health: the need for a political 
economic analysis’, The Lancet, Volume 373, Issue 9663 (14–20 February 2009): 527–
529. With regard to GATS and educational services also see A. Verger, WTO/GATS and the 
Global Politics of Higher Education (Routledge 2010) as well as A. Verger, ‘The Merchants 
of Education: Global Politics and the Uneven Education Liberalization Process within the 
WTO’, 53 Comparative Education Review 3 (2009): 379–401. 
28  M. Krajewski, ‘Public Services’, op.cit.p.361.
29  See WTO MTN.GNS/W/120, Services Sectoral Classification List, Note by the Sec-
retariat (10 July 1991).
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a collective negotiating strategy to expand the scope of the commitments in 
educational services has been underway for over a decade. Thus, during the 
first post-WTO service negotiations (GATS 2000 negotiations), the so-called 
‘Friends of Education’ group (WTO Members interested in promoting liber-
alization in the education sector) presented its first request for liberalization 
of private education services to 22 WTO Members,30 and made this request 
into a liberalization offer on their part.31 In short, industry pressure to regu-
larly improve market access in these and other service sectors is likely to be 
sustained within the GATS negotiating framework. 
4. Disciplining of domestic regulation 
For many, the GATS negotiations potentially cover any domestic measure that 
could restrict access to the services market. As Renato Ruggiero explained 
when he was Director General of the WTO, ‘the GATS provides guarantees 
over a much wider field of regulation and law than the GATT; the right of 
establishment and the obligation to treat foreign services suppliers fairly and 
objectively in all relevant areas of domestic regulation extend the reach of the 
Agreement into areas never before recognized as trade policy’.32 From its 
incipience, the GATS has always raised doubts over the margins granted to 
domestic regulation. In fact, efforts were made to dispel some of these doubts 
in its Preamble by formally recognizing the so-called ‘right to regulate’:
‘Recognizing the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the 
supply of services within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives and, 
given asymmetries existing with respect to the degree of development of services regula-
tions in different countries, the particular need of developing countries to exercise this 
right’. 
Nevertheless, a number of domestic measures is already prohibited under 
GATS. On this point, for example, domestic regulations on issues such as 
minimum capital requirements for companies, compulsory civil liability in-
surance, qualification procedures and requirements, technical regulations, 
30  See CPC 923**/‘Higher Education Services’ and CPC 929**/‘Other Education Ser-
vices’.
31  S. Scherer, ‘GATS: long-term strategy’, op.cit. 
32  See Towards GATS 2000-a European Strategy, WTO News: Speeches (2 June 1998).
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among others, could breach GATS provisions.33 In this regard, WTO Mem-
bers that have scheduled commitments granting market access pursuant to 
article XVI are currently prohibited from adopting restrictive measures in the 
following areas: (a) number of suppliers, (b) value of assets or transactions, 
(c) number of operations or amount of the production (d) number of persons 
supplying the service, (e) type of legal person and (f) stake in foreign capital. 
These measures may not be imposed on foreign services companies unless the 
WTO Members have established terms to the contrary in their schedule. In 
consequence, significant restrictions are established on non–trade policies. 
The GATS distinguishes specific liberalization commitments from domestic 
regulations required to fulfill public policy goals such as consumer protection, 
access to quality services, the requirement for universal access to essential 
supplies, integration of disadvantaged persons and groups in the labor mar-
ket, the prevention of anti-competitive conduct, fair access to services irre-
spective of income or location, etc. However, implementing such objectives 
requires that domestic regulations should be administered in a ‘reasonable, 
objective and impartial manner’ and not producing unnecessary barriers to 
trade in services. Thus, significant tensions may arise when formulating do-
mestic public policies.
The GATS also incorporates disciplines regarding domestic rulemaking pro-
cesses.34 In this regard, article VI.5 contains a mandate to develop disciplines 
regarding domestic regulation. For this purpose, section a establishes that 
WTO Members may not apply prescriptions on licensing requirements (e.g. 
professional licenses, distribution, handling licenses, etc), qualifications re-
quirements (e.g. professional qualifications, certifications, accreditation of 
management of special services, etc) and technical standards (e.g. health, en-
vironmental and consumer standards, occupational safety, etc) which nullify 
or impair such specific commitments ‘up to entry into force of disciplines 
created for those sectors’ (ongoing negotiations on Disciplines on Domestic 
Regulation).
33  G. Shaffer, Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation (Brookings Institution 
Press 2003).
34  P. Delimatsis, ‘Due Process and ‘Good’ Regulation Embedded in the GATS–Disci-
plining Regulatory Behaviour in Services through Article VI of the GATS’, 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law 10 (2006): 13–50.
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In order to ensure that domestic regulations on licensing requirements, qual-
ifications requirements and technical standards do not impair or nullify com-
mitments, article VI.5 establishes (1) that these regulations shall be based 
on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability 
to supply the service, (2) that they shall not be more burdensome than nec-
essary to ensure the quality of the service and, in the case of licensing pro-
cedures, (3) that they should not in themselves be a restriction on the sup-
ply of the service. In addition, domestic regulation could be nullify or impair 
commitments if it ‘could not reasonably have been expected of that Mem-
ber’ at the time that the specific commitments were made. Finally, section 
b encourages domestic regulations to adapt to international norms −global 
standardization− by establishing that ‘account shall be taken of international 
standards of relevant international organizations’ to determine compliance 
with the previous section (article VI.5.a).
Therefore, the so-called built-in agenda of the GATS promotes the establish-
ment of WTO disciplines regarding qualification requirements and proce-
dures, technical standards and licensing requirements and procedures. These 
disciplines are designed to be applied to all measures affecting trade in services 
within the scope of the GATS. In accordance, the Council for Trade in Services 
has a mandate to negotiate on this area pursuant to article VI:4. In order to 
comply with this provision, WTO disciplines are to be developed to ensure 
that domestic regulatory processes in this area ‘do not constitute unnecessary 
barriers to trade in services’.35 Thus, a WTO working party on domestic regu-
lation was created to fulfill this mandate and thus negotiate a separate set of 
so-called ‘horizontal’ disciplines on domestic regulation to be applied to all 
services covered within the GATS scope. As a result, the basic principles to 
be considered in order to draft these ‘disciplines on domestic regulation’ are 
the following: (1) necessity (regulations which do not restrict trade or which 
are no more burdensome than necessary in order to achieve a specific and 
legitimate objective); (2) transparency (access to information on the regulato-
ry process and the examination procedures for administrative decisions); (3) 
equivalence (taking into consideration qualifications and experience obtained 
abroad by suppliers) and (4) international standards (acceptance of interna-
tional standards which facilitate assessment of foreign qualifications). 
35  See JOB(02)/20/Rev.10, Examples of Measures addressed by Disciplines under 
GATS article VI.4, Informal Note by the Secretariat (31 January 2005).
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By establishing this regulatory framework, WTO Members are certainly in-
volved in a form of meta-regulation. That is to say, that WTO Members are 
involved in regulating domestic regulatory processes multilaterally or, in oth-
er words, regulating how to regulate. The first initiative negotiated within this 
framework focused on accounting services: the so-called ‘disciplines on the 
regulation of the accountancy sector’. It is intended for these new disciplines 
to be integrated into the GATS at the end of the Doha Round.36 Currently, 
the GATS working party on domestic regulation is not engaged in any sec-
tor-specific negotiation and is putting all its efforts into the development of 
the above mentioned ‘horizontal’ disciplines. In this regard, and pursuant to 
article VI:4, the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration instructed negotia-
tors in paragraph 5 of Annex C (Services) to adopt a text on horizontal disci-
plines before the end of the Doha Round.37 
The reform of domestic regulations on qualification requirements and proce-
dures, technical standards and licensing requirements and procedures may 
improve market access for foreign services providers. Many such foreign 
companies are currently excluded de facto from the provision of services as 
a result of regulations established by a variety of domestic authorities. How-
ever, regulatory reform in this area is highly sensitive, as establishing disci-
plines on domestic regulation may have a bearing on traditional functions of 
legislation and public administration. In this regard, the provision of services 
in the territory of each WTO Member is directly dependent on administrative 
regulations and practices formed throughout history. In fact, some of these 
may be associated with cultural identities as well as idiosyncrasies. Thus, the 
negotiating mandate article VI.4 does not prescribe an easy task, as horizon-
tal harmonization is decidedly complex. 
In any case, the project of disciplines on domestic regulation contained in the 
Chairman’s Report, dated March 2009, is the current main reference draft 
in this area.38 In addition, the 2011 Progress Report formalized the advances 
36  See S/L/64, Disciplines on domestic regulation in the accountancy sector (17 De-
cember 1998).
37  See WT/MIN(05)/DEC, Doha Work Program, Ministerial Declaration: Annexes, 
adopted on 18 December 2005 (22 December 2005).
38  See Second Revision, Draft Disciplines on Domestic Regulation pursuant to GATS 
Article VI.4, Informal Note by the Chairman, Room Document, 20 March 2009, as con-
tained in Doc TN/S/36 (21 April 2011).
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made in the drafting of these Disciplines in three bracketed categories: para-
graphs agreed on an ad referendum basis (category 1), on so-called single 
alternative (category 2) and on multiple alternatives (category 3).39 In prin-
ciple, the working party aims to ensure that all paragraphs would progress to 
the first and second category in a new revised project to be concluded in the 
mid term.40 However, in 2014, it is hard to gauge what the final result of these 
negotiations will be, taking into account the regulatory complexity involved. 
In short, and to paraphrase Lester, the question is how to craft these rules 
so as to define the boundaries of international economic law in an appropri-
ate way.41 To give but one example, an issue on which there is no consensus 
among WTO Members is whether or not the disciplines should incorporate 
proof of the need for regulation as a ‘regulatory criterion’.42
5. Prospects and policy trends 
Understandably, the progressive liberalization of world trade in services rais-
es some sensitive policy issues and concerns within non-trade constituencies. 
For this reason, already a decade ago the UN Human Rights bodies had made 
a public call for WTO Members not to inhibit access to basic services through 
trade concessions within the GATS regulatory framework.43 Answering these 
concerns, the WTO community and insider network often explain that GATS 
provides sufficient flexibility to adapt to the policy needs of WTO Members.44 
However, flexibility depends on which specific commitment is included in the 
schedule, and how it is included, as explained above: market access and na-
tional treatment is accorded to those services for which liberalization com-
39  See S/WPDR/W/45, Chairman’s Progress Report on Disciplines on Domestic Reg-
ulation pursuant to GATS Article VI.4 (14 April 2011). 
40  For a comparison with all draft proposals see RD/SERV/46/Rev.2, Chairman’s con-
sultative note.
41  See S. Lester, ‘Finding the Boundaries of International Economic Law’, Journal of 
International Economic Law 17 (2014): 3–9.
42  See SWPDR/W/45, paragraph 14. For the Secretariat notes on regulatory issues see 
S/WPDR/W/48, Regulatory Issues in Sectors and Modes of Supply (13 June 2012), Add.1 
dated 30 April 2013 and S/WPDR/W/51, Services-Related Regulatory Challenges faced 
by Developing Countries (13 March 2013).
43  See Liberalization of Trade in Services and Human Rights, OHCHR (22 June 2002).
44  See GATS: Facts and Fictions (WTO 2014).
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mitments have been scheduled, and only insofar as they have not included 
limitations.45 
On this point, it is clear that the scheduling of commitments may be subject 
to strong pressures in favor of liberalization, as a direct result of offers and 
requests in this and/or other sectors. In practice, such is the logic of trade-
offs; a traditional practice in trade negotiations which has fuelled the expan-
sion of the world trading system for more than half a century. In this regard, 
it is important to recall that the WTO is a multi-issue negotiating forum. As 
such, negotiations in the services sector are connected to parallel negotiations 
in other areas (e.g. access to agricultural and/or textile markets in exchange 
for liberalization of banking and health services, etc). Therefore, sectoral as 
well as inter-sectoral trade-offs pave the way for progressive consolidation of 
commitments. Basically, the eventual transit from so-called ‘non-consolidat-
ed commitment’ to commitment ‘with’ or ‘without limitations’ in the GATS 
national schedules does not only depend on which specific liberalization of-
fers are being brought to the services negotiating table by those who request 
commitments in a given services sector. 
Also, once commitments are consolidated, any withdrawal of concessions 
requires alternative concessions in other areas (article XXI). In this regard, 
any modification of commitments consigned in the schedules requires rene-
gotiating trade concessions with have affected WTO Members. As a result, 
paradoxically, the GATS negotiating framework ensures that changes in gov-
ernment (read national elections) cannot easily reform the policies that have 
already been consolidated in national schedules by previous governments. 
At the present time, the GATS negotiations remain open within the context 
of a series of consultations.46 However, the so-called ‘Real Good Friends of 
45  For vague or flawed entries in the access commitments scheduled under the GATS 
see in particular R. Adlung, P. Morrison, R. Martin & W. Zhang, ‘FOG in GATS commit-
ments - why WTO Members should care’, 12 World Trade Review (2013): 1–27 and A. Ru-
dolf & M. Roy, ‘Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Commitments under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services and Prospects for Change’, 39 Journal of World Trade 
(2005): 1161–1194.
46  See TN/S/38, Report by the Chairman of the Council for Trade in Services in Special 
Session of 14 March 2014 (21 March 2014).
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Services’ group (70% of global GDP)47 have opened services negotiations in 
parallel.48 This new initiative, resulting from the impasse in Doha talks and the 
uncertainties of its final success, builds upon some GATS core provisions as 
well as services commitments already contained in recent FTAs.49 Under this 
strategy promoted by the 23 RGF members to improve market access for their 
services industries,50 the GATS functions as a form of regulatory template for a 
new plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) in or outside the WTO.51 
Nevertheless, incorporating an initiative such as TiSA within the WTO regime 
is a far from easy prospect. Many WTO Members perceive variable geometry 
to be a systemic challenge for the WTO regime, as it could undermine its tra-
ditional multilateral approach to trade liberalization.52 In fact, variable geom-
etry has been generally contested by emerging economies such as Brazil, In-
dia and China for many years. However, China recently changed its position 
and made a request to join the TiSA negotiations on September 29, 2014. As 
a result, while many WTO Members are currently taking the view that negoti-
ations outside the WTO could undermine GATS negotiations, those involved 
in the so-called TiSA negotiations are obviously highlighting their potential 
for cross-fertilization.53
47  The current WTO members involved in this initiative include Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, EU, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Pakistan, Peru, South Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, and the 
United States. For recent fine studies on this area see A. Hoe Lim & B. de Meester (eds), 
WTO Domestic Regulation and Services Trade: Putting Principles into Practice (Cam-
bridge University Press 2014).
48  See Advancing Negotiations on Trade in Services, Joint Statement (5 July 2012).
49  See ‘Services Liberalization Talks Among Group of WTO Members Move Forward’, 
16 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 34 (10 October 2012).
50  See ‘Services Talks within WTO Members Group Advance, Eyeing Launch of Formal 
Negotiations’, 17 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 4 (6 February 2013).
51  See P. Sauvé, ‘A Plurilateral Agenda for Services? Assessing the case for a Trade in 
Services Agreement (TiSA)’, NCCR Working Papers 2013/29 (May 2013). For a critical 
analysis of current negotiations see S. Sinclair & H. Mertins-Kirkwood, TiSA versus public 
services, Public Services International (28 April 2014).
52  See Delhi Declaration: Fourth BRICS Summit, New Delhi (29 March 2012).
53  See TN/S/38, Council for Trade in Services Special session, Report by the Chair-
man of the Council for Trade in Services in special session of 14 March 2014 (21 March 
2014), paragraph 1.5.
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Process and production methods delinked from trade 
1.  Trading environment 
The way in which to reconcile environmental protection and economic in-
tegration, and thus trade liberalization, poses a challenge to global gover-
nance.1 In fact, achieving synergies or a balance between the two has been 
widely acknowledged as a major global policy issue since the latter years of 
the past century.2 However, today not one structural policy transformation 
has taken place towards the sustainability of world production and distribu-
tion of goods and services. This particular issue offers an apt and appropri-
ate case study to explore the approach of the world trading system towards 
non-trade issues. In this regard, environmental externalities in world trade 
law are essentially a by-product of delinking process and production meth-
ods (PPMs) from trade.3 Currently, as mentioned in the first chapter, the 
environmental externalities of global supply chains are not multilaterally 
regulated. 
The pertinent question is, to what extent does free trade promote social effi-
ciency, when the price of goods and services globally produced and distrib-
uted does not reflect its environmental costs? In this regard, some ideas of 
economic efficiency regarding trade are oversimplified, as non-repairable en-
vironmental degradation cannot be quantified in monetary terms: in short, 
1  For one of the first fine work on the links between the multilateral trade system and 
the environment see, in particular, D. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and 
the Future (Institute for International Economics 1994). More recently, see J. Watson, The 
WTO and the environment: development of competence beyond trade (Routledge 2013).
2  J. Bhagwati, ‘Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?’, Trade and the Envi-
ronment: Law, Economics, and Policy (Island Press 1993) at 159.
3  J. Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Con-
flict’, 49 Washington and Lee Law Review, Symposium: Environmental Quality and Free 
Trade: Interdependent Goals or Irreconcilable Conflict? (1992):1227–1277.
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price systems cannot determine value when costs are incommensurate (i.e. 
survival of our species). 
Nevertheless, transforming the status quo is anything but easy. Traditional 
political cycles in parliamentary democracies do not normally govern policy 
issues or design policies with the long-term in mind, as in centuries, rath-
er than decades. In short, environmental conservation is not a central issue 
in the global agenda because the citizens of the future cannot vote.4 Public 
leaders have little incentive to make environmental protection the ‘rule of the 
game’ generally and, consequently, we trade the environment. In practice, 
environmental policies depend very much on the degree of social awareness 
and pressure in developing and developed countries alike; while the lack of 
social pressure endures, development policies will continue to free-ride on 
the environment: as a result, setting up global standards for production, dis-
tribution and consumption is not a priority in either developed or developing 
societies, as priorities and preferences tend to focus in the short-term, on 
improving current standards of living. 
However, as environmentalists and other critics claim, the genuine agenda 
for pareto efficiency in global governance is inter-generational equity, as this 
would maximize the preservation the Earth and our species.5 Under this 
rationale, what makes markets (and market transactions) possible is the en-
vironment itself. In the absence of the medium, markets and market-mech-
anisms do not function (e.g. price-based competition), as they simply do not 
exist: no life. In this line of reasoning, approaching efficiency through the 
mere policy prism of alternative uses is basically macro-inefficient, as some 
environmental damages can never be monetized, or internalized. 
This phenomenon is what makes people approach sustainable development 
as the optimum efficiency criterion in itself, or the ‘most efficient criterion of 
4  See Ch. Stone, Should trees have standing?: law, morality, and the environment 
(Oxford University Press 2010). 
5  On intergenerational ethics see, in particular, C. Wolf, ‘Environmental Ethics, Future 
Generations and Environmental Law’, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law 
(Routledge 2012) at 397-414; C. Wolf, ‘Intergenerational Justice’, Blackwell Companion 
to Applied Ethics (Blackwell 2003) at 279-294 as well as the fine monograph of E. Brown 
Weiss, In fairness to future generations: International Law, Common Patrimony and 
Intergenerational Equity (Transnational publisher 1989).
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efficiency’ for our species; at least while we fail to develop further technolo-
gies enabling us to migrate elsewhere. Essentially, while such technologies 
remain unavailable, sustainable development is said to be the most efficient 
overarching principle to govern open markets; a term originally coined by the 
so-called Brundtland Report of the UN World Commission on Environmental 
and Development (Our Common Future) in 1987. The concept has some grey 
areas but nevertheless also lucidly captured certainties: 
‘Sustainable development is development that satisfies current needs without endanger-
ing the capacity of future generations to satisfy their own needs.’ 
The problem is how we operationalize sustainable development in practice, 
and the world trading system is a paradigmatic case of study in this regard, as 
it has developed a clear legal position towards externalities in all regulatory 
areas, including the environment. For this reason, the environment provides 
an appropriate case study to explore the phenomenon of delinkage in trade 
law. In principle, by reading the Preamble to the WTO Agreement, it is easy 
to conclude that sustainable development is an end-goal of the world trading 
system. In fact, the very first decision of the Appellate Body sustained that in 
both the Preamble and the WTO Decision on Trade and Environment ‘there is 
specific acknowledgement to be found about the importance of coordinating 
policies on trade and environment’.6 WTO panels have also defined sustain-
able development as ‘one of the objectives of the WTO agreement’.7 However, 
the regulatory structures of world trade are unable to easily integrate sustain-
able development. 
Trade representatives promote world economic integration by practicing, as 
they see fit, a complex game of trade-offs in which environmental dilemmas 
are embedded but generally deducted. These basically concentrate on negoti-
ating foreign market access for their domestic business constituencies. Thus, 
protection of the environment is subject to the vicissitudes of a cacophonous 
6  WT/DS2/AB/R, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gas-
oline (20 May 1996) at paragraph 30. See also J. Jackson, ‘Justice Feliciano and the WTO 
Environmental Cases: Laying the Foundations of a ‘Constitutional Jurisprudence’ with 
implications for Developing Countries’, Law in the Science of human Dignity (Cambridge 
University Press 2005).
7  See WTDS58/R/W United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
products (recourse to article 21.5), paragraph 5.54.
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and multi-level negotiating scenario in which a wide variety of special and 
general interest groups coincide in just one thing: namely, endeavoring to 
make the WTO rulebook reflects their interests. As a result, trade negotia-
tions are carried out to the accompaniment of intense background noise: a 
complex network of companies, industry associations, and civil society or-
ganizations propose, claim and suggest negotiating policies and positions to 
trade ministers, often even on negotiations site. It is no accident that environ-
mental ministers have no seat at the negotiating table. As the world trading 
system is in itself a regulatory by-product of the values of those who man-
age it, reconciling the value of open markets with the value of environmental 
protection within the pro-trade GATT/WTO framework is thus an unaccom-
plished responsibility of those who manage the evolution of this functionalist 
institution: namely, trade ministers. 
The Havana Charter from which the GATT of 1947 was devised, as has been 
explained, had a more open and multi-functional approach.8 However, after 
its demise, trade representatives adopted a regulatory approach mainly fo-
cused on the progressive liberalization of trade. As a result, social issues relat-
ing to trade −including environmental protection− are now addressed from a 
firm pro-trade (read functional) regulatory stance. Nowadays, this function-
al approach permeates not only the world trading system but an increasing 
number of PTAs. Thus, it is not easy to refute the criticisms of those who de-
nounce the restrictive (or self-contained) rationality of both multilateral and 
preferential trade regimes since decades ago. 
The foundations for greater environmental awareness and sensitivity regard-
ing trade were laid with the advent of ecology groups in developed countries 
during the nineteen sixties. But it was not until the eighties that the first envi-
ronmentalist voices were heard in political circles and the media. Before that, 
in the seventies, the GATT Secretariat made a small contribution to the UN 
Stockholm Conference on Human Environment (1972),9 and provided tech-
nical assistance to the drafters of the Convention on International Trade and 
Endangered Species (CITES) on issues of legal compatibility with GATT rules 
(1973). From then on, and during the first half of the nineties, a climate of 
8  c.a. Wilcox, A Charter for world trade (Macmillan 1949).
9  See Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade, GATT Studies in Interna-
tional Trade 1 (GATT Secretariat 1971).
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concern with respect to the development model promoted by the GATT arose 
among conservation organizations, originally and particularly in the United 
States:10 a development model denounced to deduct world sustainability and 
thus purely based on the mere reduction of ‘trade barriers’, in WTO-speak. 
The shortcomings of this state of affairs led to a long-lasting negative atti-
tude towards the world trading system among a significant part of the en-
vironmental community. In this regard, the problems of transparency, the 
functioning of panels behind closed doors, and the structural pro-trade bias 
of GATT rules and case law −beginning with the second report of 1991 in the 
Tuna case−11 contributed to consolidate a climate of concern. 
The origins of this state of affairs can be traced back to the complex histor-
ical evolution of the world trading system. Following the adoption of GATT 
in 1947, and until the Tokyo Round was completed (1973-1979), the world 
trading system basically evolved in relative isolation in respect of non-trade 
branches of domestic government, as well as other non-trade global regimes. 
As explained, the GATT Contracting Parties had their reasons for proceeding 
in such a way: the GATT (as organization) originally lacked of any proper 
institutional structure −except for that loosely provided in article XXV− and 
survived under provisional application (that is, non-ratification) for many de-
cades.12 Given these structural weaknesses, trade representatives conscious-
ly chose to concentrate on liberalization in relative self-containment, engag-
ing in few relationships with non-trade global regimes as well as non-trade 
domestic agencies. This original and rather odd legal status, outside interna-
tional legal standards, given its decades of provisional application, imbued 
the inner GATT structures with a deep functionalism, and thus an original 
tendency to avoid multi-functional ventures such as, among others, condi-
tioning trade to non-trade policies. 
Therefore, it is no accident that the first international body to address the link 
10  See for example the advertisement by Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club 
and Public Citizen published in various US periodicals (eg. New York Times) under the 
title “Sabotage” (14 December 1992).
11  For the two cases see ‘United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna’, 30 Interna-
tional Law Materials (1991) 1594 (unadopted panel report, August 16, 1991) and ‘United 
States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna’, 33 International Law Materials (1994) 839 (un-
adopted panel report, June 16, 1994).
12  See chapter 2.
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between trade and environment was not within the confines of the GATT but 
the OECD, when the latter created a working group on this issue in 1991.13 
Prior to this, a working group on environmental measures and international 
trade had been established by the GATT Contracting Parties in 1971, but it 
never actually met; and nor did the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) take environ-
mental issues on board. However, trade diplomacy moved to a radically dif-
ferent level playing field with the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986, by 
successfully negotiating an impressive set of legal instruments (24 covered 
agreements) under its package-deal approach. Thus, the ‘only trade business 
on board’ with regard to the environment was no longer tenable. As a result, 
at the Ministerial Conference of Marrakesh (1994), the Final Act concluding 
the Uruguay Round, and officially establishing the WTO, incorporated a Gen-
eral Council Decision creating the WTO Committee on Trade and Environ-
ment (CTE). 
Since its inception, ten years after the publication of the Brundtlant Report 
(1984), the CTE has performed an important task of analysis and data com-
pilation as well as inter-institutional dialogue with the Secretariats of the UN 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). However, the contribution 
to environmental protection by trade ministers through the CTE has been 
limited at best. As it stands today, according to paragraph 51 of Doha De-
velopment Declaration, the CTE functions (together with the Committee on 
Trade and Development) as a ‘forum to identify and debate developmental 
and environmental aspects of negotiations’, and thus is devoid of any endeav-
or to promote structural policy change in this area. 
Despite being well into an age of increasing policy interdependence, the in-
clusion of environmental issues in the world trading system is scant. Thus, 
the efforts of environmental groups to have some impact on the status quo 
through this committee ended in disappointment time ago. Reconciling 
trade and environment on the basis of the long established pro-liberaliza-
tion GATT/WTO acquis is not easy: it requires breaking with the deep-rooted 
inertia of a set of rules which has been successfully providing measurable 
results of progressive liberalization for more than half a century (eight rounds 
of trade negotiations). The CTE is in itself an illustrative example of the dif-
13  K. Woody, ‘The World Trade Organization’s Committee on Trade and Environment’, 
8 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 3 (1996): 458–463.
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ficulties inherent in this task; established by the above mentioned Decision 
of the GATT General Council on 15 April 1994, it first operated as a prepa-
ratory subcommittee until it was incorporated in the institutional structure 
of the WTO with its entry into force (January 1, 1995). From its beginnings, 
this deliberative body lies in no–man’s land, and has also been viewed with 
mistrust by developing countries and environmental movements alike. The 
latter, in particular, have generally questioned that such a critically systemic 
issue should be dealt with by a mere committee. In fact, creating commit-
tees often operates as a mere delaying tool, allowing public-decision makers 
to press on with their agendas, while providing a temporary buffer for some 
problems; and the environmental community is well aware of this standard 
phenomenon in comparative politics. The general attitude was quite clearly 
framed by the WWF several years ago: 
‘Internally, the time has come to “mainstream” environmental concerns into the work of 
all relevant WTO bodies and agreements, rather than leaving the topic to the debate of a 
single, disconnected committee’.14
Even during the early days of the committee, the specialized literature was 
also conclusive in this regard. Tarasofsky, for example, holds that the CTE 
will not be an appropriate forum for seeking a balance between trade and 
environment while it remains unable to act and choose between different and 
difficult political decisions.15 The CTE’s inability to submit proposals lies in 
the polarization of their positions and the reluctance of trade representatives 
of developing countries, to whom the committee facilitate disembarkation of 
the so-called green protectionism in the WTO. In fact, Item 6 of the CTE’s 
work program as well and paragraph 32 (i) of the Doha Declaration give at-
tention to this particular issue under the heading ‘environmental require-
ments and market access’. 16 
The challenge has two related dimensions. As mentioned, during the initial 
stages of the world trading system, trade ministers from developed countries 
−who originally designed the GATT and controlled its evolution− pushed for 
14  See “An Open Letter to WTO Members on the Occasion of the High Level Symposium 
on Trade and Environment”, WWF (15-16 March 1999).
15  R. Tarasofsky, ‘The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment: Is it making a Dif-
ference?’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (1999) at 471–488.
16  WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, Doha Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001.
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regime-building by providing it with an intensely functional approach to-
wards progressive liberalization. However, today, in the post-consolidation 
WTO stage, their counterparts from developing countries have gained signifi-
cant control over WTO functioning, and are not willing to amend a set of rules 
that significantly help them attract FDI and outsourcing contracts by amplify-
ing global supply chains. Interestingly, the first report submitted by the CTE 
to a Ministerial Conference (Singapore) made such facts evident:17 not less 
than 10 delegations, dissatisfied with some content, rushed out to formally 
state that this very first report did not modify ‘rights and obligations’ under 
the WTO Agreements, was not binding, and could therefore not be used ‘as 
a basis for legal action under the Dispute Settlement Understanding’ (sic).18 
Such declaration of principles clearly frames the structural problem: namely, 
that the main development model available in global governance nowadays 
is world trade; as the direct transfer of income and resources from devel-
oped to developing countries is marginal in comparison with the transfer of 
rents within global supply chains today. Thus, developing countries are quite 
aware that their lifeline for economic development is to produce and distrib-
ute goods and services with the help of the legal infrastructures of open trade. 
In essence, no country has achieved sustained growth without importing, pro-
ducing and exporting a diversifying range of value-added goods and services. 
In addition, developed countries have not supported development models 
combining free trade with significant direct transfers of rents or income to 
developing countries. Hence, world trade is the all-pervading tool for eco-
nomic development. Logically, in consequence, developing countries fiercely 
resist all policy proposals conditioning market access to compliance with x or 
y environmental standards. The structural tension between developing and 
developed countries on this issue has, therefore, a direct impact on environ-
mental policies in general, whether domestic or international. As a result, 
getting trade representatives from developing countries to see eye to eye with 
the environmental constituency on issues such as global standards of pro-
duction and distribution, or even the ecological footprint of the world trading 
17  WT/CTE/1, Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment (12 Novem-
ber 1996).
18  WT/CTE/M/13, Committee on Trade and Environment-Report of the Meetings held 
on 30 October and 6-8 November 1996, Note by the Secretariat (22 November 1996). 
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system generally,19 is close to a Herculean task. For developing countries, not 
incidentally, raising those standards through international hard-law linked 
to trade has a direct impact on their competitive advantage. Therefore, it is 
highly unlikely that multilateral consensus will be achieved on this point in 
the future −no matter how limited it may be− without developing a non-trade 
restrictive new deal in which developed countries transfer significant rents to 
developing countries. 
2. Trade measures and tests
The use of trade restrictions for environmental purposes does not appear 
to generally constitute a best policy option to efficiently make environmen-
tal fixes. Arguably, environmental protection is better promoted by means 
of resource-intensive regulatory frameworks based on structural technolo-
gy transfer, capacity building and other related public policies without the 
need for restricting world trade and economic development.20 Nonetheless, 
having said this, it is reasonable to question the establishment of any gener-
al policy prohibition against the use of trade measures to advance environ-
mental policies and objectives. In principle, and notwithstanding that trade 
restrictions are not a panacea, no policy tool should be automatically kept 
aside from the toolkit of policy design, and neither should it be structurally 
excluded for any policy reasons in global governance (i.e. open markets as an 
end in itself). After all, policy is the art of making things happen so, in order 
to do so, every potential policy tool has to be available in the toolkit of multi-
lateral policymaking. 
On the other hand, it is always difficult to define so-called trade-related mea-
sures, as well as hierarchy or order within the relationship. After all, what is 
19  N. Ahmad & A.Wyckoff, ‘Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied in International Trade 
of Goods’, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2003/15 (2003) and 
S. Nakano, A. Okamura, N. Sakurai, M. Suzuki, T. Tojo & N. Yamano, ’The measurement of 
CO2 embodiments in international trade: Evidence from harmonised input-output and bi-
lateral trade database’, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2009/3 
(2009).
20  See C. Osakwe, ‘Finding New Packages of Acceptable Combinations of Trade and 
Positive Measures to Improve the Effectiveness of MEAs: A General Framework’, Trade 
and Environment: Bridging the Gap, op.cit.p.48. 
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related to what, environment to trade, or trade to environment? Arguably, 
both social values (trade and environment) are inter-related, and thus not 
subject to any hierarchy from a general policy perspective. Terms used in pol-
icy making are not neutral. By using the term ‘trade measure’ −as opposed 
to ‘environmental measure’− we are also condoning a conceptual framework 
which surreptitiously influences the formal allocation of authority on such 
measures to trade ministers and the regimes in which they participate (i.e.: 
WTO, etc). By doing so, trade representatives are transformed into the ulti-
mate authority deciding whether or not (and in which cases) such measures 
shall be used to form public policy in practice.21 Steve Charnovitz makes 
quite a reasonable point in this vein:
‘In view of the fact that the environment regime does not use trade measures differently 
than the trade regime does, it is astonishing that the trade regime has had the temerity 
to question such use. Environmentalists are being put through psychoanalysis to explain 
why they depend on trade measures; yet the habits of the trade regime receive no similar 
scrutiny (or self-scrutiny).’22 
The phenomenon referred to above inevitably produces a chilling effect on 
environmental policies, as any environmental measure is eventually subject 
to the test of WTO law. Historically, notable provisions which hamper the 
adoption of some environmental policies are articles I (MFN clause), III (na-
tional treatment) and XI (quantitative restrictions) of the GATT, as well as 
article XX (exceptions), which goes explicitly into the protection of natural 
resources, among other issues. In addition, the agreements within the An-
nexes of the WTO agreement resulting from the Uruguay Round contain new 
legal requirements. The GATT article XX (exceptions) is the most illustrative 
provision on this point, as it is the classical parameter of legality for environ-
mental policies pursuant to world trade law. In principle, this provision from 
the GATT of 1947, and preserved in the GATT of 1994, acknowledges the right 
of domestic authorities to apply environmental policies. However, it requires 
these policies to fulfil a series of conditions. Thus, the chapeau to article XX 
requires that the measure in question (1) would not constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and (2) it would not be a disguised 
21  See T. Schoenbaum, ‘Trade-Related Environmental Measures (TREMS): The United 
States Perspective’, Trade and the Environment: The search for Balance, op.cit.pp.366-
372.
22  S. Charnovitz, ‘The Role of Trade Measures in Treaties’, op.cit.p.117.
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restriction on international trade. In turn, sections b and g regulate in detail 
the exceptions that grant GATT legality to measures adopted for environmen-
tal purposes. The requirements of article XX merit careful reading: 
‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
[the GATT] shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures… (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;... (g) 
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’. 
The detailed case law of the Appellate Body and panels explains how the 
exceptions should operate in practice. In this respect, any restrictive trade 
measure is subject to a ‘necessity test’ modulated with some elements of pro-
portionality. In order to determine whether or not a measure is necessary, 
the test requires several operations: 
(1) Estimating the value protected by the measure in question, 
(2) Evaluating the choice of the measure selected to protect said value and 
(3) Analyzing the impact of the measure on trade. 
Pursuant to the chapeau of article XX, from the moment the measure in ques-
tion is considered ‘necessary’, it will then be required to evaluate whether it 
is being applied in a non-protectionist manner. To this effect, the case law to 
date has established that there should be a balance between WTO require-
ments on market access and the state’s right to promote non-trade policies. 
The task of determining whether or not this is the case, is based on the cha-
peau of article XX, designed to combat undercover protectionist measures:
‘The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of 
locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an 
exception . . . and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive provisions . . 
. The location of the line of equilibrium . . . is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as 
the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific 
cases differ.’23
23  WT/DS58/AB/R, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (12 October 1998), paragraph 159.
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In short, the firm pro-trade approach is evident. In addition, it is sufficient to 
recall that the Appellate Body has defined article XX, from its earliest years, 
as an affirmative defense; that is, there are no presumptions: justification is 
required. Thus, for example, the adjudicative body of the WTO determined as 
follows in United States-Shirts and Blouses:
‘Articles XX and XI: (2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other 
provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. 
They are in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of 
establishing such a defence should rest on the party asserting it.’24 
Therefore, in the case of a dispute, the WTO Member applying a measure to 
protect the environment should demonstrate (burden of proof) that the mea-
sure is compatible with GATT rules. Needless to say, so-called prima facie 
presumptions are not easy to rebut in practice.25 In this respect, any domestic 
measure or regulation adopted by WTO Members for environmental purpos-
es not only needs to comply with article XX of the GATT and related case law, 
but also with provisions included in the so-called covered WTO agreements 
(GATS, TRIPs, TBT agreement, etc).26 Thus, this complex 500 pages regulato-
ry hub inhibits some environmental policy designs and regulations. 
In this context, the issue of manufacturing standards is particularly illustra-
tive, as considerable degree of environmental degradation is not caused by the 
products in themselves, but by the process and production methods (PPMs) 
employed to manufacture them. Therefore, standards related to the global 
supply chain are particularly relevant from an environmental perspective. 
Here, in principle, it is reasonable for public authorities not only to address 
the environmental effects resulting from the products (product standards) 
but from their own production process (process and production standards). 
For this reason, we tend to conceptually distinguish between ‘product-relat-
ed PPM’, in which consumption externalities are generated, and ‘non-prod-
uct related PPM’, which generate production externalities.27 Nonetheless, 
24  WT/DS33/AB/R, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts 
and Blouses from India (25 April 1997).
25  J. Cameron, ‘The GATT and the Environment’, op.cit.p.101. 
26  C. Wold, ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT’, op.cit.p.863.
27  C. Stevens, ‘Synthesis Report: Trade and Environment: PPM Issues’, Trade and En-
vironment: Processes and Production Methods (OECD 1994) at 7-22.
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the world trading system is neutral towards compulsory PPM on domestic 
products, but not with regard to imported products:28 in short, world trade 
law prevents domestic authorities to take into legal consideration the way in 
which foreign products entering the domestic market have been produced. 
The institutional fabric of trade liberalization structurally operates under a 
prohibition to discriminate among so-called like products.29 Thus, articles I 
and III of the GATT which have legally reflected this prescription since 1947 
are usually described as the ‘corner stone of the GATT’. In this regard, states 
have almost zero margins to link policy measures to aspects other than phys-
ical characteristics of a product such as, for example a highly pollutant chem-
ical within the product in order to pursue environmental policy objectives. 
Technically, domestic measures linked to the non-physical aspect of products 
(NPAs) are not compatible with GATT. In other words, world trade law does 
not allow a distinction to be made between physically identical products based 
on aspects which are not revealed in the product itself. Any discrimination 
between products with similar characteristics is, a priori, not GATT-compati-
ble, with only the exception of prison labor in section (e) of article XX, autho-
rizing discriminatory measures against products manufactured or assembled 
in prisons.
In short, any state which unilaterally regulates the PPMs of imported products 
28  On this issue see in particular See Ch. Conrad, Processes and production methods 
(PPMs) in WTO law: interfacing trade and social goals (Cambridge University Press 
2011); R. Read, ‘Process and Production Methods and the Regulation of International 
Trade’, The WTO and the Regulation of International Trade: Recent Trade Disputes be-
tween the European Union and the United States (Elgar 2005) at 239–266; S. Charnovitz, 
‘The Law of Environmental PPMs in the World Trade Organization’, 27 Yale Journal of In-
ternational Law (2002); S. Charnovitz, ‘Solving the Production and Processing Methods 
(PPMs) Puzzle’, The Earthscan Reader on International Trade and Sustainable Develop-
ment (Earthscan 2002) at 227–262, and S. Gaines, ‘Processes and production methods: 
how to produce sound policy for environmental PPM-based trade measures?’, 27 Colum-
bia Journal of Environmental Law 2 (2002): 383–432.
29  See T. Howse & D. Degan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction- an illusory basis for 
disciplining ‘unilateralism’ in trade policy’, 11 European Journal of International Law 
(2000): 249–289, and F. Roessler, ‘Beyond the Ostensible: A Tribute to Professor Robert 
Hudec’s Insights on the Determination of Likeness of Products Under the National Treat-
ment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’, 37 Journal of World 
Trade (2003): 771–781.
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and services faces a potential legal claim before the world trade jurisdiction. 
This is the case, for example, of public policies promoting so-called responsible 
consumption, which underlying idea is that PPM information may internalize 
part of the environmental costs of the production of goods and services through 
consumer freedom of choice, and thus responsible consumption. In this con-
text, global compulsory eco-labeling has become an alternative policy avenue 
for advancing environmental policies related to PPM.30 However, regulating 
the disclosure of information on PPM is also controversial within the four cor-
ners of the world trade community: are states allowed, for example, to require 
product labeling to inform citizens/consumers that a given product is made 
from Amazonian timber instead of wood grown in a sustainable forest? The 
Austrian parliament got involved in this very issue as long as 20 years ago, by 
establishing mandatory labeling of imported tropical woods. This piece of Aus-
trian legislation required a label to indicate the wood’s origin, and regulated the 
labeling criteria for imported timber from sustainable forests. The regulation 
was hotly debated within GATT.31 Finally, threats to exclude Austrian bidders 
from government procurement by timber-exporting countries in Southeast Asia 
such as Indonesia, and particularly Malaysia, forced Austrian parliament to re-
consider and ultimately revoke this ‘first in its class’ import-oriented eco-labe-
ling legislation by making the labeling requirements strictly voluntary.32 
These limitations on policy and regulatory design with regard to PPMs are 
questioned outside the confines of the trade community, particularly with 
regard to environmental global policymaking. In the words of a reputed en-
vironmentalist, Daniel Esty: ‘today, how things are made as well as what is 
traded is an issue’.33 In this regard, the environmental community has for 
30  See, JOB/TE/9, Eco-labelling: Overview of Current Work in Various International 
Fora, WTO Secretariat (29 September 2010), JOB/TE/7 Environmental Labelling-relat-
ed Specific Trade Concerns and Notifications in the TBT Committee, WTO Secretariat 
(17 September 2010) and WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Negotiating History of the Cov-
erage of the TBT Agreement with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Stan-
dards, and Processes and Production Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics, 
WTO Secretariat (29 August 1995).
31  See Communication of the Contracting Parties members of the ASEAN (L/7110), 
GATT C/M/260 (26 November 1992) at 45–64 
32  W. Lang, ‘Is the Protection of the Environment a Challenge’, op.cit.p.466. 
33  D. Esty, ‘Economic Integration and the Environment’, The Global Environment: In-
stitutions, Law, and Policy (Congressional Quaterly, 1999) at 203.
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years been criticizing the pro-liberalization bias with which these regulatory 
structures are shaping environmental policies within global economic inter-
dependence. The problem is global regulation on PPMs. In fact, multilateral 
environmental regulation of PPMs is today unlikely; and public initiatives for 
developing global compulsory ecostandards are notable for their absence.34 
In this sense, the deployment of trade measures in environmental treaty ini-
tiatives is blocked by the WTO rules in practice. In fact, there is an extended 
perception among trade representatives and officials that international envi-
ronmental negotiations have in recent years used trade-related measures too 
freely. Nonetheless, moving from fiction to facts, only 20 out of 250 Multilat-
eral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) include trade-related measures, in 
part because the power balances between trade ministries and environmental 
ministries are inclined towards the former. In this regard, the WTO Secretari-
at keeps an updated Matrix on trade measures pursuant to selected multilat-
eral environmental agreements at the request of WTO Members.35 
However, non-trade agreements have used trade-related measures for over a 
century. In fact, one of the first treaties to use such measures (for health and 
environmental purposes) was the International Convention on Phylloxera of 
1878.36 But nowadays, trade representatives tend to identify trade-related 
measures within their natural exclusive competence and thus as policy in-
struments within the treaty-based regimes and regulatory networks that they 
manage.37 As a result, these tend to perceive trade restrictions as second best 
policy options for tackling environmental problems, as there are always bet-
ter alternatives available than restricting free trade. To paraphrase Robert 
Howse’s critical stance, free traders can always imagine, in the abstract, an 
alternative policy instrument to trade restrictions, which is less trade restric-
tive and supposedly more efficient.38 
34  T. Cottier, ‘The WTO and Environmental Law: Three Points’, op.cit.p.57.
35  For the last revision See TN/TE/S/5/Rev.3 and WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.5, Matrix on 
trade measures pursuant to selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Note by 
the Secretariat–Revision (15 June 2011).
36  See S. Charnovitz, ‘A Taxonomy of environmental Trade measures’, 6 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 1 (1993): 1–46
37  See the comments of Alan Oxley (former GATT Council chairman) in A. Oxley, ‘The 
relationship between MEAs and WTO rules’, Trade and Environment Review (2003): 93.
38  R. Howse, ‘Human rights in the WTO: whose rights, what humanity? Comments on 
Petersmann’ 13 European Journal of International Law (2002): 645. 
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The problem affects two particularly significant phenomena: on one hand, 
there is a chilling effect on the use of trade-related measures in multilater-
al environmental policy design and rulemaking; on the other, the possibility 
that any environmental measures −albeit domestic or international− may be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the world trading system amplifies that effect. 
Technically, a WTO panel may declare at any time that any trade-related 
measure adopted for environmental purposes within or at implementing a 
MEA is incompatible with world trade law. On the other hand, it is not realis-
tic to expect the contrary. Furthermore, although world trade rules were not 
originally designed to confirm the legality of policy measures adopted within 
the framework of MEAs, the jurisdiction of the WTO rules and procedures is 
not prevented from deciding on domestic measures applied in compliance 
with those. Given this state of affairs, most of the environmental community 
resorts to pragmatism and the philosophy of the possible in policy design, 
and thus also probably to second or third best policy options. 
3. PPMs in global supply chains
The chilling effect produced in modern environmental law and policy by 
the regulatory structures of global exchange is evident. As explained, not 
only are PPM rules on imported products and services incompatible with 
WTO law, so is mandatory disclosure of information on PPM for imported 
products and services. PPM information may only be introduced voluntarily 
through contractual arrangements between producers, distributors, retail-
ers and consumers. That is, public authorities are not authorized to estab-
lish the binding disclosure of information with regard to PPMs of goods and 
services globally produced and distributed. This contingency goes beyond 
trade policy, by structurally restricting the way we are modeling our future. 
Not surprisingly, the Earth Summit’s Agenda 21 formally recommended 
governments that environmental policies should be present throughout the 
production cycle, and not just at the end. However, the WTO regime and 
its dispute settlement procedures somehow function as a ‘red button’ re-
garding such policy options. In addition, other cabinet colleagues −includ-
ing ministers for the environment− have been kept outside the regulatory 
structures of world trade since decades. In this context, to paraphrase Steve 
Charnovitz, there is a clear danger in giving the WTO power over the use of 
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environmental measures ‘without any responsibility for achieving environ-
mental outcomes’.39 
A question often comes to the table of environmental authorities assessing 
policy and regulatory options: ‘is the proposal compatible with WTO law?’. 
World trade law limits environmental policy design, by effectively inhibiting 
the options available. Regulatory standards on PPMs of imported products 
and services as well as the mere disclosure of information regarding PPMs are 
mere but significant examples. However, changing this status quo is difficult, 
as amending treaty-based regimes to amplify policy rationality often exact 
a high political cost. Alternatively, there are proposals already on the table 
to provide a counterbalance, by reinforcing and/or establishing new global 
environmental regimes. Pascal Lamy, while being WTO Director General, en-
capsulated the challenge in the following lines: 
‘The solution to the potential imbalance […] lies, I believe, in strengthening the enforce-
ment (the effectiveness) of other legal orders so as to rebalance the relative power of the 
WTO in the international legal order’.40 
Perhaps establishing a new global environmental regime as a counterbalance 
would constitute a systemic solution to some of these problems, by opening 
the door to world policy adjustment and rebalancing. As Tarullo explains, the 
preeminence of the WTO vis-à-vis other treaty-based regimes such as MEAs, is 
due to two key interconnected processes: the strong political leverage of trade 
agencies nowadays, as well as the relative weakness of some of those regimes.41 
However, it is not easy to expect that the world trade constituency −including, 
in particular, trade ministers from developing countries− would accept such 
a transformation. The same occurs with respect to the establishment of a con-
stitutionalized (and thus higher) treaty-based regime with jurisdictional au-
thority to develop regulatory synergies between specialized regimes (i.e. WTO 
vs MEAs). Traditionally, there is a deep reluctance among states to alter the 
39  S. Charnovitz, ‘A new paradigm for trade and the environment’, 11 Singapore Year-
book of International Law (2007): 40.
40  P. Lamy, ‘The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International Legal Order’, 17 
European Journal of International Law (2006): 984.
41  D. Tarullo, ‘The Relationship of WTO Obligations to Other International Arrange-
ments’, New Directions in International Economic Law. Essays in Honour of John. H. 
Jackson (Kluwer Law International 2000) at 171–172. 
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loose legal relationships between specialized treaty-based regimes (e.g. trade, 
environment, health, etc) and thus to promote a stronger inter-institutional 
integration. World institutional integration? Certainly, such eventual develop-
ment would be a terra incognita for all, and particularly for the elected repre-
sentatives operating within parliaments and governments; in short, the guard-
ians of the status quo. Far from it, it is more likely that trade ministers will 
sustain their effort to prevent other global negotiating fora (climate change 
negotiations, etc) from rebalancing the power laws of world trade. 
In essence, any non-trade diplomatic conference which comes to the negotiat-
ing table with trade related measures is likely to have its knuckles rapped. In 
any case environment ministers and their constituencies have not remained 
idle; taking a pragmatic approach, the environmental community is currently 
pushing for other strategies in the short and medium term, while working to 
develop future policy space and momentum for upgrading the coherence of 
world policymaking in the long run. As a result, the new pragmatic vocabu-
lary concentrates on ‘increasing synergies’ and ‘reducing tensions’ between 
the trade and environment regimes. The term synergy has gained credence 
in high-level meetings, plans, programs, and policy documents; as a less 
confrontational and more pragmatic solution than those currently offered 
by international law on conflicts of treaties.42 The UNEP itself, for example, 
has for several years been leading an initiative to increase synergies, reduce 
tensions, and thus improve so-called mutual support between the rules and 
policies of MEAs and the WTO:
‘Building mutually supportive relationships will require policy-makers to identify areas of 
intersection between MEAs and the WTO, to maximize synergies, and to minimize areas 
of potential tension. While each is significant, the discussions until now of MEA-WTO 
linkages have, in the view of many environmental policy-makers, focused disproportion-
ately on potential tensions (e.g. potential for MEA measures to create “trade distortions”, 
or their theoretical compatibility with WTO rules). This perspective does not necessarily 
reflect the priorities of MEAs.’43 
42  For the first steps see, in particular, Enhancing Synergies and Mutual Supportive-
ness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization: A 
Synthesis Report, UNEP (January 2002) and also WT/CTE/W/155, UNEP Statement at 
the Information Session with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Communication 
from UNEP (7 July 2000).
43  See ‘Background and Opening of the Meeting’, UNEP Meeting on Enhancing Syner-
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In fact, the objective of closer cooperation was also recognized in the im-
plementation plan of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) in Johannesburg, calling for efforts to ‘strengthen cooperation among 
UNEP and other United Nations bodies and specialized agencies, the Bretton 
Woods institutions and WTO, within their mandates’. These pro-coordina-
tion policies are becoming increasingly common. In the absence of enough 
political will to carry out major structural transformations in the legal and 
institutional architecture of global governance, they provide at least one way 
of moving forward44. In short, these pragmatic approaches are certainly of 
some use in building some bridges between the world trading system, the 
UNEP and the MEAs. 
The WTO Ministerial Declaration launching the ongoing Doha Development 
explicitly includes environmental issues for the first time in the history of the 
world trading system, ‘with a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness 
of trade and environment’ (paragraph 31). In doing so, WTO Members agreed 
to begin negotiations on ‘the relationship between existing WTO rules and 
specific trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs)’ (section i), on procedures for regular information exchange between 
MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for the 
granting of observer status (section ii) as well as the liberalization of trade in 
goods and services that can benefit the environment (section iii). For its part, 
paragraph 51 of the Declaration also calls on the CTE and the Trade and De-
velopment Committee to act as ‘forums for debating the environmental and 
developmental aspects of the negotiations so that the objective of sustainable 
development can be achieved’. This undertaking by WTO Members to change 
its cultural isolation by actively seeking increased inter-institutional dialogue 
and collaboration with the MEAs and the UNEP is to be welcomed. The Pre-
amble of the Doha Declaration Preamble is in itself an expression of good 
intentions: 
‘We encourage efforts to promote cooperation between the WTO and relevant internation-
al environmental and developmental organizations, especially in the lead-up to the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development’ (paragraph 6)
gies and Mutual Supportiveness of MEAs and the WTO, Palais des Nations (23 October 
2000). 
44  TN/TE/S/2/Rev.2, Existing forms of cooperation and information exchange be-
tween UNEP/MEAs and the WTO, Note by the Secretariat, Revision (16 January 2007)
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Under this narrative, the WTO has already granted observer status at the CTE 
to several MEAs Secretariats,45 and also holds annual ‘information sessions’, 
which are attended by the MEA Secretariats.46 Similarly, the WTO regularly 
organizes senior level meetings and events in collaboration with the UNEP 
(eg, providing technical assistance to developing countries). However, nowa-
days, promoting synergies means just that: inter-institutional dialogue. Thus, 
structural policy transformations are highly unlikely under such collaborative 
schemes and, in fact, are not at all on the agenda of the world trade commu-
nity. 
Ensuring the convergence −read also international legal coherence− of the 
multiplicity of specialized regimes already in place in global governance is no 
easy task. Jacobson described the phenomenon two decades ago: 
Decision making in Intergovernmental Organizations [IGOs]… tends to be a dialogue 
among segments of governments and the executive head and permanent staff of the IGO. 
What counts is what governments say in the particular IGO, not what they say in another; 
hence the relative unimportance of representatives of other IGOs. If governments wished 
or were able to enforce coordination among their departments concerning IGO policy, 
they would do this in national capitals, not through other IGOs. The lack of coordination 
within governments permits and indeed fuels considerable rivalry among IGOs and ju-
risdictional disputes among IGOs are frequent.47
This fair description of the state of affairs within treaty-based global gover-
nance nowadays vividly applies to the so-called trade and environment linkage 
generally. While awaiting more responsibility from elected representatives in 
the mid and long term, it would be reasonable to concentrate greater efforts 
and resources on increasing synergies among these treaty-based regimes in 
the short term. Evidently, inter-institutional dialogue and coordination will 
help. However, it is not enough for delivering global policy coherence. Major 
transformations are required, as the status quo is not an option in the long 
run. However, taking into account the stalemate regarding policy approach-
45  WT/CTE/W/41/rev.10, International Intergovernmental Organizations-Observer 
Status in the Committee on Trade and Environment. Revision (4 February 2003).
46  See WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.5, TN/TE/S/5/Rev.3, Matrix on trade-related measures 
pursuant to selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements (15 June 2011).
47  H. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the 
Global Political System (Alfred A.Knopf 1984) at 118.
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es towards environmental externalities between developing and developed 
countries, it would be reasonable to argue that sustainable development will 
not become a systemic driving force of supply chains while a major structural 
trade-off is on the negotiating table for the occasion. In short, the stakes for 
building consensus on such a systemic issue are high. 
4. Variable legal optics 
The lack of a new global deal or trade-off between developing and developed 
countries largely impedes international environmental law from playing a 
major role in global economic interdependence, and thus also prevents any 
MEAs from becoming a counterbalance to the world trading system in the 
near future, as explained.48 As a result, it is easy to see why MEAs and WTO 
rules and acts do not currently converge. Interestingly, the issue has been cor-
rectly framed and mapped within the CTE, in order to identify potential long 
term strategies to mitigate such problems. In this regard, legal issues related 
to the link between world trade law and MEAs absorbed the first meetings of 
the CTE, almost two decades ago. In this respect, the issue was included in 
the work program from the very first days of the CTE. The related legal issues 
addressed in the program read as follows: 
(1) Conflicts between provisions, 
(2) Conflicts between their different dispute settlement mechanisms 
and 
(3) The use of trade measures in MEAs.49 
Furthermore, point 1 of the work program was ‘the relationship between the 
provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade measures for envi-
ronmental pur poses, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental 
48  See in particular F. Biermann, ‘The emerging debate on the need for a World envi-
ronmental organization: a commentary’, 1 Global Environmental Policy 45 (2001): 45–55 
S. Charnovitz, ‘A World Environment Organization’, 27 Columbia Journal of Environ-
mental Law (2002): 323–362.
49  For an excellent work on treaty and jurisdiction conflicts between the MEAs and 
WTO law, see G. Marceau, ‘Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: the relation-
ship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties’, 35 Journal of World 
Trade 6 (2001): 1081–1131. 
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agreements’. In turn, point 5 addressed ‘the relationship between the dispute 
settlement mechan isms in the multilateral trading system and those found 
in multi lateral environmental agreements’. In this regard, for some observ-
ers, a possible channel for integrating environmental protection in the world 
trading system is to defer legally to both domestic and international envi-
ronmental law. However, trade representatives have been unable to agree on 
any protocol granting deference to the rules and acts of MEAs, as well as to 
domestic measures implementing MEAs. As a result, the task of delimiting 
these questions within the world trade regime has been undertaken by WTO 
case law, filling the gap by default. 
Nevertheless, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism does not grant MEAs 
identical legal status to WTO covered agreements within its applicable rules. 
That is, the WTO-legality of any environmental rule or act is conditioned on 
compliance with pro-trade legal criteria, as explained. In other words, legal 
control resides in the realm of the word trade regime and constituency. For 
this very reason, at the very first WTO Ministerial (Seattle 1999), a joint ex-
pert report submitted to the USTR by US environmental NGOs was already 
proposing to establish a policy of legal deference towards the UNEP and the 
MEAs within WTO: under such a proposal, the world trading system could 
grant legal deference to their rules and acts (granting legal relevance ad intra 
to external rules and acts) and, in addition, the UNEP and the MEAs Secre-
tariats could obtain some expert status within the WTO jurisdiction in cases 
dealing with disputes related to environment.50 It goes without saying that 
the proposal, also backed by some environment ministers, did not come to 
fruition. 
Following on from this, for a time, there were some who felt that questions on 
the legal relationship between these regimes would be resolved in an eventual 
WTO dispute over contradictions between a MEA and WTO law.51 However, 
no such cases have arrived at the WTO jurisdiction for an obvious reason: 
access to its procedures (locus standi) is in the hands of trade representa-
tives; and as it is they who hold the whip hand, it is unlikely that structural 
legal issues such as these will often arise in practice. Reasonably, if environ-
mental agencies had standing in WTO dispute settlement procedures, things 
50  NGO Technical Statement,op.cit.p.3.
51  See C. Wold, ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT’, op.cit.p.921.
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would certainly be different. In short, trade representatives not only avoid 
filing such complaints but also tend to avoid making strong legal arguments 
on grounds of international environmental law. Furthermore, and not sur-
prisingly, the panelists and judges working within the WTO jurisdiction also 
tend to give preference to the applicable rules of the treaty-based regime in 
which they are serving as legal experts, and are generally reluctant to depart 
from them in order to eventually apply other rules of public international law. 
In the light of this situation, as explained, domestic measures implementing 
environmental agreements may be subject to compliance with the criteria of 
article XX of the GATT (exceptions) and its case law, for example, among 
other WTO legal requirements and conditions contained in the WTO covered 
agreements. In addition, as mentioned, it is difficult to include trade mea-
sures for environmental purposes in new treaties: their use is quite restrictive 
nowadays, given the particular zeal with which trade diplomats control inter-
national rulemaking in this area. In other words, the well known pragmatism 
and so-called flexibility of the GATT/WTO community sharply contrasts with 
its historical rigidity in addressing environmental issues and concerns. 
The status of MEAs vis-à-vis WTO is an illustrative example of the relative 
value of trade and the environment in global governance nowadays. In this 
regard, some environment ministers have occasionally resisted the current 
state of play by developing self-referential legal provisions (eg. clauses of con-
flict) incorporated in MEAs attempting to regulate their relationships with 
world trade law.52 In consequence, from the nineties onward, several environ-
mental agreements incorporate legal references to the world trading system 
with diverse degrees of legal detail. For example, article 3.5 of the United 
Nations Framework Agreement on Climate Change contains the following 
provision: 
‘The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic 
system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, 
particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the prob-
lems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral 
ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a dis-
guised restriction on international trade.’ 
52  For similar global phenomena involving other government portfolios (i.e. culture 
ministers) see chapter 7 in this book.
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In turn, article 22 (Relationship with other international agreements) of the 
1992 Convention on Biodiversity stipulates the following in paragraph 1: 
‘The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any Con-
tracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where the exer-
cise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological 
diversity.’ 
Thus, the Biodiversity Convention indirectly declares that its rules prevail 
over those of the WTO, at least in the event of serious damage or threat to 
biological Biodiversity. In short, the Convention grants itself a conditioned 
primacy over other treaties through self-referential provisions. Section 2 of 
article XIV (effect on domestic legislation and international conventions) of 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) expressly regulates its relations with trade agreements: 
‘The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the provisions of any do-
mestic measures or the obligations of Parties deriving from any treaty, convention, or in-
ternational agreement relating to other aspects of trade, taking, possession or transport 
of specimens which is in force or subsequently may enter into force for any Party includ-
ing any measure pertaining to the Customs, public health, veterinary or plant quarantine 
fields.’ 
Furthermore, section 3 of article XIV of this Convention states as follows: 
‘The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the provisions of, or the 
obligations deriving from, any treaty, convention or international agreement concluded 
or which may be concluded between States creating a union or regional trade agreement 
establishing or maintaining a common external Customs control and removing Customs 
control between the parties thereto insofar as they relate to trade among the States mem-
bers of that union or agreement.’
Multiple MEAs contain provisions regulating their legal relationships with 
trade agreements generally. However, many trade agreements also provide 
self-referential clauses in this respect. In addition, such clauses are costly to 
design and tend to be non-operational in practice. In this regard, agreeing on 
the final wording of these provisions is becoming increasingly difficult in trea-
ty making negotiations. As a result, the battle for primacy between treaties 
tends to be solved in a radically different level playing field, namely that of the 
compliance incentives embedded in those treaties. After all, compliance with 
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treaties is essentially dependent on their institutional design. Consequently, 
policy tensions are solved in pure Darwinist terms by the so-called secondary 
rules of adjudication contained in each treaty. Failure to comply with some 
treaties is comparatively distinct from failure to comply with others; and this 
phenomenon obviously applies to the relationship between WTO and MEAs, 
as the WTO jurisdiction relies on its potential capacity to authorize the sus-
pension of trade concessions and other obligations, while MEAs do not enjoy 
any comparable enforcement mechanism whatsoever. In this sense, WTO 
dispute settlement is significantly more effective in comparative terms. 
Evidently, at all events, issues of forum shopping may obviously arise: tech-
nically, the same dispute may be resolved by means of applying world trade 
law or, alternatively, by means of international environmental law. In this 
regard, it is always possible for an environment minister to submit a claim to 
a MEA dispute settlement mechanism which addresses a trade-related issue 
as well. The Swordfish case is a particularly interesting example in this re-
gard.53 Nevertheless, these hard-cases are exceptional, as governments tend 
to avoid such schizoid multi-jurisdictional scenarios by all means. For this 
very reason, the relationship between the WTO dispute settlement and the 
dispute settlement mechanisms contained in MEAs are point 5 of the original 
CTE work program; and also for that reason, the WTO Secretariat regularly 
monitors the dispute settlement trends in MEAs.54 
53  See WT/DS193/1, Chile-Measures affecting the transit and importation of Sword-
fish (26 April 2000), and Case concerning the conservation and sustainable exploitation 
of Swordfish Stocks in the South Eastern Pacific Ocean, International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea, Order 2000/3 (20 December 2000), as well as WT/DS193/3, Chile-Mea-
sures affecting the transit and importation of Swordfish: arrangement between the Eu-
ropean Communities and Chile (6 April 2001).
54  For a detailed description of these mechanisms see WT/CTE/W/191, Compliance 
and Dispute Settlement Provisions in the WTO and in Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments, Note by the WTO and UNEP Secretariats, Secretariat Note (6 June 2001)
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Linking trade to world propertization of intangibles
1. Propertization of intangibles 
The Agreement on Trade related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS) 
adopts a two-pronged approach to international standards, as Picciotto 
clearly frames it, by firstly incorporating into WTO law the main provisions 
of the Berne Copyright Convention and the Paris Industrial Property con-
vention; and secondly, establishing a large number of minimum require-
ments for IP protection, in relation not only to substantive IP law but their 
enforcement procedures.1 How the world trading system came to enter into 
the intellectual property area, by crafting the TRIPS agreement outside the 
WIPO, is an illustrative example of the intertwining of international law-
making with power politics and business lobbying.2 At the beginning of the 
1980s, parties to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty -the oldest convention providing protection for patented inventions- 
applied the rules of non-discrimination and national treatment to patents 
and patent applications but retained country autonomy in substantive cri-
teria of patentability.3 In the 1980s and early 1990s, a Diplomatic Confer-
ence held under the auspices of WIPO attempted to revise the Convention. 
However, developing and developed countries could not agree on critical 
issues such as, in particular, the terms and conditions to grant compulso-
ry licensing (CL).4 In fact, attempts by developing countries to upgrade CL 
1  See S. Picciotto, Regulating, op.cit.p.234.
2  See also chapter 3.
3  See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as 
revised at Stockholm (1967).
4  See eg. J.H, Reichman & C, Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented In-
ventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of 
the Practice in Canada and the USA, UNCTAD/ICTSD–Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, Issue Paper No. 5 (2003).
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provisions in article 5A of the Convention critically contributed to bringing 
the Conference to an end.5 
The failure of the Conference persuaded IP constituencies from technolo-
gy-exporting countries to promote a forum shift to the next round of GATT 
multilateral trade negotiations: the Uruguay Round, beginning in 1986.6 In 
short, the US IP constituencies shifted their strategy from the IP to the world 
trading system and pushed the United Trade Representative to follow suit 
as a final effect of the crises facing the WIPO in its dealings with the US in 
the 1960s and 70s, when this regime became a forum for criticism of patents 
and copyright. The move to the world trading system also aimed to benefit 
from the comparative institutional advantages of the GATT dispute settle-
ment mechanism, that was to be improved in the Uruguay Round trade nego-
tiations.7 Therefore, with the entry into force of WTO, a pure jurisdictional 
reallocation or ‘forum shifting’ took place, establishing new global standards 
for IP protection under the TRIPS agreement.8 In essence, trade ministers 
managed to introduce IP protection within the world trading system by using 
a strategic association of ideas: ‘trade-relatedness’. As a result, multilateral-
ized IP protection is now part of the so-called WTO covered agreements and 
is thus enforceable through its binding dispute settlement mechanism. 
The TRIPS agreement multilateralizes intangible propertization, granting IP 
holders with legal monopolies over knowledge and information. By estab-
5  Compulsory licensing is as old as patent law. For the historical origins of the patent 
system see, in particular, I. Mgbeoji, ‘The Juridical Origins of the International Patent 
System: Towards a Historiography of the Role of Patents in Industrialization’ 5 Journal of 
History of International Law (2003): 403–422.
6  See Existence, scope and form of generally internationally accepted and applied 
Standards/Norms for the Protection of Intellectual Property-Note prepared by the Inter-
national Bureau of WIPO (15 September 1988). MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24/Rev.1.
7  For the negotiating history see J. Ross & J. Wasserman, ‘Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights’, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-
1992), Volume II (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1993) at 2241–2313 and D. Ger-
vais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (Sweet and Maxwell 1998).
8  For the first studies on the forum-shifting paradigm see J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, 
Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2000) at 564–571 and L. Helfer, 
‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking’, 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1 (2004): 1–83.
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lishing minimum global standards for IP protection in a top-down approach 
towards harmonization,9 the TRIPS agreement produces a major transforma-
tion in the history of IP protection10. In doing so, it is the most far-reaching 
and comprehensive treaty ever to be concluded in the intellectual property 
area, equally applicable to both technology importing and exporting coun-
tries.11 Technology importing countries “agreed” to negotiate the TRIPS 
agreement under the pressure of US trade unilateralism.12 The agreement was 
negotiated in the shadow of unilateral trade sanctions pursued by the USTR, 
as the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act in 1988 (the so-called Special 
301) amended Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 in order to upgrade the 
tools for the USTR to target so-called unfair foreign IP protection.13 
GATT contracting parties such as Brazil, India, Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, Nic-
aragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and the former Yugoslavia were among the 
most active developing countries opposing IP lawmaking in the Uruguay 
Round, claiming that the world trading system was primarily concerned with 
trade and not property rights in intangibles.14 However, their initial resistance 
for a narrower interpretation of the negotiating mandate at the Round (Min-
isterial Declaration of 1986) broke down in 1988, with the amendment of the 
above mentioned Section 301. Entering into operation in 1989, the Special 
301 granted USTR the authority to apply unilateral trade sanctions against 
9  P. Stephan, ‘Institutions and Elites: Property, Contract, the State, and Rights in In-
formation in the Global Economy’, 10 Cardozo Journal of International Law and Com-
parative Law (2002): 305–306.
10  C. Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics 
of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford University Press 2008) 
at 1. 
11  C. Correa & A.Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: the TRIPS 
Agreement (Kluwer Law International 1998) at xvii.
12  See K. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing countries, 
Oxford University Press, 2001 and R. Okediji, ‘Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: 
Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement’, 17 Emory International Law Review 2 (2003): 
819–918.
13  See, particularly, M. Ryan, ‘The Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking’, 19 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law (1998): 558–559
14  J. Bradley, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the 
Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations’, 23 Stanford Journal of International Law 
(1987): 8.
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countries providing ‘insufficient’ protection of intellectual property. It is in-
dicative that 5 of the 10 countries in the hard line group against incorporating 
IP protection in the new GATT Round were listed for bilateral attention in 
the first USTR announcement of Special 301 country targets; countries such 
as Argentina or Egypt were placed on the Watch List, while both Brazil and 
India −the leading opponents of the US agenda− were placed on the Priority 
Watch List: Special 301 most serious country-category in USTR’s annual Re-
ports on IP.15 As a result of these power politics, WTO annexes today contain 
an agreement on so-called trade-related IP protection. 
Almost a decade since the TRIPS agreement entered into force, there has 
been growing criticism from developing countries regarding that grand bar-
gain, as they have to live with stringent IP standards producing significant 
transfer of rents to developed countries.16 Evidently, developed and devel-
oping countries alike were generally in ignorance about its likely effects on 
knowledge and information markets.17 At that time, trade negotiators from 
developing countries had scant exposure to the western arcane technicalities 
and expertise on intellectual property.18 As Drahos recalls, many of them did 
not have a clear understanding of their interests and, in fact, were not ‘in the 
room’ when critical technical details were settled.19 As a result, the TRIPS 
agreement has produced some unforeseen adverse effects on the domestic 
policies of the developing world (eg. health policies).20
15  F. Abbott, ‘Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property 
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework’, 22 Vanderbilt Journal of Transna-
tional Law (1989): 689 and 708–709.
16  See Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy: Report the 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2003) at 8.
17  P. Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Stand-
ard-setting’, Study Paper 008 of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (United 
Kingdom 2001) at 13.
18  P. Drahos, ‘Developing Countries’, op.cit.p.13. 
19  See P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op.cit at 190–191 and F. Scherer, ‘A Note 
on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting’, 27 World Economy (2004): 1127–1142.
20  On the distributional effects of TRIPS patent protection with regards to pharmaceu-
ticals see, in particular, E. Benvenisti & G. Downs, ‘Distributive Politics and International 
Institutions: The Case of Drugs’, 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
(2004): 21–52. 
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Small groups tend to be more adept than the general public at organizing 
the ways in which they pursue their interests, as their transaction costs are 
lower.21 In essence, IP business constituencies from technology-exporting 
countries successfully managed not only to take on board IP within the world 
trading system but also to set its content. In this way, developed countries 
basically over-protected the interests of their industries. In short, the draft-
ing of TRIPS rules can be fairly described as permeated by special interest.22 
Thus, the very existence of the TRIPS agreement and a good deal of its con-
tent owes much to the global firms that guided the USTR strategy during the 
Uruguay Round, with well-staffed teams of corporate IP experts and lawyers 
assisting the US negotiators.23 In practice, the USTR acted as a proxy for IP 
constituencies -beginning at the US Advisory Committee on Trade and Poli-
cy Negotiation- and European countries, among other developed countries, 
followed suit.24 
Therefore, the TRIPS agreement can be fairly described as a regulatory 
by-product of business lobbying.25 Its drafting was seriously and strongly 
influenced by a precisely circumscribed coalition of private technology ex-
porters; namely, the twelve companies that originally founded the Intellec-
tual Property Committee (1986) in order to mobilize support for this initia-
tive.26Basically, a model of IP protection that had originated in the developed 
world was transplanted to the developing world by means of international 
21  M. Olson, The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups (Har-
vard University Press 1965) at 22–36.
22  See P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op.cit (chapters 8 and 9). 
23  In the words of Sell: “it was not merely their relative economic power that led to 
their ultimate success, but their command on IP expertise, their ideas, their information, 
and their framing skills (translating complex issues into political discourse”. See S. Sell, 
Private Power op.cit.p.4 
24  For an insightful business case study on the participation of Pfizer in the develop-
ment of international trade law see M. Sontoro & L. Paine, ‘Pfizer: Protecting Intellectual 
Property in a Global Marketplace’, Harvard Business School, Case study No. 9-392-073 
(1992).
25  See S. Picciotto, Regulating global corporate op.cit, P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite. In-
formation op.cit and J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global business op.cit.
26  For the whole process of this regulatory ‘private-public partnership’ see in particu-
lar P.Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op.cit and G. Dutfield, Intellectual Property 
Rights and the life science industries: A Twentieth Century History (Ashgate 2003).
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law.27 As Susan Sell boldly put it, a dozen corporations managed to make 
public law for the world.28 The subsequent sections of this chapter take pat-
ents as a case study on the impact of TRIPS disciplines on open markets and 
societies generally. 
2. World legal monopolies 
Patents are propertized knowledge goods. In pure analytical terms, patents 
entail the artificial creation of scarcity by state intervention.29 In this regard, 
the conceptual nature of abstract objects (or incorporeal rights) created by 
patents is challenging in itself.30 As Cohen explains, whatever technical defi-
nition of property we prefer, a property right is a relation not between an 
owner and a thing, but between the owner and other individuals in reference 
to things: a right is held against one or more individuals.31 A patent con-
fers exclusive rights over an invention for a fixed period of time, by giving its 
holder control over the legal conditions of the invention to be commercially 
produced and distributed. This government-granted power over knowledge is 
not only strong private power but legal monopoly power: article 27.1 of TRIPS 
agreement requires all WTO Members to make patents available for any in-
ventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology without 
discrimination, subject to tests of novelty, inventiveness and industrial appli-
cability. In accordance with section 1 of this article, patents are required to be 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of 
invention and whether products are imported or locally produced. 
By issuing a patent over an invention, a legal monopoly is set up, since any 
tradable good and service containing traces of that knowledge operates under 
proprietary control, and is thus enforceable in courts, for a period of time. In 
short, the so-called exclusive rights regimes in which patents are embedded 
27  See S. Tully, Corporations and International lawmaking (Martinus Nijhoff 2007).
28  See S. Sell, Private Power op.cit.p.96.
29  See S. Picciotto & D. Campbell, ‘Whose Molecule Is It Anyway? Private and Social 
Perspectives on Intellectual Property’, New perspectives on property law, obligations and 
restitution (Cavendish 2003) at 280.
30  See P. Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Aldershot 1996) (chapters 2 
and 7).
31  See M. Cohen, ‘“Property and Sovereignty”’ 13 Cornell Law Quaterly 8 (1927): 12.
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remove the general authority to act on knowledge, by locating legal authority 
in the hands of a private agent: the patent-holder; any possible negotiation 
over the granting of a voluntary license under these legal vehicles is within 
the expansive realm of freedom of contract. Therefore, patent-holders appro-
priate knowledge and trade it or not at will -voluntary licensing- by clearing 
prices aside from market mechanisms (read price-based competition). Once 
inventors are granted a patent, this legal device allows the owner full con-
trol over the registered invention in all goods and services built on that given 
technology. From then on, the patent-holder has the exclusive right to decide 
how, when and under what terms the invention is to be marketed in any do-
mestic jurisdiction of the world in which the patent is obtained. 
This is the inner logic of government–sponsored patent protection since its 
earliest inception. However, the multilateralization of IP protection has not 
only created a new level-playing field for patents but has produced a critical 
global transformation, by reengineering the legal treatment of conventional 
tangible property vis-à-vis intangible property. Firstly, under TRIPS provi-
sions, the physical property of any traded good yields to the intangible prop-
erty. In this sense, in accordance with article 51, non-IP complying goods can 
be physically destroyed by courts, in at least −read again at least− those cases 
of trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.32 The 
policy change over physical property deserves attention: 
(1) the intangible is given precedence over the thing ( /physical carrier); 
(2) the property of the intangible is given precedence over the propriety 
of the thing and 
(3) the owner of the intangible is given precedence over the proprietor 
of thing. 
Secondly, patent rights over one invention can technically embrace most of 
the globe, as inventors can file patent applications almost universally, as a re-
sult of TRIPS disciplines: already 160 WTO Members, and counting. As WTO 
Members have standardized their IP rules in line with TRIPS provisions, any 
infringement of a patent granted to a foreigner in a given state is fully en-
forceable in its courts and tribunals. Technically, this implies that a company 
32  See Section 4 of Part III on enforcement in TRIPS agreement (article 51 and accom-
panying legal footnote 14) and section 2.
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may protect its IP rights almost throughout the entire world; again, from 1 
to at least 160 jurisdictions. In fact, the feasibility of obtaining aggregated 
multi-state revenues from a given invention is only counterbalanced by the 
so-called doctrine of international exhaustion of IP. In short, unauthorized 
imports of goods using proprietary technologies are generally considered to 
be an infringement of patent rights, except when a state applies such doc-
trine, which is in any case uncommon.33 
TRIPS-based standardized legal protection is available in all state jurisdic-
tions in which the patent has been granted, irrespective of development lev-
els. Consequently, the patent-holder may decide on whatever fits her / his 
plans, whether to market the invention directly, or to license it in some or all 
domestic territories (right to exploit invention). Thus, until patent protection 
ends, a so-called ‘orderly marketplace’ of sequential windows of exploitation 
is globally reproduced to be governed by the patent-holder, either directly 
-through ownership- or indirectly -through contract-, and often combining 
with other IP assets such as copyright. During a minimum 20 year period, the 
patent-holder legally controls the commercial conditions for any given com-
pany to access the invention (royalties) as well as for users to access goods and 
services built on that proprietary technology (prices): revenue obtained from 
the working of a patent is potentially boundless for that period. Therefore, 
large patent-holders with large IP portfolios can easily play out their intan-
gible properties across multiple jurisdictions, maximizing global returns by 
subdividing or segmenting territories in unlimited windows of exploitation. 
The global transfer of rents produced by such schemes should not be un-
derestimated. From a purely profit-maximizing perspective –namely, those 
embedded in the corporate form and structure–, the patent game is high-
ly cost-effective. Obviously, because IP owners can reach into the material 
world through the things (goods) and activities (services) built on their pro-
prietary intangibles −and thus also control vital resources− the multilateral-
ization of IP protection through the TRIPS agreement is sometimes depicted 
33  See F. Abbott, ‘First Report (Final 1997) to the Committee on International Trade 
Law of the International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel importation’, 1 Jour-
nal of International Economic Law 4 (1998): 607–636 and M. Pugatch. The Intellectual 
Property Debate: Perspectives from Law, Economics and Political Economy (Edward 
Elgar 2006) at 180–181.
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as the foundation for a new form of capitalism, which focuses on the control 
of abstract objects (intangible assets), instead of physical objects (tangible 
assets).34 The culmination of this development is the global reach of patent 
protection, as knowledge operates as an optimum object of propertization, 
since it is non-rivalrous in supply. As Braithwaite and Drahos recall, the same 
knowledge can be endlessly recycled globally to generations, each one hav-
ing to pay for use or access.35 Hence, sustained pressure towards the global 
ratcheting up of intangible propertization makes completely rational eco-
nomic sense for IP-based companies, particularly if these are publicly traded 
and thus tied to the mast of maximizing shareholder value. To paraphrase 
Drahos, TNC’s unity on the IP front is based on the deep ideology of hyper-ef-
fective IP protection, not on the specific rules; as this enables investment in 
the conversion of knowledge from a public good into a private one, and then 
set the terms of access in accordance.36 
Half a century ago, Machlup argued that ‘no economist, on the basis of present 
knowledge, could possibly state with certainty that the patent system, as it now 
operates, confers a net benefit or a net loss to society’.37 However, things have 
significantly changed in recent decades, as multi-jurisdictional protection of 
IP allow patent-holders to lock up knowledge on the aggregate, by registering 
patents in multiple jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the conventional framing of 
this phenomenon as market exclusivity, patents have not much to do with mar-
ket exclusivity as they operate in ‘separate and privately controlled territories’ 
in which access to goods and services is built on legal monopolies. Thus, by per-
mitting those monopolies to be obtained in multiple jurisdictions, a significant 
legal transfer of rents from society to patent-holders (and their licensees) takes 
place, as these can freely decide across countries the prices and price differen-
tials of any good or service using a proprietary technology. 
34  J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global business op.cit.p.57.
35  P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op.cit.p.216.
36  P. Drahos, ‘“IP World”–Made by TNC Inc’, Access to Knowledge in the age of Intel-
lectual Property (Zed Books 2010) at 211. 
37  See F. Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study of the Subcommit-
tee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, 85th Congress, Second Session, Study No. 15 (1958) at 79 and B. Hindley, 
The Economic Theory of Patents, Copyrights, and Registered Industrial Designs: Back-
ground Study to the Report on Intellectual and Industrial Property (Economic Council 
of Canada 1971).
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Under TRIPS provisions, a patent granted in a set of jurisdictions transforms 
the patent-holder into a global controlling authority over the uses of a tech-
nology. In this regard, the patent-holder has the right to decide the terms 
of access, and may also discriminate between those requesting access (eg. 
selective exclusive licensing) or even fail to allow access to some. As far as 
privilege is concerned, infringers are outside the law and, as explained, their 
goods (physical objects) infringing intellectual property (intangible objects) 
are to be disposed of outside the channels of commerce, and even physically 
destroyed by public authority. In this sense, the TRIPS agreement contains 
strict enforcement procedures for enabling right holders, in cooperation with 
customs administrations, to prevent the release of IP infringing imports into 
global circulation, and also to physically destroy those goods. These effects 
are regulated in section 4 of part III of TRIPS. Therefore, article 44 states 
that judicial authorities should be empowered to order injunctions, includ-
ing the possibility of preventing imported infringing goods from entering the 
domestic territory. In addition, article 46 requires WTO Members to grant 
courts the authority to order infringing goods to be disposed of outside the 
channels of commerce or, ‘unless this would be contrary to existing consti-
tutional requirements, destroyed’. As already explained, according to article 
51 and its footnote 14, the goods subject to border enforcement procedures 
must include at least trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a com-
mercial scale for importation and exportation; and article 61 establishes that 
the infringements of IP rights are open to criminal proceedings, and thus to 
eventual imprisonment and/or monetary fines in the territory of all WTO 
Members. Finally, reiterated in this last article, ‘in appropriate cases, reme-
dies available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the 
infringing goods’. 
The logic of global propertization of intangibles is so autonomy-enhancing 
that companies holding large portfolios of such power-assets are quite proac-
tive when it comes to allocating resources for the ratcheting up of global stan-
dards. In this regard, it could be argued that the TRIPS agreement has imbued 
IP business constituencies with some negative incentives. In practice, many 
companies are increasingly proactive in extending patent scope, strength and 
term through lobbying, in order to obtain extra tranches of legal monopoly, 
both domestically and globally, and in one form or another. Allocating re-
sources to the manufacture of official consent makes rational economic sense 
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for the larger players: the most egregious example is the so-called TRIPS-plus 
agreements currently promoted by technology-exporting countries on a bilat-
eral or regional basis,38 as these subject IP standards to a regular ratcheting 
up.39 Not incidentally, as a result, public interest coalitions are forced to take 
constant action in a wide variety of forums, as an ongoing cycle of action and 
reaction.40 In this sense, for example, the European Parliament rejected the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) under its Lisbon Treaty power 
to reject international agreements; for the first time after the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, EU MPs exercised this power against this IP enforce-
ment treaty (478 votes against, 39 in favor, and 165 abstentions).41 
3. IP linkage to trade 
The legal power of patents over markets and society should not be taken 
for granted. It is no accident that centuries old tensions exist over patents 
and free trade. Patents and free trade have experienced deep controversies 
throughout history for a reason. In fact, the first organized social movements 
questioning patents, during the 19th century,42 were already focusing their 
criticism on the adverse effect of these legal monopolies on free trade and 
laissez-faire.43 The basis of such criticism lay in the fact that patentees use 
the patent system to restrain the movement of goods across borders. As Dra-
hos and Braithwaite observe, propping up the patent system and other IP 
38  US bilateral treaty-making on IP did not begin with but was intensified after TRIPS. 
In this regard, see P. Drahos, ‘BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property’, 4 The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property (2001): 807–808.
39  See P. Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and’ op.cit.p.21.
40  See F. Abbott, ‘The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends in In-
tellectual Property and Health’, Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property and Access to 
Medicines (Routledge 2006) at 31.
41  See European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 July 2012 on the draft Council 
Decision on the conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (4 July 2012).
42  For the history of English patent laws see C. MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Rev-
olution: The English Patent System 1660-1800 (Cambridge University Press 1988) and 
H. Dutton, The Patent System and Inventive Activity during the Industrial Revolution 
1750-1852 (Manchester University Press 1984).
43  F. Machlup & E. Penrose, ‘The patent controversy in the nineteenth century’, 1 Jour-
nal of Economic History 10 (1950): 1–29.
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systems at the expense of free trade turned out to be something of a long-run 
miscalculation by states, as these systems would later be routinely used as 
the backbone of global cartels during the 20th century.44 However, probably 
downplaying or underestimating the economic and social impact of cartels in 
the interwars period, an extra layer of pro-patent public rules has been added 
at the end of last century, not only ratcheting IP standards worldscale but 
directly linking world trade to IP compliance. 
Evidently, law and lawyers play a key historical role in shaping the changing 
forms of capitalism,45 and IP linkage to trade is one of those forms. As men-
tioned, in the final two decades of the last century, a small group of IP-based 
industries from the pharmaceutical, entertainment and software sectors pur-
sued the goal of standardizing world patent protection and related IP forms 
through new multilateral treaty law; and they were successful. The IP agenda 
of these companies during the Uruguay Round focused on (1) upgrading the 
legal protection of traditional IP forms, as well as (2) allowing IP owners to 
control world trade flows on all IP-based goods and services. By succeeding, 
access to goods and services based on a proprietary technology is globally 
determined by legal monopoly owners and the ancillary inter-corporate ar-
rangements built around them. By manufacturing standardized legal monop-
olies in 160 state jurisdictions, a powerful redistributive device is channelled 
from citizens and consumers around the world towards the shareholders 
of companies operating IP-based global business strategies. In this regard, 
the structural transformations resulting from legal instruments such as the 
TRIPS agreement go quite beyond IP standardization, as this agreement now 
allows patent-holders to set the terms of trade regarding any good and service 
built on their proprietary technologies. 
Thus, a structural change in global industrial organization has taken place 
over the last three decades as a direct result of linking IP to trade through 
the TRIPS agreement. By linking IP to trade, companies holding patents in 
44  See P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, op.cit.p.36.
45  See S. Picciotto, Regulating corporate capitalism (Oxford University Press 2010), 
generally, Y. Dezalay, ‘Between the State, Law, and the Market: The Social and Profession-
al Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena’, International Regu-
latory Competition and Coordination (Clarendon Press 1996) at 59–87 and Y. Dezalay 
& B. Garth, ‘Law, lawyers, and Empire’, The Cambridge History of Law in America. The 
Twentieth Century and After (1920-) (Cambridge University Press 2008) at 718–758.
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multiple territories have the enforceable prerogative to globally decide over 
the import or export of any good or service produced under their proprietary 
technology: in short, free trade is now the prerogative of the patent-holder. 
Hence, the genius of trade is inhibited in the interest of those companies do-
ing business in proprietary knowledge. In practice, the linkage of IP to trade 
produces a private form of trade conditionality, as those who now often condi-
tion trade are no longer states but monopoly traders governing the movement 
of IP-based goods and services through property and contract. In the new 
world of IP linked to trade, the terms of trade for goods and services built on 
proprietary technologies have been structurally reframed. Nowadays, while 
goods and services with unauthorized traces of proprietary technologies are 
entering or leaving a domestic jurisdiction, IP owners and their licensees can 
interfere and fully restrict free movement of those goods and services, with 
the help of private policing and customs inspections. 
It is therefore reasonable to argue that, by linking world trade to IP compli-
ance, the TRIPS agreement has structurally transformed the old notions of 
trade, understood as entrepreneurs acquiring things in one place on Earth 
and selling them in another. It could be said that, ‘the activity of buying and 
selling, or exchanging, goods and/or services between people or countries’, as 
trade is currently defined in the Cambridge English Dictionary for example, 
does not so easily apply to the (vertically controlled) free movement of IP-
based goods and services. As world exchange enters the realm of IP based 
intra-firm and inter-firm arrangements, traditional images of open trade van-
ish. Under world trade linked to IP, patent-holders are granted the discre-
tionary power to authorize world trade in goods and services built on their 
proprietary technologies, as these are anchored to a globalized monopoly 
right. Patent-holders operate as monopoly traders (or trading monopolists); 
and their voluntary licenses for all the goods and services built on their pro-
prietary technology are also a form of trading licenses. In short, the legal 
monopolist decides who trades, and in what conditions; and the privilege can 
be registered under standardized terms in the patent offices of 160 jurisdic-
tions of the world. For the critics, the patent document in a way transforms 
its holder into a gatekeeper to every state territory in which those rights are 
granted. 
In short, IP linkage to trade allows patent-holding companies to have a com-
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mon-and-control position on the global production and movement of all 
goods and services based on their proprietary technologies. Once a large com-
pany obtains an essential and/or breakthrough patent, a vertical legal infra-
structure to exploit that patent can be developed world-scale. These vertical 
infrastructures managed by the patent-holder, often with the assistance of 
licensees, take the form of a hub-and-spokes legal scheme in which the terms 
of trade are defined by IP terms: naturally, once a company wins a key patent, 
other companies begin to organize their business around the patent, often 
creating large inter-corporate networks based on long-term contracting. As a 
result, by mixing legal monopoly and inter-corporate arrangements into one 
killer compound, price-based competition can be severely damaged, if not 
precluded altogether. 
Not surprisingly, some world-class economists have strongly criticised this 
IP linkage to trade. As Jagdish Bhagwati frames it, IP rights were incorpo-
rated into the WTO, as one of three legs of a tripod, the other two legs being 
the traditional GATT and the GATS, for trade in goods and trade in services 
respectively:46 as a result, the WTO became a tripod with three legs: two le-
gitimate ones (GATT and GATS) and one illegitimate one (TRIPs). According 
to this economist, the process by which these trade-unrelated issues turn into 
trade-related matters is a cynical one.47 With the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, as Bhagwati explains, an ‘astonishing capture’ took place: ‘for vir-
tually the first time, the corporate lobbies in pharmaceuticals and software 
had distorted and deformed an important multilateral institution, turning it 
away from its trade mission and rationale and transforming it into a royalty 
collection agency’.48 
The basic motive for bringing IP issues into WTO instead of WIPO, as T.N. 
Srinivasan also recalls along similar policy lines, was the availability of the 
WTO’s dispute settlement and trade sanctions mechanism for enforcing IP 
rights.49 For Srinivasan, bringing IP rights issues into the WTO was ‘a colossal 
46  J. Bhagwati, In defense of globalization, op.cit.p.183.
47  J. Bhagwati, Termites in the world trading system: How preferential agrements 
undermine free trade (Oxford University Press 2008) at 71–72.
48  See J. Bhagwati, In defense of globalization, op.cit.pp.182-183 and J. Bhagwati, ‘Let-
ter to the Financial Times on Intellectual Property Protection’ (14 February 2001).
49  See T. Srinivasan, ‘Developing countries and the multilateral trading system after 
Doha, Center Discussion Paper Nº 842, Economic Growth Center (February 2002) at 9–10 
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mistake’. As Shrivasan recalls, the conventional argument in favor of world 
trade liberalization is that its gains outweigh losses from progressive liber-
alization, so that, in principle, a transfer scheme within each country can be 
devised to readjust and compensate the losers; however, most of the gainers 
from TRIPS are in rich developed countries and only a few, if any, are in poor 
countries.50 This being the case, and even if gains outweigh losses, interna-
tional transfers would be needed to compensate losers; but no such transfer 
to losers from the gainers is envisaged within TRIPS, in the sense of redistrib-
utive mechanisms to compensate the global exercise of IP rights.51 
In short, it could be argued that the TRIPS agreement implies an unrestricted 
transfer of royalties from user (poor) to producer (rich) countries. In princi-
ple, however, as Robert Howse puts it, there is no particular reason to believe 
on the basis of standard economics −using Kaldor-Hicks efficiency− that in-
creasing IP protection will increase aggregate domestic welfare.52 For this 
reason, so many observers publicly denounce that the future benefits of the 
TRIPS agreement to developing countries, if any, are uncertain, while the 
present costs remain concrete. In the very first estimates for the World Bank 
by Keith Maskus, the full implementation of TRIPS already involved a world 
transfer of $8.3 billion moving to a few developed countries from the remain-
ing nations.53 While the figure could go up or down, it is clear that highly 
significant south-north transfers of rents are legally entrenched in the global 
economy through implementation and enforcement of the TRIPS agreement. 
International IP protection is for most poor countries, as Bhagwati explains, 
‘a simple tax on their use of knowledge, constituting therefore an unrequited 
and T. Srinivasan, ‘The TRIPS Agreement’, The Political Economy of International Trade 
Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Hudec (Cambridge University Press 2002) at 343–348.
50  T. Srinivasan, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: GATT, 
1947 to Uruguay Round and Beyond (Westview Press 1998).
51  See T. Srinivasan, ‘The TRIPS Agreement: A Comment Inspired by Frederick Ab-
bott’s Presentation’, Department of Economics, Yale University (29 November 2000) at 
3 (mimeo).
52  See R. Howse, “From Politics to Technocracy – And Back Again: The Fate of the 
Multilateral Trading Regime” 96 American Journal of International Law (2002): 102.
53  K. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in The Global Economy (Institute for Inter-
national Economics 2000).
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transfer to the rich, producing countries’.54 In this regard, as conventional 
economic literature suggests, MFN-based trade produces positive efficiency 
effects without significant redistributive effects. By contrast, following Pa-
nagariya, non-trade agendas such as that of the TRIPS agreement produce 
efficiency effects of a dubious nature as well as large redistributive effects that 
often benefit rich countries at the expense of poor countries.55 
In addition, TRIPS disciplines are now used as a lever by industry lobbying in 
order to produce regulatory chilling effects on domestic policies of developing 
countries in a wide variety of areas, including pharmaceuticals. Thus, for ex-
ample, despite the fact that the TRIPS agreement can be fairly interpreted to 
generously accommodate compulsory licensing and domestic production of 
generics under patents held by foreign companies, the global pharmaceutical 
industry more often than not sucessfully opposes domestic policies in this 
direction by using proxy states to build on TRIPS, as well as going beyond 
that, negotiating TRIPS-plus disciplines. On the other hand, as Panagariya 
suggests, the argument that TRIPS agreement spurs global innovation to the 
benefit of all is also questionable; in this regard, trade-related IP promises to 
lower the welfare not just of developing countries but the world as a whole 
and, as such, it is an efficiency reducing, redistributive exercise.56 
As Bhagwati explains, the optimal patent period must reflect a balance of two 
forces: on one hand, the protection provided by IP rights provides an incen-
tive to innovate; on the other hand, it slows down the diffusion of benefits to 
potential users. However, patents have been uniformly extended to 20 years 
through TRIPS rules, a period so long that it cannot be called efficient at bal-
ancing those forces;57 particularly if we also take into account that this tempo-
ral protection applies multilaterally. In addition, the minimum temporal pro-
tection established in the TRIPS agreement can now be ratcheted up through 
TRIPS-plus schemes. By now, inventions under patent are legally protected 
for 20 / 7300 days in article 33 of the TRIPS agreement. In this context, a first 
54  J. Bhagwati, ‘Letter to the Financial Times on Intellectual Property Protection’ (Feb-
ruary 14, 2001).
55  See A. Panagariya, ‘TRIPs and the WTO: An Uneasy Marriage’, Paper presented at 
WTO Seminar (July 20, 1999) at 2.
56  Ibid: 2.
57  J. Bhagwati, In defense of globalization, op.cit.p.184.
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important question is why we are granting those 7300 days of monopoly pro-
tection to inventions; after all, no scientific data-driven deliberative process 
has taken place regarding such a standard of IP time frames: the figure was 
decided rather liberally by trade delegates, who basically assumed with the 
advice of some US companies that 7300 days was an appropriate time frame; 
a figure reached by adding 1095 days to the patent terms which had been in 
force in the United States since 1861 (17 years). As Bhagwati bluntly but clear-
ly depicts, understandably, ‘few believe that the optimum IPR is zero; and so 
do few believe that it extends as high as the 20-year patent rule’ forced into 
the WTO by business lobbies’.58 
In principle, it is reasonable to argue that there is no such a thing as one uni-
versally optimum level of IP protection for all states.59 However, IP linkage to 
trade has produced significant incentives for capital-holders to move increas-
ing volumes of investment to IP stock and trading. As explained, IP owners 
are now potentially able to vertically enforce standardized IP for 20 years in 
at least 160 potential jurisdictions: this, it is no accident that investor expec-
tations on the financial performance of IP companies have increased in recent 
years, as a natural result of the lobby-driven ratcheting up of IP standards. 
In consequence, the TRIPS agreement produces two basic transformations on 
the critical regimes of world trade and financial markets, respectively. Firstly, 
as for world trade, the IP linkage to trade subjects world trade in goods and 
services built in proprietary technologies to monopoly trading as mentioned 
above, as access is segmented along the exclusionary lines of 160 territories in 
which any IP-related transaction is governed by the patent holder. Secondly, 
as for financial markets, the linkage of IP to trade transforms these monop-
olies into highly tradable and liquid properties, and contributing to expand 
the capitalization of industries playing the game of intangible propertization. 
Therefore, as the combined structure of incentives of financial markets, to-
gether with IP linked to world trade allows a multi-jurisdictional enforcement 
of property rights over any given intangible, it is fair to conclude that a first 
truly global property has been created in recent decades.
58  J. Bhagwati, ‘Economic Freedom: Prosperity and Social Markets (Key Note Speech)’, 
Economic Conference on Economic Freedom and Development (Tokyo, 17-18 June 1999). 
59  See P. Drahos, ‘“IP World”, op.cit.p.p.199.
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The propertization of intangibles has become an optimum legal form of profit 
maximization, as not only can it be vertically controlled but also limitlessly 
expanded world-scale. In this sense, property within TRIPS disciplines differ 
in two essential ways from traditional tangible properties: on the one hand, a 
standardized abstract form of property can be potentially enforced globally, 
as explained; on the other, it can be limitlessly produced through the patent 
offices of the world, which currently tend to be managed with industrial pro-
ductivity criteria. Therefore, patents nowadays function as a sort of super-as-
set which is liquid and fully enforceable worldwide: in short, a highly tradable 
globalized property in its own right, the value of which is disclosed today in 
the mandatory financial information anchored to publicly traded companies 
and stock. As a result, the traditional K-10 and 10-Q like-forms within se-
curities markets do index and measure IP -stock of companies with strong 
IP-portfolios- as intangible property and productivity provides critical ‘mate-
rial information’ for investment decisions in financial markets. Paradoxical-
ly, because it is information and knowledge that allows financial markets to 
work efficiently, the new ‘financial materiality’ of IP linked to trade has also 
shifted some investment preferences towards IP-based business models. 
In the pre-TRIPS scenario, most of a company’s value was its monetary, tan-
gible and fixed assets. Nowadays, these assets are often replaced within cor-
porate strategies by patented technologies and other IP forms. Intangible as-
sets are thus moving at the core of corporate market value, and are reflected 
in stock value; by means of stock exchanges, these government-sponsored 
monopolies are −ironically− re-embedded in a market -financial markets- 
and thus too cursorily legitimized as market-driven assets.
IP has thus moved to the core of the corporate competitive advantage; as IP 
has become a dominant asset in global business transactions.60 As a result, 
exclusive rights over knowledge and information are subject to patent pro-
ductivity programs, strategic buying and selling of IP portfolios as well as 
IP-focused mergers and acquisitions.61 Arguably, the companies that man-
60  R. Parr, Royalty Rates for Licensing Intellectual Property (John Williams & Sons 
2007) at 22.
61  See C. Fisk, ‘Removing the ‘Fuel of interest’ from the ‘fire of the genius’: law and em-
ployee-inventor, 1830–1930’, 65 University of Chicago Law Review 4 (1998): 1127–1198. 
On the move to include corporations as inventors see also J. Boyle, Shamans, Software, 
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aged to get TRIPS on board in the Uruguay Round probably had not expected 
to create a global transformation of such dimensions. It is not by chance that 
multiple companies are shifting their business models, or elements thereof, 
to IP.
4. Power of world licensing 
Monopolization is a black letter illegal practice in all jurisdictions of the 
world. Virtually all economics textbooks explain why monopolies are social-
ly inefficient. Nonetheless, reaching the world monopoly premium is legally 
possible through IP. Over the last century, market, competition and efficiency 
have provided a powerful cosmovision for our increasingly interdependent 
world. However, as we climb the ladder of proprietary technologies, these 
drivers of the market economy are under stress, as all things and activities 
that can be imbued with traces of IP in the present day can be monopolis-
tically produced and/or distributed worldwide. Not only patent holders can 
exercise full control over the free movement of goods and services, and thus 
on world production and distribution; as IP architectures are built on territo-
rial modules -so-called market exclusivity-, virtually an infinite combination 
of contractual schemes allows the patent-holder to act as a private regulatory 
authority on the use and access to proprietary technologies. 
Arguably, it would be difficult to dream up a more autonomy-enhancing le-
gal vehicle from the perspective of profit maximization. In part for this rea-
son, anti-competitive inter-corporate arrangements built on IP had already 
become a systemic problem early on, in the 20th century, and thus before 
IP linkage to trade at the end of that century. In the 20s and 30s, for ex-
ample, the US chemical industry would intensively use IP within its global 
inter-company cooperative activities, following the practices of the German 
chemical industrial complex.62 The US industry learnt from German indus-
try that patents were matchless instruments of business domination, as Dra-
hos and Braithwaite recall. Thus, in subsequent years, the patent profession 
put energies into perfecting the use of this instrument, in particular because 
and Spleens: Law and the construction of the information society (Harvard UP 1996).
62  See eg. A. Greenberg, ‘The Lesson Of The German-Owned US Chemical Patents’, 9 
Journal of the Patent Office Society, (1926–27): 19–20.
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much denser legal schemes were needed to hide cartels from the eyes of com-
petition lawyers, after cartels began facing the prospect of criminal prose-
cution under the Sherman Act of 1890.63 One among the most influential 
individuals who envisioned the power of IP and promoted its use in global 
inter-corporate arrangements was Edwin Prindle (1868-1948), former high 
ranking patent official until 1899 and later Chairman of the Patent Commit-
tee of the American Chemical Association:64 
‘Patents are the best and most effective means of controlling competition. They occasion-
ally give absolute command of the market, enabling their owner to name the price without 
regard to cost of production. . . The power which a patentee has to dictate the conditions 
under which his monopoly may be exercised has been used to form trade agreements 
throughout practically entire industries, and if the purpose of the combination is primar-
ily to secure benefit from the patent monopoly, the combination is legitimate. Under such 
combinations there can be effective agreements as to prices maintained.’65
In the words of this legal entrepreneur, ‘a patent is the most perfect form of 
monopoly recognized by the law’.66 Prindle and other patent lawyers argued 
convincingly that patents were heavy hitters for legally allowing companies 
to fix price, control production and divide territories among themselves, as 
patent-based inter-corporate arrangements (eg. patent sharing) could often 
function as a robust legal shield against antitrust enforcement actions. In this 
context, as Drahos and Braithwaite explained, restrictions over price and pro-
duction could form part of patent license arrangements, so the use of such 
arrangements was able to often frustrate the intent of the Sherman Act, as 
IP-based cartels were more easily regarded by courts as a mere exercise of 
property rights.67 Interestingly, the companies participating in the IP-based 
chemical cartels of the 20th century were among the first to become genuine-
ly global: early on in last century, as these scholars explain, they learnt to use 
IP forms to bind themselves together into dominant groups operating across 
borders according to agreed terms and conditions.68 
63  P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information feudalism, op.cit.p.57.
64  See E. Prindle, ‘The marvelous performance of the American patent system’, 10 Jour-
nal of the Patent Office Society (1927–28): 255 and 258.
65  See D. Noble, America by Design op.cit. p.89.
66  E, Prindle, ‘The Art of inventing’, paper read at the 23d Annual Convention of the 
American Institute of Electrical Engineers, Milwaukee (May 28-31, 1906) at 1.
67  P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information feudalism, op.cit.p.51.
68  P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information feudalism, op.cit.p.57.
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IP-based global corporate arrangements are not a recent development in 
global economic governance, nor have they been an issue lacking policy 
awareness and concern until recent years. In fact, anticompetitive practices 
in this area have been one of the most efficient means of isolating corporate 
autonomy from market and society already since the beginning of the last 
century. However, only by the end of the 30s did the US antitrust authorities 
begin paying attention to the distorting economic and social impact of global 
cartels generally, and thus also those based on IP assets. In this regard, at the 
time of the enactment of the 1890 Sherman Act, international cartels were not 
still framed in negative terms either by US economists, politicians or judges. 
At that time, the market economy was still an ongoing conceptual endeavor, 
and basically thought to be a sole domestic endeavor. Within this context of 
economic nationalism, antitrust law and policy would mainly prohibit and 
bust domestic but not international cartelization. As a result, for decades, the 
latter would be a viable legal device for companies to do business. In fact, the 
Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 formally legalized export cartels originating in 
or joined by US companies as long as these did not have the above mentioned 
adverse effect on the domestic economy.69 In the meantime, IP would gain 
considerable pre-eminence over many of those cartels.
The change in public attitude towards global cartels under the Roosevelt ad-
ministration was brought about, right after Second World War, by the US 
Antitrust Division led by the forceful Assistant Attorney General Thurman 
Arnold.70 However, world anti-competitive arrangements around IP would 
not only be difficult for domestic authorities to scan but also to break up, as 
the power-laws of property and contract -patent as property, and license as 
contract- tend to generally operate as a legitimizing chain that grants a pre-
sumption of legality to many of those arrangements. Traditionally, domestic 
authorities face some hurdles acting against contractual relationships and 
thus tend to intervene with relative unease when framing IP arrangements 
as anti-competitive practices; and those difficulties increase when the inter-
corporate arrangement is globalized. For this reason, more often than not, 
public authorities and courts have tended to leniently interpret IP-based an-
ticompetitive arrangements as mere exercises of property rights, and thus as 
69  See E. Hawley, The New Deal and the problem of monopoly: a study in economic 
ambivalence (Princeton University Press1966).
70  See T. Arnold, The folcklore of capitalism (Beard Books 2000).
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practices circumscribed by freedom of contract. Thus, a brief exploration of 
the contract-side is required, as licensing contracts are protected in the laws 
of all WTO Members by means of TRIPS standards: ‘patent owners shall also 
have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude 
licensing contracts’ (article 27.2). In this regard, firstly, the patent-holder ex-
ercises a government-sponsored monopoly, and thus the right of outsourcing 
its exploitation through license; secondly, the licensee enters into an agency 
relationship with the patent-holder in one or more domestic jurisdictions. As 
a result, exclusive licensees are also among the winners in the IP game. 
As the patent-holder has the power to segment access to the invention in all 
territories, any IP-pollinated goods and services −and thus their physical 
presence in those territories− can be controlled through licensing and relat-
ed third-party policing. In this context, some licenses are often foundations 
for long-standing intercompany bonds based on long-term contracting. The 
basic strategy routinely using IP for segmenting global markets is a simple 
one, as Drahos and Braithwaite explain: it requires coming to an exclusive 
licensing arrangement with an agent in a country, working out a price that the 
market will bear and using IP rights to prevent anyone other than the exclu-
sive agent from importing the same legitimate product that has been released 
by the IP owner more cheaply in another place on earth.71 
Evidently, the most efficient means to effectively balance the increasing pow-
er of IP in society today is antitrust law and policy.72 In this regard, antitrust 
law and policy provides formidable regulatory leverage. Competition law and 
policy generally trumps IP law and policy, as the market-economy tends to be 
framed as an overarching and structural value of contemporary societies. As 
a result, anticompetitive behaviour such as excessive pricing, exorbitant roy-
alties, denial of negotiation of voluntary licenses (eg. patent-based standards) 
among others could be effectively busted by antitrust authorities worldwide. 
71  P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information feudalism, op.cit.p.36.
72  See generally, G. Ghidini, Intellectual Property and Competition Law: The Inno-
vation Nexus (Edward Elgar 2006) at 99–118 (chapter 5), E. Fox, ‘Can Antitrust Policy 
Protect the Global Commons from the Excesses of IPRs?’, International Public Goods and 
Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) and, particularly, N. Gallini & M. Trebilcock, ‘Competition policy 
and intellectual property rights’ Competition policy and intellectual property rights in the 
knowledge-based economy (University of Calgary Press 1998) at 17–61.
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In this regard, the TRIPS agrement provides a great deal of latitude in terms 
of how countries implement it.73 In fact, the Uruguay Round negotiators left 
TRIPS disciplines open and generous in their wording on antitrust for that 
very reason. 
Notwithstanding the fact that WTO law still lacks competition disciplines such 
as those originally conceived for the failed Havana Charter, in its ground-
breaking chapter on restrictive business practices,74 the antitrust principles 
contained in article 8.2 of the TRIPS agreement, within Part I (‘General Pro-
visions and Basic Principles’), expressly establish that appropriate measures 
may be needed ‘to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade’ (au-
thor’s italics). In this regard, the balance between exclusivity (patents as legal 
monopolies) and the public interest is generally considered to be provided 
through the subtle interplay of TRIPS article 30 (‘Exception to rights con-
ferred’) and 31 (‘Other use without authorization of the right holder’) within 
TRIPS Part II (‘Standards concerning the availability, scope and use of Intel-
lectual Property Rights’). It is through this interplay that TRIPS-consistent 
policy op tions are conventionally defined, as article 30 details substantive cri-
teria for exceptions to exclusivity, and article 31 contains a list of procedur al 
requirements to limit that exclusivity. In this context, to pick one significant 
example, TRIPS article 31.k expressly allows the issuance of CLs to remedy 
anti-competitive practices of patent holders. 
In addition, two extra provisions grant further TRIPS flexibility with re gard 
to antitrust practices generally: article 40 regarding licensing within Section 
8 (‘Control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licenses’) in TRIPS 
Part II; and article 44 regarding injunctions within Section 2 (‘Civil and ad-
ministrative procedures and remedies’) in TRIPS Part III (‘Enforcement of 
intellectual property rights’). Thus, according to article 40.2, WTO Members 
have full regulatory autonomy to define what may be deemed an anti-compet-
itive conduct: ‘[n]othing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from spec-
ifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particu-
73  See B. Hoekman, ‘Strengthening the Global Trade Architecture for Development: 
The Post Doha Agenda’ (The World Bank 2001) at 231.
74  See W. Diebold, ‘The End of the ITO’, 16 Essays in International Finance (October 
1952) and A.Wilcox, A Charter, op.cit.
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lar cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse 
effect on competition in the relevant market’. In this context, following with 
the example, compulsory licenses issued under Part III are not bound by the 
restrictions on exports under CLs granted under article 31.f of the TRIPS. 
Therefore, the antitrust provisions of TRIPS offer sufficient legal and poli-
cy space for effectively busting global anticompetitive practices based on IP. 
Those articles offer developing countries ample ‘wiggle room’ to implement 
IP-related policies favouring the public interest through free competition.75 
By doing so, competition agencies can not only remedy exorbitant contrac-
tual terms and royalties imposed on licensors, or refusals to negotiate volun-
tary licences but, as mentioned, excessive prices imposed on consumers for 
essential knowledge and technologies. In the post-Uruguay Round scenario, 
in consequence, antitrust authorities still enjoy enough leeway at deploying a 
wide variety of remedies against IP-based anti-competitive practices, includ-
ing the issuance of compulsory licenses. 
Needless to say, some global licensing arrangements in scientific and techno-
logical areas can be legally interpreted as constituting IP-based cartels and 
therefor should be seriously prosecuted by concerted antitrust enforcement 
action. After all, some licensing arrangements still do exactly the same things 
that old-school commodity cartels did: they often divide up territories, con-
trol production and fix prices. As explained, competition can be inhibited or 
even elimitated, for example, by networking essential technological patents 
territorially and aggresively defending them in the domestic courts of the 
world. In fact, nowadays, large corporate licensors with strong IP portfoli-
os together with their strategic licensees not only strategically employ legal 
injunctions in multiple jurisdictions against the use of essential proprietary 
technologies. In addition, some companies also hinder and/or delay the ne-
gotiations of voluntary licenses in standard essential patents (SEPs), among 
other illegitimate legal tactics to improve competitive advantage.
However, antitrust authorities from technology-exporting countries are 
up-scaling their surveillance over inter-corporate negotiations and decisions 
75  J. Reichman, ‘From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the 
TRIPS Agreement’, 29 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 
(1996): 28.
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regarding voluntary licensing of technology, and are now intervening in ‘li-
censing transactions’ related to essential patents as well, by increasing the 
pressure on companies to negotiate fair voluntary licenses for essential tech-
nologies within standard setting organizations (SSOs). Paradoxically, howev-
er, concerted inter-state antitrust regulatory action and enforcement in this 
area area -IP and competition- is today still nascent at best. Given this state 
of affairs, increased global action against both vertical (e.g. exclusive licens-
ing) and horizontal (e.g. cross-licensing) arrangements based on IP would 
be advisable. Unfortunately, we still do not see much concerted anti-cartel 
global enforcement action with regard to IP-based global licensing, not to say 
the development of multilateral antitrust disciplines on this area.76 The chal-
lenge is more than evident. Nonetheless, cartels are the area in which anti-
trust authorities from developing and developed countries alike have a deep-
er shared understanding; and in fact, the most successful workshops within 
the International Competition Network (ICN) are those of international car-
tel-busting, every year.77 Thus, we should not exclude eventual positive shifts 
in policy direction: fortunately, there is also sufficient disagreement on the 
relationship between competition policy and intellectual property to provide 
public authorities with significant space within which to manoeuvre.78
76  On this critical issue for economic and non-economic global governance alike see P. 
Marsden, A Competition Policy for the World Trade Organization (Cameron May, 2003) 
and M. Taylor, D. International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the WTO? (Cam-
bridge University Press 2006).
77  See M. Djelic & T.Kleiner, ‘The international competition network: Moving towards 
transnational governance’, Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Reg-
ulation (Cambridge University Press 2006) at 287–307, W. Kovacic & H. Hollman, ‘The 
International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role’ 20 Minnesota 
Journal of International Law (2011): 274–323 and W. Kovacic, H. Hollman & A. Rob-
ertson ‘Building Global Antitrust Standards: The ICN’s Practicable Approach’, Research 
Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012) at 89–109.
78  J. Berger, Advancing public health by other means: using competition policy to 
increase access to essential medicines, Bellagio Series on Development and Intellectu-
al Property Policy: Policy Options for Assuring Affordable Access to Essential Medicines 
(ICTSD 2004) at 4.
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Transforming public institutions into market niches
1. Procurement as outsourcing
The WTO Agreement contains several so-called ‘plurilaterals’ in its annex 4, 
which are not binding on all members but on those who are party to them. The 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is one of the plurilaterals within 
this annex, and an illustrative example of steady regulatory trends towards 
market-formation in all areas of society, including the tasks and activities 
originally performed by public authorities (e.g. communication infrastruc-
tures, education, health, etc). It is no accident that, nowadays, government 
procurement offers a highly attractive market niche for global companies: in 
short, states as market niches. In fact, the so-called ‘procurement markets’ 
account for approximately 13% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 29% 
of general government expenditures of the OECD countries.1 
Both the number and volume of these contracts are steadily increasing, gen-
erally involving not only goods but services. In addition, the business oppor-
tunities of this emerging global ‘market’ are quite significant, as only 25% 
of government procurement contracts are currently subject to international 
disciplines. In this context, globalized companies lobby host and home-state 
governments for increased “market access” to their procurement activity. To-
day various international regulatory initiatives establish disciplines ensuring 
that procurement contracts above certain economic thresholds are awarded 
in competitive, transparent and non-discriminatory conditions between local 
and foreign companies. Thus far, the WTO is the most relevant initiative in 
this regard.2 In fact, According to the WTO Secretariat estimates, coverage of 
1  See ‘Size of Procurement Market’, Government at a Glance (OECD 2013) at 132. 
2  The ten Parties that have currently accepted the Protocol to amend the GPA are 
Liechtenstein; Norway; Canada; Chinese Taipei; the United States; Hong Kong China; The 
European Union; Iceland; Singapore and Israel.
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government procurement subject to the GPA amounts to 600 billion Euros 
annually: 500 billion Euros per annum, pursuant to the 1996 GPA, and a fur-
ther 80-100 billion with entry into force of the 2014 GPA. 3 
The opening up of government procurement to foreign competition under 
common disciplines expands a new regulatory paradigm for governmental 
activity based on ‘less rowing’ and ‘more steering’.4 The basic policy dis-
course around these initiatives aims to transform economic efficiency and 
best value for money into the main legal criteria in government procurement 
decision making (e.g. articles 7 to 16 of the GPA). In this context, procurement 
policies targeting other social values −such as environmental protection, job 
creation, local or regional development, etc− tend to be increasingly framed 
as secondary procurement policies.5 The critics question these conceptions, 
by arguing that these disciplines reduce the capacity of public authorities to 
use procurement for pursuing other alternative and socially valued objec-
tives.6 In addition, they also argue that in the long term, government entities 
and public officials may reduce technical capacities and practical expertise 
on the ground in all key policy areas, thus compromising the quality and sta-
bility of publicly provided services, by means of the structural outsourcing 
of their tasks and activities. In short, so-called ‘learning by doing’ is intense-
ly connected to ‘knowing by doing’. On the other hand, the globalization of 
procurement markets globalizes conflicts of interests as well. As government 
representatives and high-level officials currently move from industry to gov-
ernment, and back again, policy biases towards the structural outsourcing of 
publicly provided services (i.e. health and education, etc) can be embedded 
within major government policy decisions. 
In any case, developed countries are pushing the forward button, and promot-
ing new regulatory frameworks aimed at reforming government procurement 
3  See GPA/121, Report (2013) of the Committee on Government Procurement (24 Oc-
tober 2013) at 2.
4  See D. Osborne & T. Gaebler, Reinventing government (Addison-Wesley 1992).
5  See S. Arrowsmith, ‘Horizontal Policies in public procurement: a taxonomy’, 10 Jour-
nal of Public Procurement (2010): 149–186.
6  See, in general, C. McGrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Pro-
curement and Legal Change (Oxford University Press 2007) y P. Trepte, Regulating Pro-
curement: Understanding the Ends and Means of Public Procurement (Oxford University 
Press 2004).
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along the lines of the aforementioned criteria. For example, the World Bank 
fosters cooperation and technical assistance programs, collaborating with the 
OECD through a joint initiative to strengthen the capabilities of developing 
countries in this sector, as well as assessing domestic initiatives for procure-
ment reform.7 In this regard, the decades-old OECD program on procurement 
aims to remove trade restrictions and promote competition and market per-
formance in this sector.8 Interestingly, UNCITRAL is also contributing to these 
initiatives, and its Model Law on government procurement does currently of-
fer a template of ‘good practices’ for domestic law and regulation in this area.9 
Last but not least, some regional policies stand out within procurement reform 
initiatives. The European Union, in particular, has carried out major and ex-
tensive work in the area of procurement reform and market-formation.10 As a 
direct result, the EU directives and regulations on government procurement 
provide the EU DG Trade for a bargaining chip to obtain trade concessions 
from other GPA Parties in procurement negotiations. Thus, basically, govern-
ment procurement has become a burgeoning area of global governance. 
Traditionally, WTO plurilateral agreements such as the Agreement on Trade 
in civil aircraft, the International Dairy Agreement, the International Bovine 
Meat Agreement, or the GPA itself, have not attracted much academic, me-
dia and public attention compared to the multilateral agreements (eg. GATT, 
GATS, TRIPS). However, some of these plurilateral agreements are increas-
ingly important; and this is particularly the case of the revised GPA.11 The 
7  See Joint OECD-World Bank Round Table Initiative as well as Country Procurement 
Assessment Reports (CPAR).
8  For an example of OECD’s early and innovative initiatives in this field, see for exam-
ple, Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Improving the Quality of Govern-
ment Regulation (OECD 1995), The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform (OCDE 1997) as 
well as its action program. 
9  See R. Hunja, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and 
Services and its Impact on Procurement Reform’, Public Procurement: Global Revolution 
(Kluwer Law International 1998), pp.97-107 and S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Procurement: An 
Appraisal of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a Global Standard’, 17 International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly 18 (2004): 17–46.
10  See C. Chinchilla Marin, Public Procurement in the European Union and its Member 
States (Lex Nova 2012).
11  See for example, S. Arrowsmith, ‘Reviewing the GPA: The Role and Development of 
the Plurilateral Agreement after Doha’, 5 Journal of International Economic Law (2002): 
761–790.
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revised GPA entering into force in April 2014 is a paradigmatic example of the 
aforementioned emerging procurement markets. The new agreement substi-
tutes the 1996 GPA resulting from the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) for all the 
1996 GPA parties that have accepted its Protocol of Amendment. Essentially, 
the new GPA is the last of a wide variety of policy initiatives within GATT for 
the progressive opening up of government procurement to foreign competi-
tors, which began with the negotiations within the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) 
for a Code on Government Procurement, which entered into force on 1 Jan-
uary 1981, and originally aimed at correcting the non-applicability of GATT 
rules to this sector.12 Against this background, the following pages contextual-
ize and explore the disciplines and coverage of the new revised GPA.
2.  The game and its players 
The GPA functions as a rule-based infrastructure for global procurement 
markets. To date, 43 Members of the WTO are parties to the GPA: Cana-
da, the European Union (28 member states), Korea, United States, Hong 
Kong China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Singapore or 
Switzerland, Taipei China, among others.13 The GPA has also recognized 23 
observers, and 9 of these, including the People’s Republic of China, are ne-
gotiating accession. Of the 22 GPA observers, WTO Members such as Chi-
na, India, Australia and Turkey are notable for the volume and potential of 
their procurement sector. In addition, the protocols for WTO accession of 6 of 
these GPA observers including the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia, are 
contemplating GPA accession.14 
12  See generally J. Bourgeoise, ‘The Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade and on Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective’, 19 Com-
mon Market Law Review 5 (1982): 1157–1244 and see A. Blank & G. Marceau, ‘The Histo-
ry of the Government Procurement Negotiations Since 1945’, 5 Public Procurement Law 
Review 77 (1996): 77–147.
13  For accession negotiations see Doc GPA/*. 
14  On the market value of new accessions, see R. Anderson, A. Müller, P. Pelletier & 
K. Osei-Lah, ‘Assessing the Value of Future Accessions to the WTO Agreement on Gov-
ernment Procurement (GPA): Some New Data Sources, Provisional Estimates, and An 
Evaluative Framework for Individual WTO Members Considering Accession’, 21 Public 
Procurement Law Review 3 (2012):113–138.
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The basic principles of the GPA are non-discrimination, transparency and 
procedural fairness. The GPA regulates basic disciplines for the procurement 
of goods and services by central government, sub-state entities and state-
owned enterprises in respect of which, each GPA Party has scheduled mar-
ket-access commitments. In essence, this agreement establishes a minimum 
general standard for undertakings relating to tendering procedures covered 
by its rules (e.g. regional airport services, transport infrastructures, tenders 
by state-owned enterprises, etc). 
The GPA Parties are required to grant ‘treatment no less favorable’ than that 
accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers (article 3.1). Similarly, 
they may not treat any foreign based supplier less favorably than a locally-es-
tablished supplier on the basis of ‘degree of foreign affiliation or ownership’; 
nor may they discriminate against locally-established suppliers ‘on the basis 
of the country of production of the good or service being supplied’ (article 
3.2). The regulatory objective is to ensure that foreign suppliers have equal 
access and opportunities in government procurement of goods and services. 
To achieve this, the following basic requirements have been established: (1) 
minimum time limits to prepare, submit and receive tenders, (2) require-
ments for tender specifications, (3) procedures for submission, receipt and 
opening of tenders and awarding of contracts and (4) criteria for awarding 
contracts.15 In this respect, GPA rules prescribe procedural requirements 
for three basic types of tenders: (a) open tendering procedures, (b) selective 
tendering procedures, in which suppliers are invited to submit a tender with 
conditions of participation linked to the ability to complete the contract as 
well as (c) limited tendering procedures.16 
The scope of application or coverage of the GPA is determined with regard 
to each Party in its Appendix I (also referred to as each Party’s ‘schedule’). 
In this regard, Appendix I contain details of the contracting entities which 
are subject to GPA as well as minimum threshold values for the public ten-
ders. Within this appendix, the coverage for each GPA Party is determined 
in Annex 1 (central government entities), Annex 2 (sub-central government 
entities), and Annex 3 (all other entities procuring in accordance with GPA) 
as well as Annex 4 (covered services) and 5 (covered construction services). 
15  See articles 11.2, 12, 13.1-3 and 13.4 respectively.
16  See articles 7.3(a), 7.3(b) and 10, as well as article 15.
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In principle, services are only incorporated in the two final annexes of the 
aforementioned Appendix I. However, some WTO Members have also con-
signed services undertakings to Annexes 1, 2 and 3. The other appendices 
include publications in which the Parties insert advertisements for public 
contracts (Appendix II), permanent lists of qualified providers for selec-
tive tenders (Appendix III) as well as regulations and domestic procedures 
on government procurement (Appendix 5). These appendices are designed 
to easily formalize regular changes and updates.17 In regard to these, rectifi-
cations, transfers of entities from one annex to another or amendments are 
subject to so-called ‘compensatory adjustments’ as well as WTO dispute set-
tlement mechanism (articles XXIV.6.a). 
The GPA also encourages participation and increased transparency in pro-
curement.18 However, it concentrates mainly on disciplining large-scale 
procurement in general. In this respect, its provisions are only applicable to 
public tenders with values exceeding specific thresholds (article I.4).19 On 
one hand, the threshold value for goods and services procured by central gov-
ernment entities is 130,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR);20 currently, that 
figure equates to 185,000 US dollars. On the other, the threshold value for 
contracts entered into by sub-central government entities varies. In general, 
it is situated at around 200,000 SDR with some 400,000 for procurement 
by state-owned enterprises. With construction contracts, the figures rise to 
5 million SDR. In short, the GPA’s approach to procurement tends to favor 
the ‘macro’ over the ‘micro’ and thus generally involves large companies and 
large numbers. 
Compliance with the GPA disciplines is promoted through an (1) effective in-
ter-state monitoring system, within WTO Government Procurement Commit-
tee, (2) the enforcement of binding rules for domestic review procedures, so 
that foreign bidders can appeal contracting decisions and obtain reparation, 
and (3) access to the WTO dispute settlement. With regard to the first point, 
17  See WTO/LET/*.
18  Differences in coverage vary in intensity. For an interesting study on the relative 
impact of the GPA in the US, see C. Tiefer, ‘The GATT Agreement on Government Pro-
curement in Theory and Practice’, 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997): 31–50.
19  On methods of notification for threshold values see Doc WTO GPA/1, Annexe 3.
20  IMF assesses the daily value which is based on the stock market exchange rate of four 
currencies (US dollar, Euro, pound sterling and Japanese yen).
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the GPA regulates transparency of laws, procedures and practices on govern-
ment procurement as well as the technical specifications of the tenders. In ad-
dition, tendering procedures are required to include accessible publications 
identified in Appendices II to IV (article IX). The GPA thus imposes a gener-
al obligation to publish applicable laws, court decisions and administrative 
rulings of general application, as well as any procedure (including standard 
contract clauses) regarding government procurement (article XIX.1). At the 
same time, Parties to the agreement are required to submit annual statistics 
(broken down into categories of products and services) on the number and 
estimated value of the tenders awarded to both domestic and foreign suppli-
ers.21 Each GPA Party is also required to collect and provide the Committee 
on Government Procurement, on an annual basis, with statistics on its pro-
curement covered by the rules (article XIX.5). 
The GPA also determines the publication and right of foreign tenderers to 
obtain information on positive or negative decisions on the award of tenders 
(article XVIII.1 and 2). This obligation is complemented by the right of the 
bidder’s country of origin to request additional information; such procedural 
guarantees are established to ensure that procurement decisions are based 
on ‘fairness’ and ‘impartiality’ (article XIX.2). In addition, the provisions of 
the GPA also establish a general requirement for its Parties to deliver regular 
notifications regarding the evolution of their domestic procurement rules and 
practices. In this respect, Member States are required to notify any modifi-
cation to procurement regulations and practices (article XXIV.5(b)1).22 In 
addition, modifications to the appendices can be objected to by other Parties, 
and are also regularly monitored by the Committee on Government Procure-
ment, which supervises eventual compensatory adjustments pursuant to ar-
ticle XXIV.6(a).23 
21  See Doc WTO GPA/*, Statistics for [20**] reported under article XIX:5 of the 
Agreement.
22  See Doc WTO GPA/1/Add.1. Procedure for notification of national implementing 
legislation, Committee Decision of 4 June 1996, (27 June 2006) and, for example, Doc 
WTO GPA/20, Notification of national implementing legislation–European Community 
Communication (28 January 1998) and review Doc WTO GPA/32, Examination of Appli-
cable National Legislation in European Union (12 January 2000).
23  For an example regarding the last EU proposals of modification and the US objec-
tions see GPA/MOD/EEC/23 (24 March 2011) and GPA/MOD/EEC/24 (5 April 2011). 
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In this context, the WTO Secretariat has recently been involved in a proj-
ect for turning the appendices into online tools, to provide governments and 
businesses (as potential tenderers) with interactive information regarding 
procurement. The so-called ‘e-GPA project’ aims at creating an integrated 
database comprising information on market access schedules, statistical re-
ports and links to the GPA Parties’ procurement sites, to serve as a ‘market 
information tool’.
With regard to domestic procedures, article XX of the GPA requires that do-
mestic legal systems set up procedures enabling suppliers to challenge al-
leged breaches of the agreement through judicial review. The domestic judi-
cial body with competence for this purpose should operate according to a se-
ries of procedural requirements (article XX.6.a-c), and shall be authorized to 
determine the correction, compensation (restricted to costs of tender prepa-
ration or protest) as well as rapid interim measures to correct GPA breaches 
and thus to preserve commercial opportunities (article XX.7, a-c).
Ultimately, GPA rules are under the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settle-
ment system in accordance with article XXII.1. Therefore, WTO panels and 
the Appellate Body are available to the 43 GPA Parties not only for solving 
their disputes through neutral third party adjudication but to authorize sus-
pensions of GPA concessions as a result of non-compliance with GPA rules 
and standards. With regard to non-compliance, however, the GPA differs 
from the rest of the agreements covered by the WTO jurisdiction in some key 
issues. For example, non-compliance does not imply suspension of trade con-
cessions or other obligations under WTO covered agreements. As the GPA is 
a voluntary agreement −whereas the GATT, the GATS and TRIPS are agree-
ments of compulsory accession for all WTO members−, GPA Parties are not 
authorized to suspend trade concessions deriving from the GATT (goods), 
GATS (services) or TRIPS (IP) in order to respond to non-compliance with 
GPA provisions. Hence, the so-called crossed-retaliation between GPA Par-
ties is circumscribed to the procurement sector.24
Currently, WTO dispute settlement regarding procurement is relatively scarce 
compared with other covered agreements. Arguably, the most significant 
controversy to date was that concerning public procurement of the State of 
Massachusetts, aimed at disciplining companies operating in Myanmar (Bur-
24  Article XXII.3 and 7.
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ma) and promoting human rights in that country.25 In addition, a US claim 
against procurement conditions for the construction of Inchon international 
airport in Korea was also resolved by a panel in 2000.26 Previously, a dispute 
between the EC and Japan regarding a tender for a capacity extension in a 
Multi-functional Satellite (MTSAT) was settled.27 Thus, there have been few 
procurement disputes to date within WTO.28 Notwithstanding this fact, it is 
reasonable to expect an increase in the number of disputes in the midterm, 
as 10 new WTO Members are negotiating accession to the revised GPA, and 
in particular a further 24 states are negotiating accession to the WTO itself. 
In order to accede to the GPA, a state is required to offer a list of undertakings 
which are acceptable for all 43 GPA Parties; when this occurs, the offer be-
comes part of Appendix I. For the purpose of GPA accession, the Committee 
on Government Procurement set up working groups to examine the scope 
of the offers as well as full information on opportunities for export of the 
applicant state.29 Consequently, accession to the WTO will depend on accep-
tance by all its 160 members and, therefore, also by the 43 GPA Parties. As a 
result, as mentioned, some WTO accession negotiations are raising the issue 
of accession to the GPA; although paradoxically this is technically a voluntary 
accession. In this regard, negotiating GPA accession sometimes becomes a 
sine qua non requirement for some states to obtain the so-called ‘entry ticket’ 
to the WTO.
25  See Doc WT/DS88/*, United States–Measure affecting public procurement.
26  Doc WTO WT/DS163/R, Measures affecting public procurement (procurement 
practices of the Korean Airport Construction Authority) (1 May 2000).
27  See Doc WTO WT/DS73: Japan—Procurement of a navigation satellite (3 March 
1998) See also Doc WT/GPA/M/( 18 February 1998). 
28  Three panels have drawn up reports prior to creation of the WTO: Value-Added 
Tax and Threshold GPR/21 (16 May 1984) BISD 31/247, United States Procurement of 
a Sonar Mapping System (23 April 1992, not adopted) GPR.DS1/R and Norwegian Pro-
curement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of Trondheim. GPR.DS2/R (adopted 
on 13 May 1992) BISD 40S/319. For a comment on these three cases see F. Weiss, ‘Dispute 
settlement under the “Plurilateral Agreements: the case of the Agreement on Government 
Procurement’, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 
(Kluwer Law International 1997) at 448–459. See also, Dispute Settlement. World Trade 
Organization: Government Procurement (UNCTAD 2003) at 24–29.
29  See WTO GPA/1, Decisions in procedural matters within the framework of the pub-
lic procurement agreement (1994), Annex 2, paragraphs 2 to 4 (5 March 1996).
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3. Expanding the discipline 
In addition to the current disciplines, the 1996 GPA incorporated a Future 
Work Program, also so-called ‘built-in agenda’, aimed at expanding its sec-
tor coverage. The revised GPA of 2014 is a direct result of that agenda, sig-
nificantly extending the scope of the previous agreement within the Annexes 
of the new Appendix I; drawn up within the 1996 GPA negotiating frame-
work of article XXIV.7, the agreement was adopted in 2012 and has finally 
entered into force in April 2014. This updated version of the GPA is yet an-
other by-product of treaty-based progressive liberalization.30 In this regard, 
the revised GPA builds on the procurement regulatory experience initiated in 
the GATT Tokyo Round (1973-1979), and later followed by the GPA resulting 
from the Uruguay Round (1982-1994). Following decades of experience, the 
world trading system has finally reformed this regulatory framework in 2014. 
As a result, the revised GPA adds 4 complementary objectives to the tradi-
tional disciplines managed by the GPA of the Uruguay Round: 
(1) Promoting the implementation of new procurement practices and 
methods, such as use of information technologies (on line tenders), 
(2) extending the coverage of central (and sub-central) public bodies 
subject to the GPA,31 
(3) eliminating some discriminatory measures which were not under the 
provisions of 1996 GPA,32 and 
(4) facilitating accession of new Parties by incorporating special and dif-
ferentiated treatment (S&D) for developing countries. 
Not surprisingly, the negotiations for the new instrument led by the Swiss, 
Nicolas Niggli, were particularly complicated. Beginning in 1997, it was only 
in 2006 that negotiators reached a provisional understanding on obtaining 
improvements in coverage of Appendix I for all the GPA Parties. In fact, ne-
gotiations regarding coverage (eg. public procurement in Canadian provinces 
30  See in particular S. Arrowsmith & R. Anderson, The WTO Regime on government 
procurement: past, present and prospects (Cambridge University Press–WTO 2011).
31  See GPA/79, Decision on modalities for the negotiations on extension of coverage and elim-
ination of discriminatory measures and practices, Decision of 16 July 2004 (19 July, 2004).
32  See GPA/79/Add.1, Decision on modalities for the negotiations on extension of 
coverage and elimination of discriminatory measures and practices, Decision of 21 July 
2005, Addendum (22 July 2005).
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and territories, public procurement for Japanese airports, etc.) closed just 
hours before the 8th WTO Ministerial Conference. Accordingly, on 15 Decem-
ber 2011, the 43 Parties to the GPA reached a deal to improve its disciplines 
and expand market access. The final agreement was adopted by the Commit-
tee on Government Procurement on 30 March 2012.33
The revised GPA framework aims to create a more manageable and dynam-
ic agreement. In this respect, it clarifies the S&D treatment for developing 
countries as well as simplifying the procedures for amending the lists of 
commitment contained in Appendix I. The new agreement also reinforces its 
pro-competitive and anti-discriminatory provisions and reinforces its man-
datory rules regarding transparency in procurement policies and practices. At 
the same time, its provisions reduce time frames for government procurement 
of goods and services already available on the market, and establish specific 
procedures so that potential foreign suppliers can more easily challenge and 
be compensated for decisions awarding procurement contracts contrary to 
the GPA. However, the most significant advances have been in its improved 
scope of application (so-called GPA coverage), including procurement by pro-
vincial or departmental authorities as well as procurement of services under 
the new rules; particularly, regarding infrastructure construction projects. 
The revised GPA increases its coverage tenfold with respect to the volume of 
procurement regulated by the Tokyo Round Code on Government Procure-
ment. The increased volume of trade has resulted from incorporating new 
entities and sectors in the annexes to Appendix I as well as reducing threshold 
values. In short, Parties to the GPA have added over 200 bodies to their lists 
as well as procurement of services. The GPA coverage has been significant-
ly extended in sectors such as construction, infrastructure, telecommunica-
tions, public transport, hospital equipment services and other public author-
ity services. Thus, for example, the European Union and the United States 
have extended access to tenders from central bodies such as the European 
Commission and various US federal agencies. In addition, Japan has offered 
access to public-private partnerships (PPP) and large scale infrastructure 
construction projects. At the same time, for example, Canada has opened up 
its provincial procurement markets, and Korea its public railway and urban 
transport tenders. Finally, several GPA Parties provide coverage for new com-
33  See GPA/113 (2 April 2012).
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plex ‘contractual vehicles’ like the macro-construction contracts known as 
build-operate-transfer agreements (BOTs).
 
Therefore, the revised GPA significantly increases access to procurement 
markets for foreign companies. As a result, the procurement covered by the 
new rules expands market access by an estimated USD 80-100 billion an-
nually. 34 Consequently, the consolidation of a global procurement market is 
moving forward. It is thus a sector in which rule-based liberalization has suc-
cessfully advanced within the context of an ongoing world economic crisis. In 
fact, the new instrument incorporates its own built-in agenda, which focuses 
on the following areas: 
(1) sustainable public procurement, 
(2) public procurement and SMEs,
(3) restrictions and exclusions within the Annexes of member state and 
(4) Improvements in the compilation of statistical data. 
The third of these points lays down a new negotiating mandate for increasing 
the coverage or scope of application. In this regard, the 2014 GPA built-in 
agenda formally brings to the negotiating table those sectors and entities cur-
rently restricted or excluded in the annexes of all 43 GPA Parties. Needless 
to say, the purpose of this item is to ensure the possibility of extending GPA 
coverage in the long term, with or without a successful Doha Round.35 Thus, 
the built-in agenda allows this global procurement regime in the making to 
continue its forward march. In fact, Parties to the 1996 GPA formally agreed 
that the revised GPA provided the basis for negotiating accession to the for-
mer, even before the latter entered into force... This peculiar arrangement ob-
viously involved some degree of juggling for those state representatives who 
were negotiating accession, as their discussions for accessing one treaty (the 
old GPA) were in the process of being replaced by another treaty (the new 
GPA!). As a result, as the revised GPA finally entered into force in 2014, coun-
tries in the process of negotiating accession to the former GPA were required 
to swap over to the new regulatory framework. 
34  See GPA/121, Report (2013), op.cit.p.2.
35  See GPA/113 Decision on results of the negotiations under Article XXIV:7 of the 
agreement on government procurement. 
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Currently, negotiations for accession to the revised GPA continue to move 
forward. In fact, the US and the EU are redoubling their efforts to exert pres-
sure on certain key states, with the People’s Republic of China being prom-
inent among these. The case of China’s accession is particularly illustrative. 
For some observers, accession to the GPA of emerging economies such as 
China would be more positive for US and EU companies than other potential 
results awaiting an outcome in the stalled Doha Round. To paraphrase the 
Committee on Government Procurement, China’s accession is ‘a matter of 
tremendous significance for the agreement, for the WTO and for the world 
economy and an extremely important signal for emerging economies’.36 As a 
result, the Committee hoped to conclude negotiations last year and thus in-
tensified its negotiations regarding coverage and market access during 2014. 
In addition, the WTO Secretariat is particularly involved in providing techni-
cal assistance to Chinese representatives, in order to facilitate a prompt deal 
within the brand new GPA framework. 
China’s accession is an incentive to other emerging economies to make a 
move, in order to avoid being left out of the procurement markets to which 
Chinese companies will gain access. In fact, India has joined the GPA as an 
observer, to a great extent as a result of China’s accession negotiations. The 
People’s Republic of China has been a WTO Member since 2001, but began 
negotiations to join the GPA only seven years ago:37 accession was formally 
requested on 28 December 2007 and the initial offer by China was circulated 
among the parties on 7 January 2008.38 To date, China has already submitted 
several revised offers to the GPA Parties. In fact, on January 2014, GPA Par-
ties received a fourth new revised bid, following a formal request by the USTR 
at the 2013 session of the US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and 
Trade.39 However, the bids have failed to meet the expectations of key players 
such as the United States and the European Union. The requests for market 
access improvements from the US and the EU focus on gaining extended cov-
36  See GPA/121 (24 October, 2014), Report (2013) of the Committee on Government 
Procurement, paragraph 3.13.
37  See H. Wang, ‘China’s ten years in the WTO: review and perspectives’, Journal of 
Chinese economic and foreign trade studies (2013): 53–69.
38  See GPA/ACC/CHN/1 (7 January 2008) and GPA/93 (14 January 2008).
39  For a comment on the bid circulated to GPA Parties (on a confidential basis) see In-
side U.S. Trade’s China Trade Extra, New China GPA Offer Adds Six Provinces, But Still 
Falls Short Of Demands (7 January 2014).
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erage from central public bodies, regional authorities, and reducing thresh-
old values, as well as its wide exclusions to certain procurement sectors and 
authorities. 
4. A revised agreement in context 
World procurement markets are currently dominated by industries from 
developed countries. As a result, developed countries are exerting strong 
pressure in WTO and other forums so that developing countries reduce the 
margins of discrimination against foreign companies in government pro-
curement.40 In this regard, companies lobby representatives from developed 
countries to obtain extra market access in E7 economies with a view, to name 
an illustrative example, to providing new transport and communications me-
ga-infrastructures. However, developing countries have systematically op-
posed the launch of multilateral negotiations in this area since the Uruguay 
Round (1986-1994).41 Thus, at the present time, there is no mandate for ne-
gotiating multilateral disciplines in this area.42 
In this regard, the mandate of the Doha Round only covered the negotia-
tions on the improvement of transparency in government procurement in re-
sponse to the opposition to multilateral negotiations by developing countries. 
Accordingly, the WTO Ministerial Declaration of Singapore (13 December 
1996) established a working group to analyze the transparency of procure-
ment practices,43 and envisaged the eventual negotiation of an agreement 
40  See, for example, 2014 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers: 
Annual report on trade barriers of the USTR (United States Trade Representative 2014).
41  On the pre-Seattle proactive position of developing countries (with more than 200 
proposals) see C. Michalopoulos, ‘Developing Country Strategies for the Millennium 
Round’, 33 Journal of World Trade 5 (1999): 1–30. For long-term longitudal perspective 
on the position of developing countries previous to WTO see Scott, J., ‘Developing Coun-
tries in the ITO and GATT Negotiations’, 9 Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 
(2010): 5–24.
42 For a study on the gradual approach to non-discrimination in the field of multilateral 
public procurement see M. Dischendorfer, ‘The existence and development of multilateral 
rules on government procurement under the framework of the WTO’, 9 Public Procure-
ment Law Review 1 (2000): 1–38.
43  See WTO WT/MIN(96)/DEC Declaration of the WTO First Ministerial Conference, 
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on transparency in the sector, which was in any case to be de-linked from 
GPA negotiations.44 In Doha, the trade delegates from developing countries 
managed to ensure that the Final Declaration of 2001, inaugurating the new 
Development Round, expressly excluded the negotiation of undertakings on 
procurement market access:45 ‘[the negotiations] shall be limited to the trans-
parency aspects and therefore will not restrict the scope for countries to give 
preferences to domestic supplies and suppliers.’46 
The Final Declaration opened up the possibility of new negotiations in this 
area following the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference (Cancun 2003), ‘on 
the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that session on 
modalities of negotiations’.47 However, developing and developed countries 
were unable to attain the required explicit consensus in that Conference:48 
the Cancun failure to reach agreement on this issue arose from the increasing 
tensions in negotiations regarding the so-called Singapore issues; that is, as 
a result of the tensions caused by critical policy issues such as investment 
protection and antitrust in particular. In fact, the Singapore issues ended by 
being formally excluded from the Doha Round in 2004, as a way of mitigating 
policy frictions in the interests of a successful Round. In this way, the WTO 
Members approved the so-called ‘July package’ in which developed countries 
Singapore (18 December 1996) and S. Arrowsmith, ‘Towards a multilateral agreement 
on transparency in government procurement’, 47 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (1997): 793–810 (studying the establishment of this group).
44  For the original idea of such multilateral agreement see Non Paper-Government Pro-
curement (European Union 1996) and Non Paper-Further Ideas on a WTO Government 
Procurement Initiative (USTR 1996).
45  See WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, Ministerial Declaration adopted 14 November 2001 (20 
November 2001).
46  For a critical assessment of the functions and benefits of transparency in public pro-
curement see S. Arrowsmith, ‘Transparency in Government Procurement: The Objectives 
of Regulation and the Boundaries of the World Trade Organization’, 37 Journal of World 
Trade (2003): 283–303.
47  See WT/WGTGP/W/32, Work of the working group on the matters related to items 
I-V of the list of the issues raised and points made, Secretariat Note (23 May 2002), and 
WT/WGTGP/W/33, Work of the working group on the matters related to items vi-xii of 
the list of the issues raised and points made, Secretariat Note (3 October 2002).
48  For the 12 items examined by the transparency working group (potential areas for 
drafting a possible agreement) see the ‘Chairman’s Checklist’. See JOB(99)/6782, List of 
issues raised and points made, President’s Informal Note.
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agreed to remove these issues from the negotiation mandate, in order to keep 
the Round talks ongoing.49 Nevertheless, developed countries have stepped 
up the pressure on certain developing countries to obtain undertakings to 
open up their government procurement markets through other regulatory ve-
hicles within the WTO (i.e. GATS), as well as outside WTO (i.e. preferential 
trade agreements). 
However, with regard to the former, developed countries are finding it in-
creasingly difficult to use their traditional negotiating leverage for obtaining 
trade-offs within the WTO institutional structure. As a result, the feasibili-
ty of improving access to the procurement markets of developing countries 
through GATS is currently scarce at best, as its article XIII.1 expressly ex-
empts government procurement from the main market access provisions of 
GATS.50 In any case, GATS article XIII.2 establishes a negotiating mandate 
on services procurement. Thus, it is not easy to predict final outcomes in this 
area, as the success of multilateral trade negotiations always depends on 
complex trade-offs on which consensus may be reached, literally, at the last 
minute. In practice, as mentioned, MTN Rounds (Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations) encourage a precarious balance of concessions between a wide vari-
ety of requests offered in numerous negotiating sectors (i.e. industrial tariffs, 
subsidies, agriculture, IP-health related issues, among others). Therefore, it 
is generally difficult to predict the developments and outcomes of the Round 
overall. In fact, many already argue that the Doha Round has already failed. 
The July package managed to overcome this impasse and reinvigorated the 
Round. To summarize, notwithstanding some progress in the GATS negoti-
ations regarding procurement of services, the success of negotiations is also 
dependent on other parallel WTO negotiations. In this regard, whether or not 
there is a definitive deal will depend on 160 WTO Members valuing the over-
all results positively; which is a difficult but not impossible task to achieve, as 
previous GATT Rounds suggest. 
49  See Doc WT/579 Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 (2 
August 2004). 
50  On GATS liberalization and the eventual GPA multilateralization see S. Evenett & 
B. Hoekman, ‘Government Procurement of Services: Assessing the Case for Multilateral 
Disciplines’ Services 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (Brookings 
Institution Press 2000) at 143–164.
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At the present time, the WTO regime not only manages substantive and pro-
cedural rules -which become international hard law under a binding global 
jurisdiction- but also provides a stable and dynamic regulatory framework 
for opening up domestic markets through regular multi-state crossed-conces-
sions and trade-offs. In this sense, WTO law constitutes a hyper-specialized 
legal system on its own terms and one that has been shown to be particularly 
dynamic to date. In fact, as explained, the WTO defines itself in its consti-
tutive treaty as a Permanent Forum for Negotiations, and thus includes the 
regular launch of multilateral trade negotiations among its functions.51 As 
progressive liberalization is inherent in the world trading system, the GATT 
regime has expanded its negotiating mandates over entire new areas. In this 
regard, the long-term efforts to build a global procurement market from an 
agreement of voluntary accession for WTO Members –a plurilateral agree-
ment such as the GPA– are an expression of this culture. In this context, some 
developed GPA Parties tend to promote the opening up of government pro-
curement markets through any regulatory vehicle available within the scope 
of WTO covered agreements. In fact, many north-south tensions within the 
Doha Round originate from such practices, as some developed WTO Mem-
bers such as the US and the EU are particularly lax when interpreting the 
agreed negotiating mandate for each MTN Round; and procurement is not 
foreign to these practices. 
The objective of governments pushing for this strategy −notably USA and 
EU− is to increase market access for the global companies incorporated 
in their territories. By regularly shifting forums, parallel negotiating ven-
ues are available for the ‘opening up of government procurement markets’. 
Thus, trade representatives not only negotiate procurement within the GPA 
framework but in other WTO regulatory frameworks such as GATS, as well 
as outside WTO, such as the recent US and EU FTAs incorporating procure-
ment provisions; 52 as a result, concessions that cannot be achieved within the 
51  See Article III.2 of the WTO Agreement.
52  See, for example, S. Khorana & A. Asthana, ‘EU FTA negotiations with India: the 
question of liberalisation of public procurement’, 12 Asia Europe Journal 1 (2014): 1–13. 
For a recent OECD study (briefly covering 47 RTA with procurement provisions) see A. 
Ueno, ‘Multilateralising regionalism on government procurement’, OECD Trade Policy 
Papers 151 (10 May 2013). See also Doc S/WPGR/W/49 Government Procurement re-
lated provisions in Economic Integration Agreements –Note by Secretariat (31 August 
2004) and Doc S/WPGR/W/49/Add.1 (8 September 2009), containing the two reports 
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world trading system will be requested in alternative forums.53 Therefore, a 
variety of initiatives have been launched in diverse forums for promoting the 
opening up of procurement markets. This strategy not only transcends the 
GPA framework, but also the WTO itself: 
•	 Liberalization within the GPA framework,
•	 Liberalization within the WTO framework, but outside the GPA (i.e. 
GATS), 
•	 Liberalization outside the WTO (e.g. bilateral treaties).
In the world of regulatory networks, the WTO will continue to be the central 
regulatory regime for governing the global market economy in the making as 
long as it is able to regularly expand and upgrade its rules. For this reason, the 
eventual failure to achieve significant results in the Doha Round is generally 
perceived by trade practitioners and experts as a serious systemic risk for the 
world trading system. In the absence of substantial multilateral concessions 
within the Doha Round, the GPA framework analyzed in these pages will be 
increasingly perceived by some as a feasible alternative model for advancing 
new commitments in other sectors potentially covered by WTO law. Argu-
ably, such strategies of variable geometry within WTO could perhaps mitigate 
fragmentation in economic governance, by at least allowing disputes to be 
resolved within the WTO dispute settlement system and thus within the four 
corners of well-established procedures, practices and case law. However, the 
path of preferentials is not free from perils.54 
from WTO Secretariat on this issue. 
53  See K. Alter & S. Meunier, ‘The International Politics of Regime Complexity’, 7 Per-
spectives on Politics (2009): 13–24. For the case of industrial property, see, en particular, 
S. Sell, ‘Cat and Mouse: Forum shifting in the battle over intellectual property rules and 
enforcement’, International Studies Association Montreal (March 16-19th 2011). 
54  J. Bhagwati, Termites in the world trading system: How preferential agrements 
undermine free trade (Oxford University Press 2008).
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7
Legal commoditization of cultural expressions
1. Culture as consumption 
World trade law and policy is a collective endeavor promoting the public 
good nature of markets. Its basic economic underpinnings generally consist 
of transforming the marketplace into a central social institution and for-prof-
it organizations as its primary actors.1 Within this paradigm, all things and 
activities are approached by trade policymakers through these policy lenses. 
This final chapter takes culture as a case of study for exploring some blind 
spots in this world vision. In doing so, these pages analyze the two main 
global competing perceptions of culture: that is to say, the position of culture 
within the world trading system on one hand and, on the other, the alterna-
tive legal stance taken in this regard by some ministries of culture within the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
In line with the market paradigm, trade agreements regulate the objects and 
activities that encapsulate cultural expressions as goods and services, respec-
tively. In essence, this is the predominant perception of culture among public 
and private technocracies currently managing the big audiovisual industries 
of developed countries. Within the world trading system, progressive liber-
alization of trade in goods and services is promoted, irrespective of whether 
the objects and activities subject to global transaction have a cultural ‘nature’ 
or not.2 As a result, global cultural transfers are approached from a purely 
commercial perspective in the trade policy mind. That is to say, for example, 
‘a book = a comb’ (read object as product), or ‘cinema = auditing’ (read film 
screening as commercial service), etc. 
1  S. Picciotto, Regulating global corporate capitalism (Cambridge University Press 
2011).
2  I. Bernier, ‘Culture’, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic, and Political 
Analysis (Springer 2005).
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For the critics, obviously, the framing of culture as mere goods and services 
conflicts with the alternative perception of culture as a structural social val-
ue to be promoted and preserved:3 that is, as a set of collective experiences 
that are a reflection of each society and which are continually elaborated on 
over time.4 The question that often puzzles critics is framed in this way: is it 
reasonable to apply the same regulations to cinema, theatre, or television, for 
example, as those applied to trade in combs, or auto-parts and components 
(GATT)... or to auditing and consulting services (GATS)? Many think that it is 
not and thus, in contrast, argue in favor of special and differentiated policies 
regulating world exchange, in order to protect and promote diversity.
In this sense, the alternative world visions of culture are more subtle and 
complex. Understanding that the way our values and tastes develop is largely 
determined by social environment, and thus always includes exogenous com-
ponents, critics denounce the overexposure to the audiovisual products and 
services of world cultural industries, which are often distributed with preda-
tory business practices, and which also do not usually vary much in terms of 
cultural diversity. The critics also suggest that domestic policies focused on 
promoting the growth of ‘national’ cultural industries so that they can com-
pete in the global marketplace only increase such bias worldscale, as cultural 
industries often tend to discriminate against social values such as (1) equality, 
(2) collectivism, (3) cooperativism, (4) anti-consumerism, among others, in 
favor of other types of values. 
In short, for the critics, by regulating the world as a mere ‘marketplace’, and 
culture as mere ‘products’ or ‘services’, basic components of our collective 
imagination are placed under industry/corporate control.5 By extension, as 
overexposure to industrial cultural products and services has a bearing not 
only on citizens’ decision-making but on identity formation across the lifes-
3  Regarding the term “culture”, a wide range of definitions have been compiled by 
Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn in the nineteen fifties. A. Kroeber & C. Kluckhohn, 
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Peabody Museum of Archaeology 
& Ethnology 1952).
4  On the way in which images of popular culture circulate and the ways in which they 
are internalised and how they adapt life styles, see A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: 
Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (University of Minnesota Press 1996).
5  P. Grant & Ch. Wood, Blockbusters and Trade Wars: Popular culture in a Globalized 
World (Douglas & McIntyre 2004)
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pan as well, political ecosystems are also seen to be affected in the long-term 
policy cycle.6 This last critical stance from a cultural policy perspective was 
clearly framed or encapsulated by Gramsci, who half a century ago explained 
how ‘cultural hegemony’ also produces manufacture of consent and thus in-
evitably social control.7 Thus, the protection and promotion of cultural diver-
sity is often perceived to be a systemic issue for society.
2. Alternative legal ideas 
The world trading system approaches culture as mere goods or services 
to be traded under GATT and GATS disciplines, respectively, as culture is 
also subsumed in the logic of comparative advantage, specialization and ex-
change. However, as mentioned, what is conceived as mere ‘goods and ser-
vices’ by trade agencies and audiovisual industries, for example, for others is 
also deemed to be ‘cultural expressions’. Inevitably, the question remains of 
whether it is sufficient to specialize in producing guns and butter and thus 
leave to others the production of films, digital games or documentaries. In-
dependent producers and a number of culture ministers have taken the latter 
stance and, in consequence, propose alternative public policies to those fo-
cused on pure world-market formation and market access. In this regard, a 
significant number of ministers of culture representing their countries at UN-
ESCO perceive culture as a ‘set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual 
and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, 
in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value sys-
tems, traditions and beliefs’.8 Thus, they see culture as more than just goods 
6  A good society, as Stuart Mill would have said, requires complete freedom for human 
nature to expand in infinite and opposing directions. See J. Stuart Mill, On Liberty and 
Autobiography, VII (London 1873) at 239.
7  For the initial reflections on the idea of ‘cultural industry’ (1947) see, M. Horkheimer 
& T. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Sanford University 
Press 2002) and A. Mattelart & J. Piemme, ‘Cultural Industries: The Origins of an Idea’, 
Cultural Industries: A Challenge for the Future (UNESCO 1982) at 51 –61.
8  Definition of the Convention on Cultural Diversity and the UNESCO Universal Dec-
laration on Cultural Diversity from the conclusions of the World Conference on Cultural 
Policies (Mondiacult 1982), the World Culture and Development Commission (Our Cre-
ative Diversity 1995) and the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for De-
velopment (Stockholm 1998). 
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and services and, by extension, somewhat more than the object or activity in 
which a cultural expression is encapsulated. 
As a result, a group of culture representing their countries as UNESCO mem-
bers not only question but also resist the purely commercial worldview of 
culture as mere goods and services currently promoted by trade agencies 
through international lawmaking. With this aim, the UNESCO Convention 
on Cultural Diversity was set up on 18 March 2007, strategically designed to 
act as a counterweight to the strictly commercial worldview of culture. Thus, 
the preamble of the convention offers an alternative reading of the mean-
ing of culture in society: ‘cultural activities goods and services have both an 
economic and a cultural nature, because they convey identities, values and 
meanings, and must therefore not be treated as solely having commercial val-
ue’. The convention considers ‘cultural activities, goods and services relevant 
when they embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of the com-
mercial value they may have’ (article 4.4). In this regard, cultural expressions 
are defined as follows: ‘those expressions that result from the creativity of 
individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural content’ (article 4.3). 
In accordance with this approach, culture acts as the cement that somehow 
helps bring people together. Therefore, world trade liberalization in cultural 
products and services is considered to be inefficient in social terms from a 
cultural policy perspective, as it facilitates domestic access to domestic mar-
kets -and thus also the global expansion- of dominant audiovisual industries 
which integrate world production and distribution through vertical business 
models based on IP, for example. From this perspective, trade liberalization 
intensifies the long ongoing asymmetries in the balance of cultural trans-
fers between societies, and has an adverse effect on sustainable local cultures. 
Therefore, advocates of cultural diversity are seeking to adapt the state of play 
in order to rebalance cultural exchange.9 
Finally, imbalances in cultural transfers are not uniquely relevant for policies 
on cultural diversity as those have a direct and measurable bearing on bilat-
eral trade balances. In this regard, countries can improve their bilateral trade 
balances by means of favorable balances on cultural transfers with other 
9  For the challenges faced by cultural diversity due to these asymmetric cultural flows 
see Report on Human Development 2004: Cultural liberty in today’s diverse world 
(PNUD 2004).
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countries: in this regard, for example, mass consumption of US products and 
services was fuelled by the internationalization of cinema, television and pop 
music beginning in the first half of the 20th century; Will Hays, the head of 
the Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA) at that time, coined the 
popular expression ‘trade follows the film’ for this very reason.10 In this re-
spect, it is no coincidence that US leadership in the international post-war or-
der was partly consolidated through the globalization of US-originated mass 
culture.11 Ultimately, power is exercised in the most effective and lasting way 
through persuasion and soft power.12 The influence on the social, political 
and economic preferences of others through culture, as in cultural transfer, 
is always more efficient than coercion.13Also for that reason, any advanced 
foreign policy grants a pivotal role to so-called cultural diplomacy today.14 
As part of this general policy approach, countries with large export-oriented 
cultural industries within their territories, such as the United States, tend to 
intensely and often fiercely promote trade liberalization on audiovisual prod-
ucts and services.
3. Treaty-based resistance 
In contrast to the purely commercial worldview of culture, cultural diversity 
seeks –among other policy measures– to promote some degree of reciprocity 
in the global balance of cultural transfers. In this respect, the Universal Decla-
ration on Cultural Diversity, approved post September 11 by UNESCO (2001), 
the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 
10  See G. Bakker, Trade Follows the Film: Europe versus Hollywood in the Interwar 
Years, Cultural Industries in Britain and Germany: Sport, Music and Entertainment From 
the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century (Wissner Verlag 2012) at 139–155.
11  R. Vasey, The World According to Hollywood, 1918–1939 (University of Wisconsin 
Press 1997) at 42.
12  J. Nye, Soft power: The means to success in world politics (Public Affairs Press 
2004).
13  A. Dorfman & A. Mattelart, How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialism ideology in the 
Disney Comic (International General 1984).
14  See Cultural Diplomacy: The Lynchpin of Public Diplomacy (State Department, 
2005), R. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twen-
tieth Century (Brassey’s Inc 2005) and F. Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The 
C.I.A. and the World of Arts and Letters (The New Press 2000).
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Humanity (2003) and the Convention on Cultural Diversity (2005) are ex-
ponents of a non-strictly commercial perception of culture. The Declaration 
raises cultural diversity to the category of common heritage of humanity and 
connects with the dignity of the individual. Similarly, it supports intercultural 
dialogue and assumes that one should recognize others (otherness) as well as 
the inevitable condition of one’s own ‘plural’ identity.15 This set of soft-law 
rules paved the way for the Convention on Cultural Diversity to later legalize 
an alternative conception and approach to culture. 
The convention preamble clearly expresses the alternative worldview: ‘cul-
tural diversity is strengthened by the free flow of ideas, and that it is nur-
tured by constant exchanges and interaction between cultures’. For this rea-
son, one of the goals is ‘to encourage dialogue among cultures with a view to 
ensuring wider and more balanced cultural exchanges in the world’ (article 
1.c). The idea of intercultural dialogue aims to achieve cross-fertilization be-
tween societies communicating their own and other values. In short, it aims 
to enable non-hegemonic societies to relate on an equal footing -intercultural 
communication and dialogue- with current hegemonic cultures (i.e. western 
culture). Furthermore, the Convention also confirms the principle of equita-
ble access: ‘[the] equitable access to a rich and diversified range of cultural 
expressions from all over the world and access of cultures to the means of 
expressions and dissemination constitute important elements for enhancing 
cultural diversity and encouraging mutual understanding’ (article 2.7). Simi-
larly, it defines ‘interculturality’ as ‘the existence and equitable interaction of 
diverse cultures and the possibility of generating shared cultural expressions 
through dialogue and mutual respect’ (article 4.8).
Underlying this treaty framework is a policy position that considers that 
promoting dialogue between societies is more socially efficient in aggre-
gated terms than merely promoting market access for the global cultural 
industries. This legal framework was alternatively devised for preserving 
independent creators as well as small and medium enterprises producing 
and distributing culture across nations. In this respect, the Convention pro-
vides new tools. Articles 2.2 and 5 of the Convention regulate the sover-
15  For a selection of the relevant provisions of multiple international instruments see I. 
Bernier, Catalogue of International Principles Pertaining to Culture (International Net-
work on Cultural Policy 2000).
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eign right of states to apply policy measures to protect cultural diversity: 
‘states have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to adopt measures and 
policies to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions within 
their territory’. In turn, its Intergovernmental Committee has the power to 
prepare and submit operational guidelines to the Conference of Parties in 
this regard (article 23.6.b). 
Both in theory and practice, the UNESCO Convention was strategically de-
signed to provide a legal counterweight to trade liberalization within WTO 
and PTAs; in short, to counteract the legal treatment of culture within these 
regimes as a mere product or service.16 Paradoxically, an instrument of in-
ternational law created by the ministers of culture -read the convention- at-
tempts to rebalance the leverage of other instruments of international law cre-
ated by trade ministers -namely WTO law as well as PTAs-. In this regard, it 
could be argued that, within the current fragmentation of global governance, 
treaty-based regimes are sometimes transformed into a higher level-playing 
field for world policy battles, including inter-ministerial battles (i.e. cultural 
vs. trade agencies). 
In fact, regulating the international legal position of the UNESCO Conven-
tion with regard to WTO law itself was one of the main issues during the ne-
gotiations and, obviously, posed a direct challenge by ministers of culture to 
those running the trade portfolio.17 Finally, article 20 regulating this issue 
-entitled ‘relationship to other treaties’- was worded with calculated ambi-
guity as a result of policy pressures; the reason for this is the disagreements 
between the majority group led by European ministers of culture on one 
hand -who advocated a special treatment for cultural goods and services-, 
and , on the other, the United States, Australia and Japan, who publicly 
framed the whole initiative of the Convention as an undercover protection-
ist initiative. The suggestive subtitle of the provision is ‘Mutual support-
16  C. Graber, ‘The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: A Counterbalance 
to the WTO?’ 9 Journal of International Economic Law (2006): 553.
17  The European Commission actually claimed (in a communication to the European 
and Council and Parliament) that the new instrument has no effect on the rules of the mul-
tilateral trade system: ‘such instrument would not affect and be without prejudice to’. See 
Towards an international instrument on cultural diversity, Commission of the European 
Communities, COM(2003) 520final.
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iveness, complementarity and non-subordination’, and section 1 reads as 
follows: ‘Parties recognize that they shall perform in good faith their obliga-
tions under this Convention and all other treaties to which they are parties’. 
Accordingly, ‘without subordinating this Convention to any other treaty’, 
the Parties (a) ‘shall foster mutual supportiveness between this Conven-
tion and the other treaties to which they are parties’ and (b) ‘shall take into 
account’ the relevant provisions of the Convention ‘when interpreting and 
applying the other treaties to which they are parties or when entering into 
other international obligations’. 
However, blowing hot and cold as it were, section 2 then also contains the fol-
lowing provision: ‘Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying 
rights and obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are 
parties’. Therefore, the clause leaves the question of the legal relations between 
the UNESCO Convention and WTO law at a complete stalemate. In practical 
terms, however, this result is a triumph for the advocates of a commercial worl-
dview of culture, as the Convention only relies on a mechanism of good offices, 
mediation or conciliation for settling disputes in article 25, and lacks effective 
enforcement procedures to ensure compliance with its rules. In short, the rules 
which carry weight in practice within domestic inter-ministerial politics when 
it comes to solving the tensions of the ‘trade and culture’ puzzle are those of the 
world trading system, as this regime relies on a binding jurisdiction, compul-
sory for all WTO members, which also ensures compliance with WTO law by 
authorizing suspension of trade concessions and obligations.18
 
Notwithstanding this situation, the Convention can be useful for obtaining 
some measure of deference to cultural diversity within both WTO adjudica-
tion and MTNs: on one hand, interpreting treaties in compliance with general 
international law technically requires ‘taking into account’ any international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties (article 31.3.c of the Vien-
na convention on the law of the treaties).19 On the other hand, the mere exis-
tence of the UNESCO Convention substantially improves the negotiating po-
sition of its parties as WTO Members within WTO negotiating rounds. That is 
18  See J. Jackson, ‘The role and effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism’, Brookings Trade Forum (2000) at 179–219 and P. Mavroidis & A. Sykes (eds), The 
WTO and international trade law/dispute settlement (Edward Elgar 2005).
19  P. Zapatero, ‘Modern international law’, op.cit.
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to say, the Convention helps resist the pressures for progressive liberalization 
within WTO.20 To quote Voon: 
‘The UNESCO Convention may well cause those WTO Members who seek greater leeway 
for their cultural policy measures to dig in their heels and refuse to increase their commit-
ments in relation to cultural products under GATS’.21
That is the real power of the convention and the main reason why the US del-
egation qualified it as ‘deeply flawed’, warning that it could potentially ‘impair 
rights and obligations under other international agreements and adversely 
impact prospects for successful completion of the Doha Development Round 
negotiations’.22 In short, the UNESCO Convention gives its parties a degree of 
negotiating leverage within the WTO regime. Aside from reducing the level of 
pressure for progressive liberalization in this sector, however, no major glob-
al transformations are expected as a result of the convention.23 At the same 
time, it should be recalled that the convention has obviously not been ratified 
by the United States.24
Given this state of affairs, the conference of the parties (COP) and the in-
tergovernmental committee of the Convention have two basic alternatives to 
address the approach to culture embedded into WTO: integration (read co-
operation) or confrontation (read conflict). If the parties to the Convention 
were to accept greater cooperation, perhaps some friendly but minor conces-
sions to cultural diversity could be obtained within WTO decision-making 
procedures in the midterm. Arguably, this would also imply a measure of ad-
herence to the legal worldview of culture promoted in WTO. 
20  K. Acheson & Ch. Maule, ‘Convention on Cultural Diversity’, 28 Journal of Cultural 
Economics 4: 251.
21  T. Voon, Cultural products and the World Trade Organization (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2007) at 253.
22  See Robert Martin, Final Statement of the United States Delegation: Third Session 
of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts, UNESCO (3 June 2005).
23  J. Pauwelyn, ‘The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, and the WTO: Diver-
sity in International Law-Making’, ASIL Insights (November 2005).
24  C. Balassa, ‘The Impact of the U. S. Position in the Trade and Culture Debate: Nego-
tiation of the Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions’, The UNESCO Conven-
tion on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions : a Tale of Fragmentation in International 
Law (Intersentia 2012) at 71-95.
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Be that as it may, if cooperation is sought, this would require greater inter-in-
stitutional communication, and thus joint decision-making in some matters 
of shared competence. Within the UNESCO Convention, the task could be 
granted to the intergovernmental committee, which is probably the body best 
qualified to make proposals on this point. Until now however, UNESCO and 
the WTO have developed their own activities in clinical isolation from each 
other. In fact, the ministers of culture negotiating the convention did not 
agree to cooperate with other treaty-based regimes but to ensure that those 
regimes operate in compliance with the objectives and principles of the con-
vention! Thus, article 21 under the heading ‘International Consultations and 
Coordination’ reads as follows: 
‘The Parties undertake to promote the objectives and principles of this Convention in other 
international forums. For this purpose, Parties shall consult each other, as appropriate, 
bearing in mind these objectives and principles.’ 
Similarly, article 23.6 authorizes the intergovernmental committee ‘to estab-
lish procedures and other mechanisms for consultation aimed at promoting 
the objectives and principles of this convention in other international fo-
rums’. In short, the UNESCO Convention does not so much seek to extend 
a bridge to the world trading system as to demand from WTO rules and acts 
that they will ensure the non hindrance of the policies and domestic measures 
promoted by its treaty provisions. At present, 133 signatory states have ad-
hered to or ratified this international legal instrument. 
4. Competing world visions 
Evidently, bridging these world visions, legalized through separate and dis-
tinct but equally valid treaties, is not an easy task. Freedom of choice is not 
automatically synonymous with the market, just as democracy is not equiva-
lent to the marketplace. Similarly, access to culture and consumption of cul-
ture are not equivalent, as consumption may be a form of access, but access in 
itself is more than the activity of consumption. There are some qualitative dif-
ferences. Nonetheless, developing a sustainable legal balance between open 
markets and cultural diversity probably requires world policies to strengthen 
the position of the two basic extremes of any cultural experience; namely, 
creators and users: that is, adopting world policy measures of positive dis-
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crimination towards the micro -independent SME, micro-entrepreneurs and 
individual creators and users- instead of macro -large-scale cultural indus-
tries- in critical policy areas.25 
Cultural diversity policies have been devised to nurture the richness of social 
life, by opening all windows, as well as keeping them open. These policies en-
able us, as community or individuals, to better situate ourselves in the world, 
by having access -and thus being exposed- to the kaleidoscopic tapestry of 
cultural backgrounds, worldviews and expressions, built by the others, here 
and there. On the contrary, the cultural content produced and distributed for 
mass production by large industries cannot easily extend our comprehension 
of others -as they are simply not those others- and so naturally do not en-
rich our vital experiences.26 As nonintegrated or alternative visions often do 
not pass through,27 the transformative power of art (stories, dreams, images, 
ideas) is also diluted. 28 For these basic reasons, the UNESCO Convention de-
fines cultural content in article 4.2 as ‘the symbolic meaning, artistic dimen-
sion and cultural values that originate from or express cultural identities.’ 
However, it is not only WTO regulatory approaches to cultural products and 
services that deserve reconsideration. Mainstream antitrust law and policy 
should also arguably be revisited, as the way in which antitrust law is inter-
preted and enforced in most jurisdictions nowadays tends to benefit large 
companies to the detriment of small and medium cultural enterprises; a bias 
inevitably translated to antitrust enforcement cooperation. Conventionally, 
competition law and policy in advanced economies is oriented to protect con-
sumers, not competitors. As a result, competition law and policy has been 
progressively reoriented by the leading antitrust authorities in last decades 
25  See Reclaiming Cultural Diversity: Report on the conference ‘Regulations in Favour 
of Cultural Diversity’, De Balie, Amsterdam, Utrecht School of the Arts/Hivos (25-27 Sep-
tember 2003).
26  J. Smiers, Arts under Pressure: Promoting cultural diversity in the age of globaliza-
tion (Zed Books 2003).
27  On the idea of how cultural industries eliminate autonomy of art see M. Horkheimer 
& T. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, op.cit. For a brief historical analysis see also H. 
Buchloch, ‘Introduction’, Neo-Avantgarde and Culture Industry: Essays on European 
Art from 1955 to 1975 (MIT Press 2000).
28  See Recommendation relating to the artist’s condition approved in the plenary ses-
sion 37a of UNESCO (27 October 1980).
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towards so-called ‘consumer welfare maximization’, which is essentially un-
derstood as lower prices, with some conditions added.29 In addition, the num-
ber of competitors required for competition to technically take place in any 
market sector has almost become irrelevant, as the motto protect competi-
tion, not competitors has been transformed by antitrust authorities into reg-
ulatory axiom,30 in which legality is nowadays basically decided by measuring 
so-called economic efficiencies. 
This policy approach impacts world market structures, and thus world pro-
duction and distribution of goods and services by giving legal preference to 
large-scale business activity generally, and thus also in relation to the cultural 
sector. As cultural diversity does not have any legal meaning under this policy 
approach which is diffused around the globe in a variety of regulatory forms, 
antitrust authorities have not adopted any significant enforcement action in 
the benefit of small and medium producers and distributors of culture vis-à-
vis the practices of larger competitors. In short, the very legal idea of cultur-
al diversity in both society and market -as it stands in international instru-
ments- is still at odds with domestic and global antitrust policies.31
In this context, the policy strategies of some culture ministers and proactive 
critics may perhaps help rebalance the position of diversity within these reg-
ulatory structures in the long term. The convention on cultural diversity part-
ly owes its existence to the international network on cultural policy (INCP), 
originally devised by ministers of culture to counteract services liberalization 
in the cultural sector within the first round of post-WTO negotiations. This 
global inter-ministerial network was, in turn, supported and advised by the 
international network for cultural diversity (INCD),32 a strong civil society 
29  For a comment see J. Brodley, ‘Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress’, 62 New York University Law Review (1987): 1035-
1036.
30  See Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294, 320 (1962).
31  See in particular E. Fox. ‘We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors’, 26 
World Competition 149 (2003): 149-165.
32  The Canadian cultural community was a central influence in the process. For the ini-
tial proposals see New Strategies for Culture and Trade: Canadian Culture in the Global 
World, SAGIT/Cultural industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (Feb-
ruary 1999). See also, I. Bernier & H. Ruiz Fabri, Evaluation of the Legal Feasibility of an 
International Instrument Governing Cultural Diversity (Quebec 2002).
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coalition sufficiently well organized to end up presenting its own ‘Proposed 
convention on cultural diversity’ to UNESCO.33 For example, the pressures of 
the leaders and representatives of European culture during the GATS 2000 
negotiations led the EU DG Trade not to accept service liberalization requests 
in the cultural sector within the GATS negotiating framework, and not to 
make any liberalization offer within such negotiations.34 
In fact, the so-called European cultural exception consisted precisely of this, 
some years before, during the Uruguay Round -ie. not making services lib-
eralization offers in the audiovisual sector-,35 whereas the United States re-
fused to recognize the special cultural nature - read cultural exception- of 
audiovisual services.36 To paraphrase Voon, the GATT contracting parties 
agreed to disagree on this.37 From then on, the European Union has failed 
to listen to the continuous demands and requests of the United States to im-
prove access of their industries to the European audiovisual market (cine-
ma and television restrictions).38 However, this defensive strategy inside the 
WTO cannot easily be played by less powerful WTO Members. Thus, evident-
ly, this attitude leaves multiple developing countries alone in protecting their 
cultural diversity against the intense pressures of an USTR aiming to improve 
market access for audiovisual products and services. 
33  See Proposed Convention on Cultural Diversity (15 January 2003).
34  For the revised text of the European offer see TN/S/O/EEC/Rev.1, Communication 
from the European Communities and its Member States, Conditional Revised Offer (29 
June 2005).
35  On the concept of cultural exception and its implication in domestic and global public 
policies see J. Farchy, La fin de l’exception culturelle? (CNRS 1999) and B. Gournay, Ex-
ception culturelle et mondialisation (Presse de Science 2002).
36  See J. Croome, Reshaping the world trading system: a history, op.cit.p.328, as well 
as the WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Audiovisual Services: Background Note by the 
Secretariat, S/C/W/40 (15 June 1998).
37  See T. Voon, Cultural products and the World Trade Organization (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2008) at 5 and 249.
38  See Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1(2001), Ministerial Declaration of Doha (14 No-
vember 2001). For an explanation of the point of departure and context of negotiations see 
P. Messerlin, S. Siwek & E. Cocq, The Audiovisual Services Sector in the GATS Negotia-
tions (American Enterprise Institute Press 2004) and Ch. Graber, ‘Audiovisual Media and 
the Law of the WTO’, Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity (Schulthess 2004) at 15-65.
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Future world polity and markets
Eunomia is the word for the old Greek practice of imagining good societies. 
Markets and states are powerful social inventions and continue to be among 
the most useful means of organizing human gatherings. A proper balance be-
tween open markets and social states can arguably deliver optimum models 
for organizing social life, or at least feasible second bests, until something 
better is invented. After all, through open markets we are able to produce 
best price and quality goods and services; through social states we are able 
to secure safety nets for all, and a measure of fairness. The world trading 
system analyzed in these pages has to be framed in the context of this back-
ground, as a critical architecture of global governance providing an effective 
legal framework for the management of open markets. Notwithstanding its 
inner flaws and contradictions, some of which are mentioned in this book, 
its legal infrastructures have made a long-lasting contribution to prosperity, 
reducing poverty and raising standards of living, unmatched by any previous 
moment in human experience. Last but not least, the world trading system 
is also one of the best designed treaty-based regimes in history as well as 
from the perspective of comparative international law; thereby also signaling 
a capacity for managing open markets for the better which has not yet been 
sufficiently chartered. 
However, it would be reasonable to argue that the restrictive rationalities of 
both its insider network and rulebook should be more properly balanced. To 
paraphrase Picciotto, there are wide-ranging policy debates about both the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the emerging system of global governance;1 
and that certainly fully applies to the WTO regime. Trade equals market, and 
markets require states and thus a wide variety of public policies. However, the 
rulebook regulating open markets is delinked from some things (e.g. sustain-
ability, antitrust, etc) while paradoxically linked to others (i.e. propertization 
1  S. Picciotto, Regulating corporate, op.cit.p.79.
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of intangibles). The regulatory spectrum of the WTO notably advanced along 
these lines, giving more voice to business than to parliaments and non-trade 
agencies. In principle, rebalancing global governance within open markets 
requires the construction of higher mediating institutions −mediating open 
markets with other policy values− as well as bridges which effectively connect 
international regimes in order to operate jointly within an improved overar-
ching legal framework. Probably, the policy avenue of so-called international 
regimes, so dear to functionalism -in the sense of decomposable hierarchies 
governing specific issue areas and designed to keep out the public, as well as 
officials from other branches in order to apprehend and manage social life-2 
would do well to be reengineered. 
The world trading system is entrenched within the natural sets of relation-
ships between market and society. In longitudinal terms, the best account 
of the enduring and frequently fraught struggle between market and society 
were masterly portrayed by Polanyi time ago.3 Building on that seminal ex-
planation, Ruggie encapsulated the paradigm of so-called embedded liberal-
ism, as a positive and influential narrative depicting how the capitalist coun-
tries ventured to reconcile the efficiency of markets with the social state, at a 
moment in history in which there was a wider policy consensus which con-
sidered the social state needed for open markets to exist and function proper-
ly:4 the world trading system -as it stood prior to the Uruguay Round- was 
the distilled policy expression of this grand bargain -embedded liberalism- 
for peaceful post-war global governance. However, while world liberalization 
steadily advanced to historical levels of deep economic interdependence, key 
developments in global governance have taken place; some of them having 
a strong bearing on world policy direction, notable among these being the 
fall of the Berlin Wall as well as several major economic crises together with 
the rise of the ideology of market fundamentalism. Naturally, in recent years, 
international economic law and policy have taken a rather different approach 
to that of the embedded liberalism originally devised in the post-war global 
2  See R. Keohane & J. Nye, ‘The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the World 
Trade Organization: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy’, Efficiency, equity and legitima-
cy: the multilateral trading system at the Millenium (Brookin Institution Press 2001) at 
264.
3  K. Polanyi,The Great Transformation, op.cit.
4  J. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism 
in the Postwar Economic Order’, 36 International Organization (1982): 379–415.
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order. What Ruggie says today when revisiting that notion is, literally, that a 
fundamental recalibration of the public-private sector balance is taking place, 
both domestically and on a world-scale.5 
But, what is that recalibration about? Robert Howse is one of the observers 
who has most clearly captured such recalibration.6 As he explains, through 
embedded liberalism, trade liberalization was entrenched within a political 
commitment to the progressive, interventionist welfare state, a view broadly 
shared by the major players in the world trading system of that era. The trust 
that emerged from this shared vision produced acceptance of the differenc-
es in approach to the mixed economy and welfare state. In short, under the 
embedded liberalism bargain, differences in approach to the mixed economy 
were to be managed and thus generally accepted. In Howse´s own words, 
there was a notion that gains for the winners should allow to fully compensate 
the losers from removal of trade restrictions, while still netting an aggregate 
welfare gain; in principle, and according to this conception -based on Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency-, no one needed be worse off in the end: the existence of a 
regulatory welfare state to take care of the interests of the losers through the 
use of non-trade policy tools -that are less costly to domestic welfare than 
trade restrictions- was assumed by all actors involved in that grand policy 
bargain. 
However, following the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, it became common-
place to assume that world trade liberalization needed some fine-tuning in 
order to maintain the grand bargain; under these economic pressures, indus-
trial policies began to be seen as undercover beggar-my-neighbor solutions 
for declining industrial sectors: as Howse frames it, a protectionist cheating 
on the open trade bargain; and then came the economic conservative rev-
olution, together with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which provided for 
market-based perspectives generally, a strong critique of statist economic 
management, and thus offering a radically different outlook and prescription 
for the world.
Needless to say, the dominance of so-called market fundamentalism in the 
5  J. Ruggie, ‘Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: the corporate connection’, Taming 
Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (Polity Press 2003) at 93–130.
6  R.Howse, “From Politics to Technocracy, op.cit.pp.98–99.
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1980s, conventionally labeled the Washington consensus, was wrapped up 
in economistic triumphalist chants and translated to international organiza-
tions, including the GATT, by close knit cadres of technocrats and experts. In 
this context, the grand bargain of trade liberalization was no longer framed in 
terms of relative adequacy of the scope for trade adjustment. Both inside and 
outside the GATT, domestic adjustment policies were portrayed in rather a 
different light: in essence, domestic adjustment policies were considered not 
only as legally but morally questionable interventionist measures, politically 
conceived as structurally biased in the benefit of local rent-seeking constitu-
encies. 
The new paradigm in the making was to be expanded through most regulato-
ry networks of global governance across which the GATT already performed 
a nodal function. In this context, the new policy narrative for rewriting the 
rules of the game for trade during the decade of the 80s shifted the perspec-
tive to consider a greater variety of old domestic policies as interventionist /
protectionist trade barriers. The new motto for this policy quest was distilled 
in the term ‘market access’: societies are equated with markets, and foreign 
(read global) companies are to have a right to access or enter those markets 
-society as market-, if necessary even reforming law and policies less obvi-
ously related to trade, or even totally unrelated. Within this narrative, mul-
tiple legal and policy measures could be expediently reframed as a barrier 
to market access; which is what essentially has happened over the last three 
decades. 
This transformative agenda got on board the Uruguay Round and, playing 
along with the historical context, became an essential part of its core: thus 
resulting in the expanded disciplines contained within WTO annexes, which 
we now indefatigably visit, revisit and dissect in order to venture whether this 
or that policy measures are legal or illegal in the new world of post-Uruguay 
Round public policies. Obviously, the logic of the trade-offs involved within 
this multi-state bargain has successfully enhanced market access worldwide. 
However, that package deal now entrenched worldwide is also no longer able 
to sustain the old embedded liberalism bargain, as the new WTO rulebook 
has more ambiguous if not weaker welfare effects (i.e. TRIPS) in contrast to 
the traditional GATT disciplines, namely those reducing tariffs, quotas, and 
discriminatory domestic regulation. As a result, not only has the policy dis-
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tance between developed and developing countries increased but also that 
between both critics and advocates of open markets. In consequence, the 
policy space and momentumneeded to re-embed any meaningful global new 
deal is currently lacking. 
In an interdependent world, moreover, conventional understandings of mar-
kets and states still require some fine tuning. As Picciotto sharply observes, 
despite the complex nature of the transformations of both the political and 
the economic spheres, and of the interactions between states and markets, 
mainstream accounts since the 1970s have remained confined within simple 
concepts of the state and the market, and have been particularly biased to-
wards focusing on the failures and limits of states; as he explains, the notion 
of state action as being generally in the public interest has been deeply under-
mined, from both left and right; conversely, however, the concept of the mar-
ket is used much less critically, by theorists of both persuasions. However, and 
paraphrasing Picciotto, the critics against market fundamentalism offer little 
basis for understanding the growth of regulation and of networks of global 
cooperation and coordination that have in fact accompanied the long road 
of international liberalization, and which play a major role in shaping global 
change. Last but not least, many of these critics are still indulging in senseless 
and exhausting shadow-boxing against a non-existent deregulation.7 
In short, and as Braithwaite also frames it, those who believe we are in an era 
of neoliberalism –meaning a hollowing out of the state, privatization and de-
regulation– are mistaken, we are in a rather more complex and hybrid stage, 
which fairly recently and somewhat tentatively has been coined as regulatory 
capitalism.8 Leaving aside whether regulatory capitalism properly describes 
the core changes taking place at the present time, it would be fair to con-
sider it a potentially workable term for approaching the global transforma-
tions taking place with regard to markets and states. For David Levi-Faur, 
for example, regulation is both a constitutive element of capitalism −as the 
framework that enables markets− and the tool that moderates and socializes 
7  S. Picciotto, Regulating global corporate, op.cit.p.76.
8  See D. Levi-Faur, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’, 598 The Annals of 
the American Academy (March 2005): 12–34, D.Levi-Faur (ed.), ‘Varieties of regulatory 
capitalism’, 16 Governance (2006): 363–366 and J. Braithwaite, Regulatory capitalism: 
How it works, ideas for making it work better (Edward Elgard 2008).
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it.9 Whether or not the backbone of this transformation is capitalism or reg-
ulation, it is certainly evident that there is a global symbiosis between the two 
which deserves greater attention, particularly from elected policymakers. In 
a world characterized by open markets and increasingly complex regulatory 
networks, state and markets are not fully separated and distinct entities. As 
Joel Paul explains, the premise that the market and the state are autonomous, 
rational and homogenous actors is plainly erroneous: 
‘The state’s interference in the market and the market’s engagement in the state call into 
question the false premise of the market’s autonomy. More to the point, they cast doubt on 
our understanding about the relationship of the state and the market and its consequences 
for economic integration’.10
In this context, following Underhill’s insight, the relations between states and 
markets are probably best understood as a condominium: an explanatory 
model suggesting that states and markets are part of ‘the same integrated 
ensemble of governance’.11 In this radically different scenario -a state-market 
world condominium-, it is easy to argue with Picciotto that the policy debates 
about both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the emerging systems of global 
governance, unfortunately, have too often been conducted in the simplistic 
terms of a state-market dyad, and only slowly have they begun to come to 
terms with these more complex realities of the twenty-first century.12 
A longitudinal big picture for these changes is offered by Braithwaite in a 
snapshot: as the Australian scholar puts it, the very long-term transitions 
since feudal structures fell to incipient capitalist institutions moved from a 
police economy, to an unregulable 19th century liberal economy to the provid-
er state economy of recent decades and, now, to regulatory capitalism: as part 
of this profound historical transformation, markets have tended to progres-
sively become more vigorous in fits and starts, across all of these transitions, 
as has the regulation of their externalities; and in this case, not only have 
9  See D. Levi-Faur, ‘The Global Diffusion, op.cit.pp. 12–32.
10  J. Paul, ‘Free Trade, Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous Market Fallacy’, 1 
Columbia Journal of European Law (1995): 62.
11  G. Underhill, ‘States, markets and governance for emerging market economies: Pri-
vate interests, the public good and the legitimacy of the development process’, 79 Interna-
tional Affairs (2003): 765.
12  S. Picciotto, Regulating corporate, op.cit.
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markets, states, and state regulation become more formidable, but also non-
state regulation by a wide variety of actors, thus opening the floor to a new 
world of private–public hybridity.13 
Be that as it may, the litmus test for both the efficiency and legitimacy of the 
evolving system of global governance is probably dependent on a mixture of 
thriving markets and social rights. Pascal Lamy clearly described the chal-
lenge by imagining a so-called ’Geneva consensus’. In one of his last public 
speeches as Director General of the WTO, this practitioner of globalization 
recalled what some people think: that the successful opening of markets re-
quires solid social policies to redistribute wealth or provide safeguards to the 
people whose living conditions are disrupted by global economic interdepen-
dence;14 in his words, it is not only the legitimacy of global governance but the 
very credibility of modern democracies that is at risk if an increasing number 
of citizens perceive that the architectures of global governance managed by 
their representatives simply promote economic interdependence while not 
handling subsequent imbalances impacting daily life.15 
The challenge, however, is not only that of the eventual feasibility of devel-
oping this imagined consensus; reasonably, the development of consensus, 
if any, probably has little chance of being pursued in the vicinity of the Place 
des Nations, in Geneva, particularly once the so-called Washington consen-
sus has finally gone for good: the United States and the European Union may 
have lost that historical opportunity, in part by legitimizing and artificial-
ly sustaining such a simplistic and restrictive ‘consensus’ for three decades 
already, and thus promoting a fixed set of ill-conceived recipes around the 
world. As Virgilio Zapatero has explained, consensus is a way of taking deci-
sions and doing things based on dialogue and transaction.16
In consequence, whether it is possible to develop a new consensus now also 
from the East -and thus from Beijing- is only a question that time will tell. In 
13  J. Braithwaite, Regulatory capitalism, op.cit.pp. 26 –27.
14  P. Lamy, ‘Lamy calls for mindset change to align trade and human rights’, WTO | 
Speeches and statements (13 January 2010).
15  P. Lamy, ‘Lamy calls for strenghening system of global governance’, WTO | Speeches 
and statements (15 March 2010).
16  V. Zapatero, El arte de legislar (Tecnos 2009).
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any event, in the current absence of a strong world polity and demos, the ques-
tion to consider seriously is not only the role that elected representatives from 
parliamentary democracies would play in developing consensus for the world. 
In addition, it is no accident that corporations already have a bearing on global 
rulemaking generally. As the way the world evolves is connected to who imag-
ines its forms and functions, these challenges need to be seriously considered 
in our social equations. In any case, a system of global governance managed by 
public and private technocracies is not the most promising of all worlds.
Policy is not spontaneously self-generated; it is defined by people. The tran-
sition from government to governance, as Picciotto has explained, implies a 
lack of a clear hierarchy of norms, a blurring of distinctions between hard and 
soft law, and a fragmentation of public functions entailing a resurgence of 
technocracy.17 In this context, world market and state global elites are strong 
drivers currently shaping our world; a hybrid global technocracy not inci-
dentally operating under pervasive public-private regulatory partnerships. 
By performing their evolving tasks and activities within expert rule-based 
systems such as WTO, these globalized technocracies define and redefine 
the state of play. The present day regulatory networks in which they manage 
global governance and are empowered are clearly not without flaws and con-
tradictions; not to mention dubious lobbying, as global corporate capitalism 
suggests across the blurred frontiers between general and special interest. 
Thus, it is not always easy to see on whose behalf the technocrat is speaking in 
some global policy omissions and decisions. Furthermore, their performance 
is not only increasingly difficult to supervise but also to track by publicly 
elected representatives and civil society alike, as the depth and breadth of 
regulatory networks within global governance has grown enormously within 
the quest for economic interdependence. 
Only by building a stronger world polity and demos will open markets be sus-
tainable. World policy coherence requires rebalancing open markets with in-
creased social cohesion and participation. Evidently, the regulatory networks 
managing world exchange today cannot promote any meaningful measure of 
policy coherence, never mind Eunomia. In this context, the system of glob-
al governance can be reengineered, but this inevitably requires investing in 
17  S. Picciotto, ‘International Transformations of the Capitalist State’, 43 Antipode 1 
(2011): 87–107
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world regime-building as well as rejuvenating the grand bargain of embedded 
liberalism to deliver world social cohesion. This can only be done by exacting 
extra revenue from international free movement of goods, services and cap-
ital. In principle, this rebalance should not be impossible to deliver for the 
elected representatives currently in charge; after all, society is a continuous 
rebalancing experiment. 
196
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